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This study will empirically analyse whether the Mental Health Act of 1973 had 
an impact on sentencing practices for murder and murder related crimes at the Cape 
Supreme Court from 1964-1980. It contextualises the various discussions and debates 
that were taking place in the judiciary and mental health fields, and demonstrates that the 
said Act had little significant impact on sentencing practices after 1975, when the Act 
was finally ascended into law. Furthermore, analysis of the courtroom testimony not only 
reveals how debates on criminology, psychiatry, psychology and politics unfolded during 
the period under investigation, but it is argued that these very debates, rather than any 
legislation, had a more significant impact on the sentencing practices for the crime of 
murder in the Cape Supreme Court.   
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Hierdie studie sal op ŉ empiriese wyse die Wet op Geestesgesondheid van 1973 analiseer om 
te bepaal of die wetgewing van 1973 wel ŉ impak gehad het op vonnisopleggingspraktyke vir 
moord en moord verwante misdade by the Hooggeregshof in Kaapstad tussen 1964-1980. Dit 
sal die verskeie gesprekke en debatte wat plaasgevind het onder lede van die regbank, en  in 
geestesgesondheidsvelde kontekstualiseer, en addisioneel sal hierdie studie demonstreer hoe 
die wetgeweing van 1973 eintlik ŉ minimale impak gehad het op vonnisopleggingspraktyke 
na 1975, toe die wetgewing uiteindelik as wet aanvaar was. Verdere analise van getuienisse 
van die hof wys nie net hoe debatte in Kriminologie, Psigiatrie, Sielkunde en in die politici 
ontvou het nie, maar dat die einste debatte ŉ meer beduidende invloed gehad het op 
vonnisopleggingspraktyke as enige ander wetgewing op moord en moord verwante misdade 
by die Hooggeregshof in Kaapstad. 
 
Sleutelwoorde: Wet op Geestesgesondheid van 1973, Strafproseswet van 1977, Moord, 
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On 6 September 1966, Prime Minister Hendrik Frensch Verwoerd was stabbed four 
times in the neck and chest by Dimitri Tsafendas.1 This sent shock waves throughout South 
Africa and prompted a variety of commissions of enquiry into the murder. Of particular 
importance was the debate around creating greater cohesion between psychiatrists, 
psychologists and jurists in criminal cases where the accused was considered insane. In the 
wake of Verwoerd’s assassination, the government decided to review the outdated 1916 
Mental Disorders Act, effectively changing how those deemed mentally defective would be 
considered and punished within the formal judiciary. The 1973 Mental Health Act was 
eventually implemented in 1975. However, changes needed to be made to the Criminal 
Procedure Act of 1955 to ensure that those deemed mentally unfit would be sentenced 
accordingly. The Criminal Procedure Act was changed in 1977, two years after the Mental 
Health Act was implemented. It is within this period of debate and legislative transition that 
this study is located.   
Through a systematic investigation of the court records from the Cape Supreme Court 
from 1964-1976, and a review of the law reports from 1977-1980, this dissertation 
investigated the sentencing practices of those who appeared before the courts on the charge 
of murder and related offences. In so doing, courtroom discussions and professional 
testimonies reflected the evolving debates on criminology, psychiatry, psychology and 
politics during the period under investigation. Questions arise as to whether sentencing 
practices changed over time, if so under what conditions and essentially whether this was 
due to the changes in the abovementioned legislation or some other criteria.  
 
1.1 Literature Review 
Effectively assessing the impact of the Mental Health Act of 1973 on sentencing 
practices at the Cape Supreme Court requires the intricate analysis of a variety of different, 
but related, fields: the judicial, the legislative and mental health arms. The state of crime in 
                                                             
1  H. Laurenson & S. Swartz: “The Professionalization of Psychology within the Apartheid State 1948-1978,” 




the Cape, notions on criminology in the 1960s to 1980s, sentencing practices in the courts, 
judges’ proclivities, the assassination of Hendrik Verwoerd in 1966 and the ensuing debates 
on how to amalgamate a variety of different approaches to effectively consider mental illness 
in the sentencing practices is a necessity. This requires contemplating mental health 
strategies in the country as well as the inherent racism attached to mental health debates. 
These debates also had to negotiate growing resistance to mental health reforms, particularly 
from the Church of Scientology. In negotiating these domains, effective change could be 
implemented within mental health legislation, as was seen in 1975. 
For a study such as this, it is important to contemplate the level of crime, especially 
murder, in South Africa. Medical doctor and scholar of crime, Louis Franklin Freed’s 
dissertation “Crime in South Africa” explains the complex nature of crime in the 1950s. 
According to Freed, a criminal is a: 
Frustrated person emerging in society as a product of disorganizing forces 
variously arising from his psycho-somatic personality or his multiform social 
environment, and conducing finally to a form of maladjustive behaviour which 
threatens the safety, security, and the happiness of other persons in the 
community.2  
This already gives a sense that a criminal is a product of both nature and nurture. This 
proves instrumental in subsequent debates about mental health and the criminal during the 
period in question.   
Freed’s study included an analysis of crime in the city of Cape Town. Cape Town, 
as a subject, is unique due to the predominantly Coloured3 population which he argues was 
largely responsible for the high incidence of crime in the city. He argues that in almost every 
Coloured district of the Cape Peninsula, knife attacks, robbery, murder, rape, car-stealing, 
soliciting, pimping, and other illicit activities are the “order of the day”. He quotes South 
African writer Hugh MacKinnon: 
The “skollies”4 of today are the roughest, toughest, juvenile thugs in the world. 
Primed with Brandy and dagga, and armed with revolvers, strap-slung 
automatics, bayonets, home-made daggers, bicycle ‘pepper bombs,’ they 
terrorize Europeans, wealthy Malays, prosperous Indians, and Natives alike. 
These adolescent killers are no longer the ragged hoodlums that they used to be, 
for today they have taken to wearing smarter clothes, and they are affecting a sort 
                                                             
2 L. F. Freed: Crime in South Africa: an integralist approach. p. 3. 
3 The formal racial categories of the time have been maintained within this dissertation as they were pivotal to 
the discussions around changing legislations and perceived notions of criminality in South Africa during this 
period.  




of tough-guy American slang borrowed from the films. Violence is the only code 
they know. They go all out for money, and to get it they strike in the dark with 
everything they have got. They have no respect for life, and no respect for age, 
sex, race, colour, or creed.5 
He argues that this level of gangsterism was the result of two centuries of hatred, 
bitterness, and inferiority in the face of all other races. He also attributes much of this 
criminal behaviour to environmental factors such as poor parenting, inadequate housing, 
poverty and the abuse of substances such as cannabis and alcohol.6 Many of these were 
considered mitigating circumstances during sentencing in the period under investigation.  
Of particular importance to these environmental factors is the Group Areas Act. The 
Group Areas Act’s origin lies within the white population’s growing fear of the black and 
Coloured urban working class. This, together with the Nationalist government’s commitment 
to apartheid, formed part of the government’s reasoning for the act. Additionally, the white 
trader’s fears of competition, falling inner city property values, ghetto overcrowding, and 
deteriorating housing conditions can also be attributed to the reasoning for the Act. It has 
been argued that the sanitation syndrome was simply a ruse by the authorities to segregate 
and remove certain races from urban spaces. As a consequence, these forced removals 
contributed to rising crime statistics in the Cape.7 
After the 1948 election won political power for Afrikaner workers, farmers, and 
entrepreneurs, it was deemed that the physical removal of all non-white people from the 
cities would serve their interests well. It began with the tightening of the Pass Laws and an 
inquiry into the ‘Ghetto’8 Act. This resulted in a parliamentary report in which the framework 
for spatial apartheid were demarcated in the final two chapters of the report.9  
According to Don Pinnock, given the political, economic and ideological framework 
within which the removals took place in Cape Town, social disaster was inevitable. As the 
familiar social landmarks in the close-knit communities of the old city were ripped apart it 
resulted in a whole culture disintegrating. These removals forced individual people to the 
Cape Flats, but not whole neighbourhoods. These close knit neighbourhoods were ripped 
apart during the forced removals. These changes brought with them psychological 
difficulties and skewed coping behaviour. Notably, these removals also had an impact on 
                                                             
5 L. F. Freed: Crime in South Africa: an integralist approach, p. 138. 
6 Ibid., pp. 139-142. 
7 D. Davis & M. Slabbert (ed.): Crime and Power in South Africa: Critical studies in criminology, pp. 22-23. 
8 Asiatic Land Tenure Act of 1946. This act provided for the racial segregation of Indian business and residence.  




marital relations. The divorce and marital desertion rates rose. Parent-child relationships also 
became problematic – often because of the father’s sense of inadequacy in his new 
environment. Accompanying this was a rise in promiscuity, alcohol abuse, and drug 
trafficking. More children were on the streets with nothing to do.10 
Whereas Don Pinnock and Louis Franklin Freed focused their criminological studies 
on the environment which breeds criminality, legal scholar Martin Chanock focused on 
South African legal culture, and the various discourses about law and how they relate to each 
other.11 Some of these discourses include crime, criminals, criminality and penology. 
Understanding legal culture depends on how these various discourses about law relate to 
each other. According to Chanock, how we frame them is pivotal. This entails an analysis of 
scientific and practical areas of knowledge and activities which depend on a structured 
imagination of selves and others. This is of interest in understanding excessive adherence to 
the law, or legalism, in a society influenced by colonial thinking in which criminal justice 
can be influenced by racial, or indeed class, discriminations.12 
Chanock argues that at the beginning of the 20th century in South Africa, it appeared 
that legal preoccupations, discourses, methods, and techniques were separated from debates 
on criminology and penology. The institution of white rule in South Africa had an impact on 
the criminological and penological agenda. In essence, this was a grab for power based on 
racial doctrine. While both ideology and institutions were developed within the context of 
the struggle by the new white state to control blacks during urbanization, the specific debates 
about crime had to draw upon other international discourses which were more liberal and 
egalitarian, in principle.13 It is in this ideological transition that certain features become 
apparent.  
As in many British colonies, the framework of criminology in South Africa was 
imported from criminological ideas in Britain, Europe, and North America. These imported 
external discourses prescribed how law should unravel in local contexts. Within criminology 
in South Africa, there existed a constant battle between these imported discourses, local 
needs and the realities of legal precedence, or deviation from prescribed law, as seen in 
jurisprudence. The framework, concepts and procedures of law were imported from English 
                                                             
10 D. Davis & M. Slabbert (ed.): Crime and Power in South Africa: Critical studies in criminology, pp. 29-30. 
11 M. Chanock: The Making of a South African Legal Culture 1902-1936: Fear, Favour and Prejudice. 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001. 
12 Ibid., p. 61. 




law, Roman law and Roman-Dutch law.14 It is here that criminology was adapted to suit 
local needs. 
Legislation, however, did not go unchallenged and unchanged over time. This is 
clearly reflected in both the changes to the mental health acts as well as criminal procedure. 
These changes have a long and complicated history. Chanock draws on examples of the first 
adaptions of “scientific” criminology in South Africa and to its connections with 
anthropological thought on race at the turn of the 20th century. Criminologists in South Africa 
did not attempt to understand the black criminal, but attempted to construct an essentialist 
picture of the black criminal. In essence, the construction was intrinsically linked to racial 
separateness.15 This dictated how the purported criminal should be punished.  
Internationally, the aim of criminology was to offer a scientific understanding of 
crime. In the local context of South Africa, however, it justified a form of covert oppression 
closely related to the political context of racial preoccupation. However, the profession was 
also concerned with understanding criminals and “deviancy” of individuals. Initially this was 
contemplated in a pathological framework. Deviancy was initially explained in terms of 
brain defect. The categories which also permeated in legal procedures – such as moral 
imbecile, moral insanity, degeneracy and feeble-mindedness – were adopted from psychiatry 
and become basic components in criminology. These categories overlapped with 
contemporary anthropological debates, preoccupied with clearly identifying varying levels 
of intelligence between the various races. It became increasingly difficult to separate inherent 
criminality from the fundamental physical, mental and cultural characteristics attached to 
notions of savagery and blackness: if all criminals were like savages then all savages were 
criminals. Much criminological writing found it hard to consider black criminals as 
individual actors responding to situations as a consequence of their environments or history, 
as suggested by Pinnock and Freed above.16 This posed problems for a criminal law 
organized around the notion of “guilty intention” in relation to specific acts. This was a 
necessity in passing the appropriate sentence.17  
                                                             
14 M. Chanock: The Making of a South African Legal Culture 1902-1936: Fear, Favour and Prejudice, p. 63. 
15 Ibid., pp. 63-64. 
16 L. F. Freed: Crime in South Africa: an integralist approach, 1963 & D. Pinnock: “Breaking the Web: gangs 
and family structure in Cape Town” in D. Davis & M. Slabbert (ed.): Crime and Power in South Africa: Critical 
studies in criminology, pp. 29-30. 




Typically, criminologists in South Africa argued that white offenders were “weak” 
or “defective”, but they could be rescued from their situation, particularly if they could be 
separated from blacks; as if criminality was infectious, it could spread like a disease up the 
racial hierarchy. Conversely, arguments were made that the reverse process was also a 
possibility. These notions were based on the stereotype of the easily corruptible, gullible, 
mystified “tribal innocent” who came to the city in search of work. Naturally these arguments 
were promoted to justify separation of the races during this period.   
According to criminologist and scholar Dirk van Zyl Smit, early South African 
criminologists developed an intellectual basis for their work during the course of their 
practice, but they too were products of their environment. Two of the most notable 
criminologists of the 1930s, for example, Geoff Cronjé and W. A. Willemse, both had 
prolific careers, but both had attachments to the growing Afrikaner intellectual circles as 
nationalism grew in the country. Additionally, both had studied in Europe during a period 
when Nationalism was on the rise and returned to South Africa where they became notable 
and influential academics in the field.18 
Both Cronjé and Willemse supported Afrikaner Nationalism throughout their 
academic careers.19 With his involvement in the Volkskongress,20 Cronjé only approached 
problems of crime through this lens. His assessment of cultural and sociological factors 
served as a foundation for his sociological justification of apartheid.21 Willemse’s major 
contribution to the field on criminology came with the publication of Kriminologie22 in 1933, 
with C.I. Rademeyer. It was the first South African text on criminology. Kriminologie was 
to a large extent a summary of Willemse’s earlier work on abnormal psychology. It explained 
in the earlier chapters a strong hereditary theory of criminal behaviour. A chapter on “Social 
Crime Problems of the Union of South Africa” set the tone for the future of South African 
criminology in the 1930s until its heyday in the 1980s.23 It is, therefore, through the lens of 
                                                             
18 D. van Zyl Smit: “Adopting and Adapting criminological ideas: Criminology and Afrikaner Nationalism in 
South Africa”, Contemporary Crises, (13), 1989, pp. 229-232. 
19 For additional reading on what van Zyl Smit refers to as “Afrikaner Criminology” see D. van Zyl Smit: 
“Criminological Ideas and the South African transition”, The British Journal of Criminology, (39), (2), 1999, pp. 
198-215. 
20 In 1934 he attended the Volkskongres in Kimberly. The aim of this congress was to discuss the Carnegie report 
on the poor white problem in South Africa. This congress was of great significance to Afrikaner Nationalism, 
and for the emergence of a specific unit to deal with Afrikaner social work and criminology.  
21 D. van Zyl Smit: “Adopting and Adapting criminological ideas: Criminology and Afrikaner Nationalism in 
South Africa”, Contemporary Crises, (13), 1989, p. 233. 
22 Translation: criminology. 




growing Afrikaner nationalism that much of the criminological debates of the 1940s and 
1950s proliferated.24 
According to Chanock, the discussions around criminology fed into the insecurities 
of white society which sought the best “science” to justify its policies. His chapter on 
“Prisons and Penology”25 gives a clear and concise view of sentencing during the early 
formation of South Africa’s legal culture when, in essence, punishment was in the form of 
retribution rather than rehabilitation. To illustrate the difference in sentencing practices in 
South Africa, Chanock uses the once prevalent sentence of lashing as an example. During 
the period of 1911-1914 about 4 000 people per year received a sentence of either cuts or 
lashes. The average cut or lash per person was about nine. The former British colonies of the 
Cape and Natal26 relied heavily on the use of corporal punishment in the early period of their 
existence. This is not surprising as common thoughts at the time suggested that the non-
white races, in particular, would only learn from their mistakes when corporal punishment 
was administered. White offenders would rarely receive lashes and when they did, they 
received far fewer in comparison.27  
The fluid nature of sentencing is also reflected in a 1914 petition by the prison Board 
of Visitors of the Transvaal who complained that prison sentences, especially in what the 
Board referred to as the “very numerous cases of culpable homicide among Africans”, was 
being arbitrarily passed down. The next year the same Board of Visitors drew attention to 
the disparities between judges in sentencing of cases involving violence against white 
women and children by Africans. They noticed that the sentence for rape was the severest in 
Natal which used the longest prison sentence and lashes, with the Free State coming in 
second. However, it was the lowest in the Cape. The Board of Visitors of the Transvaal had 
received complaints from men in prison where some had been more severely punished for 
the same crime as their fellow convicts.28 Here the independent workings of the different 
courts throughout the country, the freedom of judges to deviate from prescribed sentences 
as well as the more lenient reputation of the Cape courts is illuminated. Albie Sachs suggests 
that the courts of all four provinces deliberately rejected dominant racial attitudes.
 
Cape 
                                                             
24 D. van Zyl Smit: “Adopting and Adapting criminological ideas: Criminology and Afrikaner Nationalism in 
South Africa”, Contemporary Crises, (13), 1989, p. 239.  
25 M. Chanock: “Prisons and Penology” in The Making of South African Legal Culture 1902-1930: Fear, Favour 
and Prejudice. 
26 In 1918, the Director of Prisons dubbed the province, the ‘lashing province.’ 
27 M. Chanock: The Making of South African Legal Culture 1902-1930: Fear, Favour and Prejudice, p. 104. 




liberal politics, however, led to comparatively more liberal Cape court. In order to effectively 
gauge the impact of mental health legislation on sentencing practices thus necessitated a 
detailed investigation in a judicial system less influenced by racial rhetoric.29 
While Chanock illuminates the fluid nature of sentencing and how judges can deviate 
from prescribed norms in sentencing, historian Robert Turrell in his book White Mercy 
focused on the most severe of sentence, the death penalty. The argument that Turrell makes 
regarding the death penalty concerns racial equality: black men charged with the crime of 
murder were more likely to be sentenced to death than their white counterparts. This was 
particularly evident if they committed a crime against a white person. Turrell quotes Joe 
Slovo, the Minister of Housing in the first post-apartheid government. Slovo refers to his 
experience as an advocate in the 1950s: 
Jerry Maritz rarely pronounced the death penalty, because as Judge President he 
saw to it that the bulk of the trials that came before him involved a black accused 
and a black victim.30 
Justice Maritz once interrupted Slovo in the flow of his argument to suggest that if 
his client’s plea was changed to culpable homicide, he would not go to jail. Slovo made it 
clear that Maritz’s attitude did not stem from the belief in the abolition of the death penalty, 
but rather in his relaxed and casual attitude towards violence if it did not involve the white 
community.31 The arguments made by Slovo on race-of-victim and racial indifference to 
intra-black homicide have provided essential grist to the interpretation mills of the few South 
African scholars who have considered the question of race and the death penalty.  
Pioneer scholar in the field, Jack Simons, found a way of combining the two. For the 
first handbook of the Institute of Race Relations published in 1949, Simons published an 
extensive survey on the criminal justice system where he illustrated three arguments to show 
how the white judicial system placed a higher value on the lives of whites than blacks. Firstly, 
Simons showed there was indeed a greater probability of conviction in murder cases where 
the victim was white. The marked differences in the ratios of prosecutions to convictions 
indicate that race bias had an effect upon the courts’ decisions. It was rare for whites to be 
convicted of murder when the victim was non-white. The accused was either acquitted or 
found guilty of culpable homicide or assault. Therefore, there was a reluctance to execute 
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white offenders.32 Secondly, Simons noticed that the courts were casual about the verdict 
and lenient about the sentence when both the victim and the perpetrator were black. To quote 
Simons: “not only is less value placed upon the life of a non-European, but non-Europeans 
as a group are assumed to observe low standards of morality and self-restraint.”33 Thirdly, 
Simons pointed out that the Governor-General and the cabinet reprieved whites more easily 
and readily than non-whites after the mandatory death sentence for murder was abolished in 
1935. The statistical evidence for this belief lay in the fact that only four whites were 
executed between 1935 and 1946.34 
There is some similarity between the argument made by Simons and that made by 
Gunnar Myrdal in An American Dilemma, published in 1944. However, it is unknown 
whether Myrdal directly influenced Simons. He is not mentioned in Simon’s notes, but 
Ellison Kahn, who is a leading South African legal academic monitoring the death penalty, 
feared that in the late 1960s South Africa’s death penalty system was attracting harmful 
allegations of racial prejudice by sociologists using Myrdal’s analysis. According to Kahn, 
whites who controlled the justice system took a benevolent view of intra-racial crimes of 
Coloureds and “Bantus”35, due to the fundamentally racialistic view that they were prone to 
violence and had low levels of morality and self-restraint. Therefore, whites were to be 
treated more strictly because they were expected to maintain higher standards of behaviour 
and have greater control over their aggressive instincts.36 These points, made by Simons and 
Myrdal, are reflected in the criminal cases at the Cape Supreme Court. The coming chapters 
will grapple with this by discussing the criminal cases and the sentences accompanying them.  
Additionally, Turrell focused on the mercy reports37 and what they reflected, and 
according to him, a strong sense of essential racial difference could be derived from 
dominant white ideological discourse that marked all the reports. The “natives” were simply 
seen as different from whites. All of them were considered “primitive”. The essential 
characteristics of primitive men were that they were quick to anger and thoughtless in the 
excessive violent act they committed in a rage. Another characteristic attributed to them was 
that native men and women were more jealous than their white counterparts. A further 
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stereotype in the mercy reports was that of “the drunken coloured man”. The Cape Attorney-
General, E. W. Douglas, once told the jury that “they as men of the world, and knowing the 
habits of these coloured people, could, if they, on all facts, had any doubts whether he, when 
he killed the woman, actually intended to do so, find a verdict of guilty of culpable 
homicide.”38  
Therefore, the mercy reports reflected that white convicts were more likely to receive 
mercy and have their death sentence commuted to a lengthy prison sentence. The 
unsuccessful convicts were either hanged for deliberate or determined murder. Deliberate 
murder is the calmly contemplated, cold-blooded murder of an individual, and determined 
murder is the persistent and dangerous assault of an individual. On the one hand malice is 
something that must be considered: Did the accused make preparations, use threats, or say 
something before the assault to reveal their intention to kill? On the other hand, was malice 
implied according to how the victim was assaulted: where on the body the victim was struck, 
and what kind of weapon was used, and how many times was the victim struck, are all factors 
taken into consideration. According to Turrell, Coloureds, Indians and whites were 
condemned for deliberate murders, while blacks were condemned for determined murders.39 
The impact that the law had on sentencing practices is profound and, therefore, warrants this 
dissertation to discuss when moments of transition occur.  
To discuss sentencing practices without considering the key influence of trial judges 
in these cases would be an enormous oversight. Legal scholar David Dyzenhaus discusses 
the Judiciary’s complicity during apartheid and their reluctance to acknowledge that by 
refusing to properly participate in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of the post-
apartheid era. Dyzenhaus discusses three important factors such as the rule of law, judicial 
independence and legislative intent. He looks at Judges specifically and how they used and 
interpreted the law to uphold the legal order of apartheid through means such as legislative 
intent and the rule of law. Dyzenhaus attempts to illustrate how the judges simultaneously 
enjoyed judicial freedom from the state to interpret the law, and were bound to the rule of 
law. Apartheid laws made judges complicit in perpetuating apartheid and abandoning their 
freedom of interpretation of the law. 
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In his book Judging the Judges, Judging ourselves: Truth, Reconciliation, and the 
Apartheid legal order, Dyzenhaus references an important South African jurist, Arthur 
Chaskalson’s work as important to his own. Chaskalson’s opinion on the rule of law was 
considered controversial, because many judges resist the idea that their own personal morals 
should have an impact on the interpretation of the law. According to judges, their duty as 
judges is to interpret the law as it was intended by legislators to be interpreted. According to 
Dyzenhaus the apartheid government had unchecked limits on its legislative power. Statutes 
had to comply with numerous official steps before it was signed by the head of state, in order 
to be recognized as valid. These statutes had no substantial limits on the legislation of the 
contents thereof. Therefore, the judges appeared to be under a duty to interpret the legislation 
as it was clearly expressed, and as the legislature indicated it should be interpreted, regardless 
of how morally offensive they themselves found the legislation.40 
According to Chaskalson, this created an “almost Schizophrenic approach by 
courts”41 in interpreting apartheid law. This was because the judges’ Common Law tradition 
required them to interpret statute law, as much as they could, in the light of the principles 
developed by judges in their decisions which “deny all forms of discrimination and which 
seek to protect fundamental rights and freedoms”.42 Essentially, judges were asked to uphold 
and give effect to equitable Common Law principles, despite the fact that they were 
upholding discriminatory laws. South African law is part of the common law heritage, which 
means the decisions judges make on the interpretation of the law lay down precedents for 
the future. Therefore, Chaskalson claimed that it was the duty of judges to resort to common 
law in a legal order where the government was determined to use the law to uphold and 
implement apartheid ideology.43  
However, Chaskalson did acknowledge that the problem was that the statute law 
reigned supreme over Common Law. Additionally, even if judges were able to use such 
presumptions when they could, their interpretations would always be subjected to statutory 
understanding, which was a likely outcome if the government was sufficiently determined 
to realize its policy unchecked by these presumptions.44 
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Judges knew that any judicial decisions that would weaken the agenda of the ruling 
government or enact legal restrictions on the enactment of apartheid would be overruled by 
legislative amendments to make the government’s intention clear. Therefore, in cases where 
statutory provisions seemed vague, the judges argued that their duty as a judge compelled 
them to clear up the vagueness, not by referencing a common law presumption, but by 
referencing how the legislature would have wanted the statute to be interpreted. That 
understanding of their duty was entrenched in a particular notion of the rule of law. The 
notion has it that the role of judges in maintaining the rule of law largely involves judges 
seeing to it that those who implement a statute does it in agreement with the law as it was, 
intended to be implemented.45  
It has been an unspoken rule of South African judicial practice that judges must not 
look to the parliamentary record, to see what has been said in the debates, for indication of 
legislative intent. The rule of law requires an independent judiciary shielded from political 
pressure and influence. The idea of the rule of law as removed from politics is worth 
protecting, especially during a transitional period when a nation is moving away from a 
regime that used the law as a tool of domination, thus unavoidably politicizing the role of 
judges. This means that the rule of law should be regarded as impartially as possible in order 
for the judges to be seen as to stand above the political fray of a transition, accountable only 
to the law. The idea that the rule of law can be considered as removed from politics can then 
be thrown into question, because the choice of conceptions of the rule of law for South 
African judges during apartheid was clearly a political one.46 In addition, certain aspects 
such as politics, public debates, misconceptions, and preconceived notions, all entered the 
narrative in the courtroom when witnesses, complainants, accused and experts were called 
to testify. Therefore, analysis of the actual court procedure allows one to adequately 
investigate the extent these discussions affected the reasoning of judges. How they 
interpreted this, has motivated this study. 
This chapter thus far has given context to this study by referring to discussions in 
criminology, sentencing practices, and the proclivities of trial judges. However, the 
assassination of former Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd was the catalyst for the ensuing 
debates, commissions of enquiry, and discussion in the judicial and mental health fields. In 
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the aftermath of the assassination of former Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd in 1966, both 
the Prime Minister Verwoerd and Dimitri Tsafendas were sent to Groote Schuur Hospital. 
Verwoerd was declared dead on arrival, and Tsafendas was interviewed by the acting head 
of the Department of Psychiatry, Dr Isaac Sakinofsky. When asked why he had killed the 
Prime Minister, Tsafendas vaguely answered that the Prime Minister was against the 
“English way of life,” against the “Cape to Cairo movement” and supported what he, 
Tsafendas, saw as an unjust Immorality Act that banned sexual relations between members 
of different population groups.47 This case brought issues of “madness” to the forefront of 
South African society. The media and politicians struggled with a case they referred to as a 
mindless killing. The media’s coverage of Tsafendas as a “crank” and “madman” became 
increasingly popular in the weeks after Verwoerd’s death. The government’s explanations 
for Tsafenda’s actions revolved around notions of insanity. This sparked many debates.48 
In her article “The Assassination of Hendrik Verwoerd: The Spectre of Apartheid’s 
Corpse”, Deborah Posel states that she is interested in “the fluctuating ways in which the 
Apartheid regime made sense of Tsafendas’s life and motives in the aftermath of the 
assassination, in its efforts to redeem a sacrificial meaning of Verwoerd’s death.”49 In the 
case of Verwoerd, the meaning and impact of what Tsafendas had done was inseparable from 
the cultural politics of leadership within the Afrikaner volk. The political culture of Afrikaner 
nationalism strongly subscribed to a patriarchal form of leadership. This type of leadership 
was an expression of strength, courage and protectiveness of the father of the volk. 
Expectations of his authority were amplified by the belief that his rise to power was a calling 
from God. No one embodied this version of the national leader more than Verwoerd.50 
The first efforts to make sense of the assassination were sensationalized and rife with 
conspiracy. There were certain elements that portrayed Tsafendas as a smart and malevolent 
antagonist, and this portrayal of him immediately captured the public’s imagination. White 
members of the public, desired for a story that crucified Tsafendas. According to Posel 
stories that Tsafendas was an expertly trained assassin were very popular. The Afrikaans 
newspaper Die Beeld even published a story that made reference to a secret file that the 
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security police had on Tsafendas. During this chaos political leaders called for “fact and 
certitude”. On 23 September 1966 the government announced in the Government Gazette 
that it would launch an enquiry into the death of the Prime Minister. The aim of the inquiry 
was to “probe into all aspects relating to the death of Hendrik Frensch Verwoerd which the 
Commission deems to be in the public interest”.51 This commission was the first spark that 
led to the Rumpff Commission of 1967, which in turn recommended the Commission of 
Enquiry of 1972 to reappraise the existing Mental Disorders Act of 1916.52 
In the aftermath of Verwoerd’s assassination, a substantial change in the discourse 
of mental health can be seen. South Africa saw numerous official publications deal with the 
topic of mental health eventually culminating in a new Mental Health Act of 1973,53 the first 
significant change in legislation since the 1916 Mental Disorders Act. Training for 
psychiatrists and psychologists was instituted, and psychologists began working in 
psychiatric institutions in increasing numbers and were now required by law to register with 
a professional board. At first glance it may seem that these changes were only repercussions 
of the aftermath of Verwoerd’s assassination. However, other countries such as America and 
the United Kingdom had also experienced a growth in the professionalization of both 
psychiatry and psychology after the Second World War, prompting needed reform in South 
Africa.54 
According to psychiatrist Dr M. Minde the state of psychiatric knowledge in South 
Africa went through different stages. The first stage being the settlement of the Cape Colony 
in 1652. This stage was referred to as the “demonic” stage due to the belief that insanity was 
caused by demonic possession. This belief had weakened by the second half of the 18th 
century. The second stage of psychiatric knowledge spanned the entire 19th century and 
lasted to the middle of the 1930s. This stage is also referred to as the custodial stage. During 
this period the preferred treatment was containing the patient to an asylum as other treatment 
options were limited. The rationale was to keep the patient safe, but also to protect the 
community. By the 1930s, physical treatments such as the use of insulin comas to treat 
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patients became popular. The treatment was favoured for schizophrenics, and cardiozol and 
electroshock for manic depressive psychoses and schizophrenia. Another form of treatment 
was the prefrontal leucotomy, which is now obsolete.55 
According to Robert Kaplan the period between the First and Second World Wars 
was considered a difficult time for psychiatry. The medications that were available – such as 
opiates, chloral hydrate, paraldehyde, barbiturates and bromides – were not curative but 
treated the symptoms of psychiatric patients. Paraldehyde, for example, was considered to 
be a good sedative and barbiturates had anti-anxiety properties and was useful for sedation 
and to restrain patients. However, the side-effects and possible addiction to these 
medications could be lethal to patients. By the late 1930s, new biological treatments became 
popular in Europe. A new treatment, Malariotheraphy presented hope that new additional 
biological treatments would be made available. Insulin-coma therapy, developed by Manfred 
Sakel after he observed a depressed patient recover after going into a hypoglycaemic coma, 
had become a popular treatment method.56 According to historian Julie Parle, who has 
written about the early treatments for psychiatric conditions, the use of insulin-comas in 
psychiatric institutions was common in South Africa.57 
South Africa’s mental health professionals and those in England had always enjoyed 
a close link with one another. New developments in Britain were often quickly reproduced 
in South Africa with no regard for the difference in context. Most of South Africa’s mental 
health professionals received their training in Britain and followed the progress of psychiatry 
in the Northern Hemisphere when they returned. Professionals would often visit medical 
institutions in places such as Europe, America and Britain. Britain is of particular interest as 
South Africa adopted their mental health legislation.58 
By 1948 with the establishment of the National Health System in the United 
Kingdom, psychiatric hospitals acquired the same status as general hospitals. At the time 
nearly half of all beds in hospitals were allocated to mental patients. Hospitals were the 
domain of superintendents who primarily trained on the job. The psychiatric qualification 
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was a diploma that lacked the status of other medical fields. Luckily the establishment of the 
National Health System gave more funding for facilities, and expansion of staff members. It 
was the National Health System that made clinical psychologists a standard part of the health 
service by establishing a career structure and salary scales.59 
According to psychiatrist and scholar Dr Gillis, psychiatry in South Africa, was still 
in its infancy at his point. In the past, all psychiatric training had been done at the mental 
hospitals, by the hospital superintendent. There had been no formal training course before 
the first university diploma course. The first training course, based on the British model, was 
set up at Johannesburg’s Tara Hospital in 1948. Tara Hospital was a psychiatric institution 
linked to the University of the Witwatersrand. Dr Gillis recalls that while Tara Hospital was 
breaking new ground the majority of South Africa’s mental institutions still funct ioned on 
the old custodial method. These institutions were overpopulated, and the staff suffered poor 
professional specialization.60 
The physical stage of the physical treatment period lasted to the mid-1950s and was 
followed by the fourth stage of the development of psychiatric knowledge which was marked 
by the rise of psychotropic drugs.61 The discovery of psychoactive drugs resulted in 
deinstitutionalization that changed the professions of psychology and psychiatry 
internationally by reducing the number of chronically ill psychotic patients that were 
institutionalized and, therefore, changing the landscape of psychiatric institutions. 
Neuroleptics in 1952, imipramine in 1956, and the inhibitors of monoamine oxidase in 1958, 
for example, had a prolonged effect on psychotic symptoms in patients that had been 
previously unresponsive. Methods such as physical restraint were no longer necessary. The 
use of treatments such as an insulin coma, Metrazol shock treatment, and ECT62 could now 
be minimized or eliminated completely. It now became possible to treat patients in an out-
patient setting. Due to deinstitutionalization, the function of asylums shifted from custodial 
to curative. This is important, because patients that would respond favourably to these 
treatments could be send home. During this period South Africa was not the only country 
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updating its outdated mental health legislation. Ireland and Norway updated their laws in 
1945 and 1961 respectively.63 
Helen Laurenson and Sally Swartz, in their article “The Professionalization of 
Psychology within the Apartheid State 1948-1978”, have stated that with the development 
of psychoactive drug treatments such as insulin-coma therapies fell out of fashion. Therefore, 
with the psychoactive drugs becoming available, psychiatric institutions moved towards a 
curative approach instead of being custodial.64 
During the apartheid era, the medical profession in South Africa had been complicit 
in abuses. The psychiatric profession’s reputation had taken a considerable knock. The abuse 
of homosexual conscripts, male and female, in the South African Defence Force comes to 
mind. According to Robert Kaplan’s article “The Aversion Project-Psychiatric abuses in the 
South African Defence Force during the Apartheid era”,65 for over a period of two decades, 
conscripts were systematically removed from the Defence Force and subjected to aversion 
therapy and sex reassignment surgery. The doctor behind these abuses was a psychiatrist, Dr 
Aubrey Levin, a former Colonel in the Defence Force. He was in charge of Ward 22 at One 
Military Hospital were most of these conscripts were “treated”.66 This is but one example of 
many where medical practitioners, inside and outside of the field of psychiatry, had abused 
patients.67 
Kaplan focuses his work on the individuals in the medical field who commit medical 
abuses. In his article “The Clinicide Phenomenon: an exploration of medical murder”, he 
focuses on individuals who commit such acts.68 The article identifies three categories of 
Clinicide; namely (1) medical serial killers; (2) treatment killers; and (3) political mass 
murderers. Medical serial killers are those who use their medical training and knowledge to 
murder mass numbers of patients predominantly through administering lethal doses of 
medication, while treatment killers have no apparent motive. They do not kill on the same 
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scale as medical serial killers, but death in increasing numbers usually accompanies their 
treatment. Lastly, political mass murderers are the accomplices in state brutality, repression 
and genocide. They use their training to commit abuses in the name of nationalism or some 
other form of ideology.69 
Due to the focus of this dissertation being the impact of mental health legislation on 
sentencing practices it is therefore necessary to discuss the basis of South Africa’s mental 
health legislation. Early Mental Health legislation dates back to Roman Law and Roman-
Dutch Law. In his book Mental Health Law in South Africa, A. Kruger begins his discussion 
on mental health legislation in South Africa by referring to the history of mental health law 
with particular reference to Roman law and Roman-Dutch law. In Roman law the care for 
mentally ill individuals falls on family members because the family unit in Rome was a 
close-knit one. According to Roman law the mentally ill person should be taken into custody 
of his nearest family member, not only for the sufferer’s care, but as a curator of their estate. 
This law becomes applicable when mental retrogression is setting in.70 
Roman law did not distinguish, in so many words, the different classes of insane 
persons. Lunacy was always considered curable. The insane person would have freedom 
when s/he lapsed into periods of sanity. Therefore, s/he would no longer be under the 
direction and control of his curator. When the insane person relapsed back into insanity s/he 
would once again be under the direction and control of the same curator. The insane person 
would have no legal capacity, except for moments when s/he was sane. Curatorship would 
only end completely when the insane person became well again, permanently, or if the insane 
person died. Roman law did not concern itself with the rights of the patient, but with 
protecting the family heritage. The interests of the family and the community had to be 
protected.71 
Roman-Dutch law, as the name suggests, was built upon the principles of Roman 
law. Roman-Dutch writers examined and developed the principles of Roman law, especially 
relating to the mentally ill. They had adopted the relevant principles of Roman law and 
adapted it according to their needs and their context. An important development in Roman-
Dutch law was that the curator was no longer automatically appointed. The curators were 
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appointed either by the provincial court of Holland or by the ordinary magistrates, depending 
upon which court the relatives of the patient approached. Additionally, curatorship did not 
automatically end with the recovery of the patient. An application had to be made to the court 
that ordered the curatorship, and only then could the court remove that curatorship.72 
In Roman-Dutch, law the patient could now also apply to the court for an annulment 
of the order placing a curatorship over them if they felt aggrieved by the order. The right to 
confinement could also be granted by the court. In earlier times this right was granted to the 
family and friends of the patients. It would appear that mentally ill patients were treated 
much better in Roman-Dutch law than in Roman law. However, in Roman-Dutch law there 
was no control over how the patient was detained, or how the patient was treated. The 
detention of the patient was rather informal than official. Roman-Dutch law had legitimized 
the incarceration of the mentally ill, yet no mental hospital or even a reasonable treatment 
plan existed.73 
As English Law had an impact on the South African legal system, it is important to 
refer to the ‘M’Naghten’ rule in English Law.74 The “law” came to be in 1843 when the 
private secretary, Edward Drummond, of the Prime Minister of England, Sir Robert Peel, 
was murdered by Daniel M’Naghten. During the trial it became clear that M’Naghten had 
been suffering from delusions that he was being prosecuted by the Prime Minister and other 
members of parliament. The jury found him “not guilty, on the ground of insanity.” The 
M’Naghten trial had received some notoriety in England because of the verdict. However, 
the nature and extent of the unsoundness of mind that would “excuse” such a crime became 
the point of departure in discussion of the case in the House of Lords.75 
In the same year as the court case took place, the House of Lords began to develop 
the M’Naghten Rules. The judges were tasked with setting out the proper test for insanity. 
Here follows their rule: 
To establish a defence on the grounds of insanity, it must be conclusively proved 
that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was labouring 
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under such defect of reason, from a disease of the mind, as not to know the nature 
and quality of the act he was doing; or if he did know it, that he did not know 
what he was doing was wrong.76 
Within the next century the rule was adopted in South Africa and followed until the 
assassination of Verwoerd when the ensuing commissions of enquiry concluded that the 
legislation was not satisfactory, or effective. Therefore, the M’Naghten rules were extended 
to include a “test” based on whether a mentally disordered person had committed an offense 
under an irresistible impulse, even though he had the capacity to understand the nature of the 
act and appreciate the wrongfulness of the act.77 
Not only has legislation impacted the mental health field in South Africa, ideologies 
about race such as eugenics influenced how mental health was conceptualized for the 
different races. According to Saul Dubow, race is viewed as a scientific construct and, 
therefore, it becomes easy for white supremacists to use “scientific” evidence as proof for 
white superiority. It also influences the imagery and representation of non-whites in 
European minds.78 Therefore this “scientific” justification for racism plays an important role 
in creating and maintaining white supremacy.79 According to psychologists C. Van Ommen 
and D. Painter in their edited volume Interiors: A History of Psychology in South Africa 
psychiatry and psychology developed racialized processes of knowledge production.80  This 
meant that the fields of psychology and psychiatry had been influenced by early theories on 
race. 
The study of human difference can be traced back to the mid-eighteenth century. It 
was with the development of European enlightenment that the main racial divisions of the 
world were firmly established. One of the great paradoxes of the enlightenment is that it 
implied not only the advanced scientific forms of reasoning, but also “the rationalization of 
old prejudices”.81 A significant development was the association of race as type. Carl 
Linnaeus distinguished between European man, Asiatic man, African man and American 
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man. The Europeans were civil, governed by law and ingenious. Africans were lazy, careless 
and governed by the arbitrary will of their masters. Johan-Friederich Blumenbach, who is 
often referred to as the father of physical anthropology, first named three fundamental races: 
Caucasian, Mongolian, and Ethiopian. Later American and Malayan were added. The 
profiling of racial types or sub-types was well underway.82 
The institutionalization of physical anthropology in Europe strengthened the 
conception of race as a type. Robert Knox published his book, The Races of Men in Britain 
in 1850. He sought to establish a link between anatomical differences and national character. 
Knox was one of the most important scientific racists of his time. His ideas became very 
influential as mid-Victorian society became increasingly susceptible to the ideology of racial 
determinism. Moreover, Knox was also a forerunner of anthropometrical studies in South 
Africa. He developed an interest in comparative anatomy when working as a field surgeon 
in the Eastern-Cape. He was one of the first people to refer to the Khoisan people as the 
“yellow-skinned race of Southern Africa”. He also claimed responsibility for sending the 
first “Kaffir Crania” to Europe. Many of Knox’s statements on the mental and physical 
characteristics of the “Bosjeman”, the “Hottentot” and the “Caffre”, as well as the questions 
he posed about their racial origins, were still taken seriously by scientists some 50 years after 
the publication of The Races of Men in 1850.83 
The classification of people according to their physical attributes involved many 
different criteria. Criteria included the analysis of skin colour, hair texture, bodily stature, 
head shape, and facial proportions. As comparative anatomy emerged, these forms of 
measurements became more technically advanced. Moreover, Blumenbach initiated the 
study of the human crania. While his classification of the world’s peoples into distinctive 
types relied on physical criteria, it continued to reflect an older biblical paradigm which took 
monogenesis for granted. Therefore, he regarded the various forms of mankind as having 
“degenerated” form a single “Caucasian” type. Monogenetic forms remained powerful in a 
pre-Darwinian world because it agreed with European religious and philosophical 
orthodoxies.84 
The origins of eugenics dates back to the 1860s when Francis Galton explored the 
inheritance of natural ability. It overlapped with the rising intensity of imperialist feeling 
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from the 1880s helping to fan nationalist fervour and provided a convenient justification for 
the colonial subjugation of non-Europeans. The rise of the eugenics movement was 
responsible for the explicit expression of racist conceptions. It offered important 
reinforcement to those who continued to seek scientific justification for their prejudices. 
Chief measures started to move away from relying exclusively on physical anthropology to 
an emphasis on intelligence testing, since this also offered a path to the same invalid goal of 
ranking groups by mental worth. By translating the insights of evolutionary biology into a 
popular idiom with a recognizable social programme, eugenics gave Social Darwinism a 
decisive impetus and a distinct political resonance.85 
On the one hand eugenics reflected the confidence in the superiority of the Anglo-
Saxon race. This was supported by the application of evolutionist ideas to society in such a 
way as to normalize divisions based on social class, gender and race. However, eugenics also 
reflected a deep vulnerability and fear among the Victorian middle class.86 These biological 
conceptions of race informed Christian-National theory, both implicitly and explicitly. 
However, these had to be reconciled with theological and cultural explanations of human 
difference. In constructing a coherent argument for apartheid, Christian-National ideologues 
frequently chose to suggest biological theories of racial superiority, rather than to assert these 
openly.87 
It is within these various contexts, that the issue of mental health and the law is 
situated. While the manner in which this developed during the period under investigation is 
further discussed in the content chapters, it is important to note that resistance to change has 
historically been consistent. One such example can be seen in the resistance to changes in 
mental health legislation during the period under investigation.  
While researching the parliamentary debates, the house of assembly mentioned the 
Church of Scientology during their discussion of the proposed Mental Health Act. It became 
clear that the organization had been involved in anti-psychiatry activities not just abroad, but 
in South Africa. Due to the nature of Scientology’s anti-psychiatry activities in South Africa 
this dissertation will focus on the harmful practices of Scientology and its attacks on 
psychiatry, and what the implications were of their activities. Historian Tiffany Fawn Jones’s 
chapter “Critics of the system? The Church of Scientology and the International Vilification 
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of Psychiatry” in her book Psychiatry, Mental Institutions, and the Mad in Apartheid South 
Africa88 provides an in-depth look at Scientology in South Africa and their critique of South 
African psychiatry.   
The Church of Scientology89 and its subsidiary, the Citizens Commission of Human 
Rights (CCHR)90 had not always positioned itself against the apartheid state. The 
organization tried to ally itself with the National Party claiming that the true enemies of the 
state were psychiatrists.91 The CCHR had their own self-serving agenda for attacking 
psychiatry. Scientology rejects psychiatry completely, in favour of their own dogma, as a 
means to obtain mental clarity. However, the organization never managed to form a 
relationship with the National Party government. Instead, due to their rejection by the 
Apartheid state, they began to publicize the overall conditions in hospitals and began a series 
of investigations that would culminate in the international community ostracizing the South 
African government and those working within its constraints. The attacks on psychiatry 
perpetrated by the organization revealed how close the relationship between the government 
and psychiatrists were. The relationship was close enough for the government to set up a 
Commission of inquiry into the organization in 1969.92 
The theory of Dianetics, on which Scientology is based, is inherently racist. In 
Hubbard’s Dianetics: The Modern Science of Mental Health he argues that “primitive 
societies, being subject to much mauling by the elements, have many more occasions for 
injury than civilized societies”. According to Hubbard, these societies have a very limited 
level of medicinal and mental health knowledge and practice. Notably, Hubbard made it 
clear that Africans were of too low intelligence for them to become effective members of the 
organization. However, despite his initial racist rhetoric and the organization’s continued 
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reassurance to the National Party government that it supported their mandate, Scientology 
was never able to win the support of government officials.93 
In 1969 an investigation into the organization began, because of their attacks against 
psychiatry and prominent psychiatrists who were aligned with the state. Since opening their 
branches in South Africa, they began targeting psychiatrists who headed up large mental 
health organizations or had political connections. Some of their targets included T. J. 
Stander, the director of the South African National Council for Mental Health, and his 1966 
replacement Jan J. Robbertze. They also targeted prominent United Party members which 
included Dr. E. L. Fisher, and Dr. A. Radford; both of whom practiced in the field of 
psychiatry. Both had been outspoken advocates for the improvement of mental health care.94 
In 1972 the government published the commission of inquiry into Scientology detailing 
as much information about Scientology as possible, particularly the organization’s activities in 
South Africa. The document consists of 15 chapters containing all the information the 
government could gather about the organization, its founder and their activities in South Africa. 
Although Scientology did not appear to be a threat to the hegemony of the Apartheid state, it 
did however assist in denting the international reputation of South African psychiatrists. 
Therefore, it is important to include the findings of the Commission of enquiry into Scientology 
in this dissertation. 
  
1. 2. Methodology 
The archival research in this study is primarily focused on criminal cases from the 
Cape Town Supreme court for the period of 1964-1976. This is two years before the 
assassination of former Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd in 1966. This entailed a 
systematic perusal of over 2000 boxes of criminal case files from the Cape Town Supreme 
Court for the period 1964-1976 housed at the Cape Town Archives and Records Services.95 
The Supreme Court archives are the most comprehensive and systematically maintained 
archival source base from which relevant statistical analysis and contextualization within the 
broader debates could be conducted. Due to the sheer volume of case files, this dissertation 
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will only discuss cases brought before the courts for murder, culpable homicide and murder-
related cases. These cases had to be rewritten based on the various and conflicting 
information sheets bound within what can only be described as an incoherent folder. The 
statistics have been tabulated and presented in Chapter Two. Unfortunately, the Western 
Cape Archives only houses criminal case files until 1976. Therefore, trends between 1977 
and 1980 had to be gleaned from case law from the legal journals. These do not provide 
contextual information but do provide some indication of deviations from the prescribed 
minimum and maximum sentences in cases of murder, and the conditions under which such 
deviations occurred.  
It should be noted that given the nature of the study which focusses on mental health 
and sentencing practices for murder, in which the testimony of expert testimony provided 
invaluable information surrounding the various debates unfolding in the country, specific focus 
has been kept on the main Supreme courthouse in Cape Town. Vastly different trends may be 
found within the rural circuit courts, which also fell under the Cape Town Supreme Court. 
Similarly, the formal mental state of the victim as per the categories under the DSM 
classification system, falls beyond the scope of this dissertation. It should also be noted that 
this study does not attempt to evaluate the moral implications bound by the act of murder, but 
rather questions the way in which various considerations unfolded during the judicial process.    
Parliamentary debates, commissions of enquiry, 96 including those on the mental health 
act, and the proposed criminal procedure bill from the National Library in Cape Town were 
also consulted.97 The study could have been elevated if access to the Valkenberg assessment 
files was granted. However, the discussions which arose in the actual court proceedings have 
provided sufficient evidence of the complex ways in which these debates were contemplated 
and negotiated within the legal system.   
Due to the timeframe investigated, consideration was given to the subjects of this study. 
The author has opted to use the initials of those brought before the courts to avoid any undue 
harm that the study could have on survivors or members of their family.  
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1. 3. Dissertation Outline 
Chapter Two will provide a statistical analysis of the prosecution and conviction rate compared 
to the criminal cases where mental illness was averred. This chapter will also discuss legal and 
medical terminology, such as the legal definitions of murder and culpable homicide. 
Additionally, attention will be given to mitigating factors taken into consideration in the 
sentencing of parties found guilty for murder. This includes intoxication,98 degree of 
provocation, and related mental considerations, such as intelligence tests, as well as more 
pathology-based discussions such as epilepsy and head injuries.99 The reflection on the 
proclivities of court judges is also discussed in this chapter. The psychological and psychiatric 
considerations in these trials are fleshed out within the remaining content chapters.    
Chapter Three will discuss the legislation prior to the 1916 Mental Disorders Act to 
give context on what the outdated mental health legislation was based on, particularly the 
English M’Naghten rules. Additionally, the criminal cases which appeared before the Cape 
Supreme Court, two years prior to the assassination of Verwoerd will be discussed, outlining 
some of the discussions that went into the sentencing of those found guilty. This chapter, 
therefore, provides context to what unfolds in the various debates on psychiatry, psychology 
and the judiciary after the assassination and subsequent debates and commission on mental 
health and the legal profession. This chapter will also look at the Rumpff Commission of 1967, 
instigated by the first van Wyk Commission in 1966, that recommended that a Commission of 
Enquiry be called into the Mental Disorders Act of 1916. 
Chapter Four will focus on mental health in the courts, as discussed in the parliamentary 
debates, and as reflected in the new proposed acts of parliament. Additionally, this chapter will 
discuss criminal cases at the Cape Town Supreme Court between the years 1968-1971 to gauge 
how these cases unfolded in the aftermath of Verwoerd’s assassination. The Commission of 
Enquiry in the Criminal Procedure and Evidence legislation of 1955 will also be discussed due 
to the report of the commission recommending that a new Criminal Procedure Bill be drafted 
to replace the outdated 1955 Criminal Procedure Act, which was largely based on English and 
Roman-Dutch law and did not adequately reflect the new issues and concerns of South African 
society at this point. The second van Wyk Commission of 1972 also published its findings that 
made influential recommendations to parliament concerning mental health legislation. 
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Additionally, the parliamentary debates concerning these proposed changes will be discussed, 
namely the Mental Health Act No. 18 of 1973 that only became law in 1975 and the Criminal 
Procedure Bill of 1973 that lapsed only to become law in 1977. 
Chapter Five will predominantly be a discussion of criminal cases before the Cape 
Supreme Court from 1974-1980 to gauge what trends had become apparent after all of these 
legislative debates and changes. Interestingly, the previously discussed Acts were not yet 
reflecting in the legislation, however, they do appear in the criminal case discussions. Due to 
cases for 1977-1990 not being available in the archives, this study will make use of the law 
reports for 1977-1980. Additionally, the government statistics will be used, as this is the only 





Sentencing Practices for Murder and Culpable Homicide at the 
Cape Supreme Court, 1964-1976 
This chapter serves as an important foundation from which the developing trends in 
mental health and the judiciary develop in the coming chapters of this dissertation. The 
chapter will begin by expanding on the complex and somewhat nuanced terminology of 
murder in South Africa during the 1960s and 70s. Attention will be shifted to a detailed 
presentation of the prosecution and conviction rates tabulated by the author for cases 
appearing in the Cape Town Supreme court between 1964 and 1976. This will be followed 
by a discussion on the most prolific trends of this court. This will include a brief introduction 
to the preference of judges, the passing of the death sentence and the most prevalent 
extenuating circumstances seen in the court proceedings. The chapter ends with the locating 
of cases in which mental illness is considered a mitigating factor. It is argued that many of 
the extenuating circumstances share similarities with the existing secondary literature but 
through the discussions and reflections on mental illness in the judiciary, components of 
more complex and unfolding debates begin to unravel.  
 
2. 1. Note on Categories of Murder Charges 
When an accused was charged, s/he appeared before a magistrate and was formally 
charged for an offence as determined by the Attorney-General. In cases where multiple 
offences had occurred, the more severe and/or the one for which a conviction was more 
likely, became the formal charge. In some instances, as will be shown later, compound 
offences were also presented on the charge sheet.   
The focus of this study is on cases brought before the courts for murder and culpable 
homicide. According to legal scholar T.B. Barlow, murder was considered the wrongful 
killing of a human by another with the intent to kill. In order to find the accused guilty of 
murder they must have intended the death of their victim. This involves either deliberate 
purpose to kill or causing some kind of injury the accused knew was likely to cause the death 




If found guilty, the maximum sentence that could be passed was death by hanging. This was 
mandatory prior to 1935 after which, it was at the discretion of the presiding judge.1 
Culpable homicide was a lesser charge compared to murder with a lower range of 
sentences. In order for the accused to be guilty of culpable homicide they had to cause the 
death of another human, without the intent to kill. The death could be a negligent 
performance of some legal act, or the negligent failure to perform some legal duty. It is clear 
that the distinguishing factor between murder and culpable homicide is the absence of intent 
to kill. The death is a result of the failure of the accused to foresee the possibility of harm 
and not paying enough attention to the possibility of harm resulting from their action. It is 
important to note that there is a clear distinction between the performance of an illegal act 
and the negligent performance of a legal one. 
During the trial, the accused was asked to plead either guilty or not guilty. It was here 
that one could also accept guilt on a lower charge. This could also be on the advice of the 
judge. One such example can be seen in the case of the State v. D., in 1970. The accused in 
this case, D. was charged with murder of a young Coloured man by stabbing him to death. 
D. pleaded guilty to culpable homicide and on the 16th of March 1970 Justice van Zyl found 
him guilty of culpable homicide and sentenced the accused to six years in jail. Both the 
accused and the deceased were residents of the farm Onverwag where they were both 
employed, including the woman central to this case, Sanna Ewerts Voe. On the 9th of 
September 1969 the deceased, J. N., went to visit the witness Sanna as they were lovers. 
According to the witness testimony of Sanna Ewerts Voe the deceased was her ‘vryer’2’. 
Sanna and the deceased left to go to the home of Marie Jacobs, who also lived on the farm 
Onverwag, where they spent the night. Early the next morning the deceased left to go to 
work, and by midday the deceased and a man named Douglas, a tenant of Marie Jacobs, met 
up with Sanna at the crossroad at Onverwag.3 
She could tell that both of them had something to drink, however they were not drunk. 
The three of them went back to the home of Marie Jacobs where they were joined by her 
husband Karel. At the house they had about a gallon of wine amongst them. A little while 
later the accused showed up at Marie Jacobs’s house. He walked over to the kitchen door 
and called the deceased to come with him. The deceased obliged. According to Sanna the 
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deceased walked to the kitchen door where he faced the accused. They did not speak to each 
other, and suddenly they started fighting. The battle continued outside. Sanna later found the 
deceased with blood on his chest. According to her she did not see what happened or what 
happened next as she bolted to get the police. When she returned J. N. was dead.4 
  If no evidence was proven against the accused, the charges were dismissed and the 
accused was discharged. If found guilty, however, a variety of factors were taken into 
consideration. These include extenuating circumstances such as having temporary loss of 
faculties. This could include alcohol and substance abuse at the time of the murder. It could 
also include provocation, a history of violence as well as a previous conviction. This would 
determine whether the death sentence would be passed or whether a lighter sentence was 
warranted. This was made explicit during sentencing.  
The presiding judge could either find the defendant guilty of murder, guilty of murder 
without extenuating circumstances, guilty of murder with extenuating circumstances or 
guilty of culpable homicide. In some instances the sentence might even be lowered to the 
level of assault. The punishment would therefore vary from the death penalty, imprisonment, 
being declared a State patient or a fine. It could also be suspended.  
In the case of S. N., for example, the accused and the deceased, were jovially chatting. 
During their interaction the accused wanted to give his female cousin a fright and he pulled 
out a dagger. He jokingly made stab movements towards his cousin, accidentally stabbing 
her in the process. The court believed that neither of the parties were intoxicated and that the 
accused genuinely tried to help his cousin after he had accidentally stabbed her. The accused 
also had no previous convictions. Justice van Zyl found him guilty of culpable homicide and 
sentenced him to 18 months imprisonment suspended for 18 months.5 While he did not 
receive a prison sentence, this judgment would remain on his record for life.  
Suspended sentences, or portions thereof, even appeared in quite gruesome cases of 
baby killing. In the State v. J. J in 1972, the accused was charged with the murder of a three-
month old baby. The accused was severely intoxicated. According to the deceased’s mother, 
he was unable to stand upright and he was stumbling. The accused had arrived home in this 
state and proceeded to pick up his baby. Due to his intoxicated state the mother demanded 
that he give the child to her. The deceased then proceeded to throw the baby to the mother 
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and he fell on the cement floor. According to the mother the deceased fell hard. Sadly the 
child died later due to the fall. The trial judge, Justice Steyn found the accused guilty of 
culpable homicide and sentenced him to 18 months imprisonment suspended for three years.6 
Some sentences are quite hard to fathom. In contrast to the case above, T. P. was 
charged with murder after he assaulted the deceased during a fight that resulted in the death 
of the deceased. The confrontation occurred outside a local store in Cape Town. It was 
unclear to passers-by what the accused and the deceased were arguing about. According to 
some they seemed heavily intoxicated. It was determined that the deceased was quite 
intoxicated, however it is not clear how intoxicated the accused was. The fight ended when 
the accused took a broken bottle that was lying outside the store and proceeded to stab the 
deceased in the chest with it. The deceased died before he could be taken to hospital for 
medical assistance. Justice Beyers found the accused guilty of murder with extenuating 
circumstances, and although the accused had no previous convictions, especially for assault 
indicating aggressive behaviour, he was sentenced to a hefty 15 years imprisonment.7 
In murder cases the highest degree of mens rea or intention is an important element 
and unless the prosecution can discharge the onus of proving the presence of this intention, 
it cannot get a conviction for murder. It is essential to distinguish between the intent to kill 
and the desire to cause the death of the deceased. An example of this may be that a man may 
not want to kill a woman but may nevertheless be prepared to assist her in committing 
suicide. The intent to kill covers knowledge that the act of the accused is dangerous enough 
that it is likely to cause death, coupled with recklessness where death results.8 
Mens rea is defined as a blameworthiness state of mind with which the perpetrator 
acts. In cases where the mens rea of a perpetrator is an issue, two factors may arise which 
have to be dealt with separately. The first is whether the perpetrator can be held responsible, 
that is, whether his mental state is of such a nature as to render him accountable for his act 
under the law. When the perpetrator is responsible, the second factor arises. This factor asks 
in what blameworthy state of mind the perpetrator acted, that is, did he kill someone with 
the intention to kill, or was his intention merely to frighten the deceased and was he negligent 
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in his actions? That second factor is of importance when the question of diminished 
responsibility is raised.9 
It is here that the divergence between criminal law and mental health becomes 
apparent. Criminal law adopts the point of view which accepts that man can direct his will 
in respect of his actions. Criminal law does not allege that disposition, character and 
environment have no influence in shaping the human will, but holds all mentally sound 
persons accountable for punishable action, irrespective of the extent of influence of the 
factors mentioned in shaping the will. When the jurist associates the term ‘insanity’ with 
responsibility, he introduces a medical concept, although psychiatry does not use the term. 
To the jurist it means the mental condition of a person which, as a result of morbid disorder, 
may be regarded in law as abnormal. The jurist cannot use the methods of jurisprudence to 
establish the effects of morbid disorder on a person’s mental condition. Therefore, psychiatry 
and psychology have to be called in to solve the problem of responsibility on a case by case 
basis.10 It is here that expert testimony becomes visible in the court proceedings and it is here 
that one can ascertain how debates on mental health permeate into the judicial space.  
To further enhance this theory, attention will first be given to the statistics of the 
Cape Town Supreme Court followed by a presentation of cases on some of the overarching 
extenuating circumstances that led to a deviation in sentencing for the convictions of murder 
and culpable homicide.  
 
2. 2 Prosecution and Conviction Rates, 1964-1976 
In this section, the tabulated statistics from the Cape Town Supreme court will be 
contextualized within the government’s available national statistics on murder and culpable 
homicide prosecution and conviction rates. Unfortunately, for the years 1969-70, 1971-72, 
1973-74, and 1975-76 only the national conviction rates for murder and culpable homicide 
were published. Therefore, the tabulated statistics for the prosecution rates from the archival 
research for 1969-70, 1971-72, 1973-74, and 1975-76 provide much needed context.11 
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There is a steady increase in the murder prosecution rate from 1963-64 until 1967-
68. Unfortunately, the prosecution rates are not available for 1969-70 to 1975-7612 therefore 
it is not possible to ascertain if the rates steadily increased or declined. The national 
conviction rate for murder remains relatively high for the period of 1963-1976. However, 
the national conviction rate for murder in 1963-64 was the lowest for this period with only 
970 murder convictions. It is evident from the national statistics for culpable homicide that 
the charge rate for culpable homicide is relatively high, whereas the charge rate for culpable 
homicide tabulated from the archival research for 1964-1976 shows the opposite trend.  
Nationally the conviction rate for culpable homicide is high, as is the conviction rate 
at the Cape Supreme Court. Unfortunately the statistics of the national prosecution rate for 
culpable homicide is not available for the years 1969-70 to 1975-76. Yet, from the 
prosecution rates of 1977-78 and 1979-8013 the trend of high culpable homicide rates 
continues. Therefore, it is possible that the unavailable prosecution rates for 1969-1976 will 
indicate that the national prosecution rate for culpable homicide had remained high 
compared to the prosecution rates at the Cape Supreme Court.  
The national prosecution and conviction rates based on the race of offenders indicates 
that ‘Bantu’ males have the highest prosecution and conviction rates for murder and culpable 
homicide followed by Coloured males. At the Cape Supreme Court it can be ascertained that 
the majority of criminal cases were Coloured offenders, due to the uniquely high Coloured 
population in the Cape. Nationally, Coloured males had the second highest prosecution and 
conviction rate, whereas at the Cape the inverse would be true. It is not possible to determine 
if this is a national trend throughout the years of 1964-76 due to the change in how the 
government statistics were tabulated. This trend is only visible in the national statistics from 
1963-64, 1965-66, and 1967-68. From 1969-70 only the conviction rates were available and 
not the prosecution and conviction rate by gender and race. The gaps in the official statistics 
are therefore filled by this study.  
The following figures are the prosecution and conviction rate of murder, culpable 
homicide, murder with extenuating circumstances and murder without extenuating 
circumstances for the period 1964-1976. It is important to compare these rates with each 
other, because the prosecution rate indicates the initial charge, where conviction rate details 
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the final charge on which the defendant is found guilty or is discharged. This allows for 
analysis on the circumstances under which the charge was lowered. Mitigating or 
extenuating circumstances are also reflected when the accused is found not guilty or when 
the charge is downgraded. The most significant statistic for this study is that for those 
accused of murder and sent for a psychiatric evaluation. 
For 1964, the prosecution rate for murder and culpable homicide is 202 and 8, 
respectively. The conviction rate differs quite dramatically – 27 and 144, respectively (see 
Table 1 below). Out of the total 210 cases prosecuted, four cases were dismissed. According 
to Table 1, there is a strong indication that there was an increase in the number of criminal 
cases for murder and murder related crimes in 1965 and 1966 compared to 1964. The 
discharge rate for 1966 is higher than 1964. In 1965 and 1966 there is a high prosecution14 
rate for murder whereas the rate for culpable homicide is quite low. However, the conviction 
rate for culpable homicide in both figures is quite high compared to the conviction rate for 
murder. This can be attributed to criminal cases where the murder charge was mitigated to a 
lesser charge of culpable homicide. The conviction rate for murder with extenuating 
circumstances, in 1965 and 1966, is higher than the prosecution rate. Therefore, the 
defendants in these cases avoided the death penalty but received lengthy prison sentences. 
These cases are considered too severe to be convicted as culpable homicide, but there are 
certain factors present that mitigate a lesser charge of murder.   
 1967 has the highest amount of murder and murder related criminal cases for the 
period 1967-1971. The same trend in culpable homicide convictions can be seen between 
1967 and 1971 as seen in 1965 and 1966. The conviction rate for culpable homicide is much 
higher than the prosecution rate. This is due to murder charges being either reduced to 
culpable homicide charges or the defendants being found guilty of the lesser charge of 
culpable homicide. The culpable homicide conviction rate is higher than the murder 
conviction rate. In 1967 and 1968, the amount of convictions for murder with extenuating 
circumstances are significant. In 1969 the culpable homicide rate is higher than the rest, but 
not as high as in 1965 and 1966.  
The amount of murder and murder related criminal cases are very high for the years 
1972-1976. The years 1975-1976 have relatively fewer murder and murder related cases with 
both under 200 cases per year. The same trend in culpable homicide prosecution and 
                                                             




conviction rates can be seen for the years 1972-1976 as in 1964-1966 and 1967-1971. The 
murder charge rate is high but the conviction rate for culpable homicide is higher which 
indicates that murder charges were mitigated to lesser a lesser charge of culpable homicide. 
The conviction rate for murder with extenuating circumstances in the years 1972-1974, are 
also relatively higher. The conviction rate differs each year, and there is no clear pattern that 
emerges for the conviction rate for murder with extenuating circumstances.  
Table 1: Statistical Analysis of the Prosecution and Conviction Rates, 1964-197615 
  
Charge:            
Murder 
Charge:            
Culpabale 
Homicide 


















1964 202 8 27 144 28 7 98,1% 4 1,90% 
1965 216 11 11 150 40 7 91,6% 19 8,40% 
1966 202 8 27 144 28 7 93,6% 14 6,4% 
1967 254 15 14 182 43 5 90,7% 25 9,3% 
1968 189 24 10 148 41 2 94,4% 12 5,6% 
1969 194 2 9 137 23 2 87,2% 25 12,8% 
1970 185 7 10 138 35 1  95,8% 8  4,2%  
1971 207 5 12 151 29 3 92,0%  17 8,0% 
1972 219 3 14 154 39 0 93,2% 15 6,8% 
1973 298 2 16 223 36 0 91,7% 25 8,3% 
1974 279 0 9 190 43 2 87,5% 35 12,5% 
1975 140 4 17 92 28 0 95,1% 7 4,9% 
1976 122 1 15 84 17 1 95,1% 6 4,9% 
 
The section regarding the conviction rate of murder without extenuating 
circumstances should be viewed with the conviction rate of murder. The concept of 
extenuating circumstances was to mitigate the harshness of the death penalty. That is, the 
accused would still be guilty of murder, however if the accused could prove the existence of 
a factor that would mitigate the death penalty as a sentence, the trial judge may at their own 
discretion impose a lengthy sentence instead of the death penalty.16 Therefore, a guilty 
conviction for murder can still get an accused the death penalty, with or without extenuating 
circumstances. In other words, no definable patterns could be gathered from the actual 
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murder and murder without extenuating circumstances cases in this study, suggestive of the 
arbitrary way in which the crime was punished within the formal judiciary.   
 
Table 2: Statistical Analysis of Mentally Disordered Cases, 1964-197617 
  
Accused Sent for 
Evaluation 
Percentage Sent for 
Evaluation  Declared Mentally Ill 
Percentage Declared 
Mentally Ill After 
Evaluation  
Percentage Declared Mentally 
Ill in Comparison to Total 
Charges for Murder and 
Culpable Homicide  
1964 1 0,48% 0 0% 0% 
1965 1 0,44% 1 100% 0,44% 
1966 1 0,45% 1 100% 0,45% 
1967 1 0,37% 1 100% 0,37% 
1968 2 0,94% 1 50% 0,53% 
1969 0  0 0  0  0 
1970 1 0,52% 0 0% 0% 
1971 2 0,94% 0 0% 0% 
1972 0 0  0 0 0 
1973 7 2,33% 1 14% 0,33% 
1974 6 2,1% 1 17% 0,36% 
1975 2 1,4% 0 0% 0% 
1976 8 6,5% 0 0% 0% 
 
The rate of defendants being declared mentally disordered according to the relevant 
Acts are considerably lower than those sent for mental health evaluation. This is especially 
true by 1973 where there is a spike in cases and a gradual decrease in 1974 (Table 2 above). 
Interestingly, there was only one case in 1975, which is the year the new Mental Health Act 
became law in March of that year. There is a spike again in 1976 in the number of defendants 
sent for observation.  From the sporadic spikes in cases from 1973 it can be assumed that 
this is due to an increase in awareness of mental illnesses among the defendants in criminal 
cases. In the cases from 1973 to 1976 there were discussions taking place regarding the new 
mental health act before it became law. These discussions were primarily concerned with 
psychopathy, and what provisions will be made under the proposed legislation. These 
discussions will be dealt with in more detail in the relevant chapters. The number of 
defendants declared mentally disordered and deemed a State President’s decision patient is 
                                                             




extremely low with only one deemed mentally disordered and declared a State President’s 
patient every other year. The increase in cases from 1964 can be attributed to the 
assassination of Hendrik Verwoerd when issues of mental illness became prominent to the 
judiciary. The content of these cases will be thoroughly discussed in subsequent chapters. 
In the murder charge rate there appears to be four periods that coincide with the 
events discussed in this study, around which the content chapters have been periodized. In 
the first period from 1964-1967 the murder charge rate is over 200 cases per year. In 1967, 
which is the year after Verwoerd’s assassination in September of 1966, there is a spike in 
cases from 202 case for 1966 to 254 cases for 1967. Additionally, in 1967 the findings of the 
Rumpff Commission was published which recommended another Commission of Enquiry 
in the Mental Disorders Act of 1916. This marked increase in cases could be attributed to 
the nervous climate regarding defendants and their mental state. However, with regards to 
the rate of defendants sent for mental health evaluation (see Table 2), there was no increase 
in the number of defendants sent for mental health evaluation in the immediate aftermath of 
Verwoerd’s assassination. From 1965 to 1967 there had been one defendant sent for 
evaluation and each of those defendants had been declared a State President’s patient. The 
exception being in 1964 where there was one defendant sent for evaluation, however they 
were not declared a State President’s patient. This is rather telling, one would expect an 
increase in patients sent for evaluation as the number of murder charges increased after 
Verwoerd’s assassination and the subsequent commissions of enquiry.  
In the second period of 1968 to 1970 the murder charge rate decreases. Interestingly, 
during this period there were no Commissions of Enquiry, therefore there were no findings 
that could be influencing the discussions that the judiciary were having. However, in 1968 
there were two defendants sent for mental health evaluation and one was declared a State 
President’s patient. This is a noticeable increase in the percentage of defendants sent for 
evaluation: 0,94% for 1968 compared to the 0,37% for 1967, which was the year after 
Verwoerd’s assassination. The year 1969 also has the highest number of murder charges for 
the period of 1968-1970, yet there were no defendants sent for mental health evaluation in 
that year.  
For the third period of 1971-1974 there is an increase again in murder charges back 




By looking at the conviction rate percentage18 for 1973 it is only 91, 7% compared to the 
conviction rate for 1968 which is 94, 4%. Although 1973 had the most murder charges, it 
also had a discharge rate of 8, 3% whereas 1968 had a discharge rate of 5, 6%.  Notably, 
during this period the findings of the Second van Wyk Commission was published in 1972 
and the Botha Commission also published its findings in 1971. Additionally, during this 
period the House of Assembly began its debates regarding the then proposed Mental Health 
Act of 1973 and the proposed Criminal Procedure Bill of 1973. These acts were considered 
landmark changes in dealing with the mentally ill in general and in criminal cases, in 
particular. During this period the discussion surrounding the proposed changes to legislation 
started to appear in criminal cases in this period. The amount of defendants sent for 
evaluation during this period distinctly increased. In 1971 two had been sent for evaluation, 
however none were declared. Notably, for 1973 there were seven defendants sent for 
evaluation, compared to the zero sent in 1972. However, of that seven sent only one was 
declared a State President’s patient. Similarly, in 1975 only two were sent for evaluation and 
none of the two were declared a State President’s patient.  
Lastly, for the period of 1975 to 1976 there is a marked decrease, again, in murder 
charges. During this period the Mental Health Act of 1973 became law in 1975. However, 
the Criminal Procedure Bill of 1973 lapsed and only became law in 1977. In this period the 
amount of defendants sent for mental health evaluation increases considerably from only two 
in 1975 to eight in 1976. However, neither in 1975 nor 1976 were defendant’s declared State 
President’s patients. The increase in cases sent for evaluation is indicative of an increase in 
awareness of the mental state of defendants. It is clear from the criminal cases that the 
judiciary began to participate in the changing discussions regarding mental health. Although 
the number of murder charges decreased, the percentage of those sent for evaluation jumps 
from 1,4% in 1975, when the Mental Health Act became law, to 6,5% in 1976. This is much 
higher compared to the percentage of those sent for evaluation in the years 1964-1975, 
considering the low amount of murder charges for the period of 1975-1976.  
As discussed above, the murder charge rate varied each year. By only referring to the 
charge rate it is clear that a fair amount of defendants had been charged with murder. 
However, the conviction rate is telling in the sense that although the charge rate for murder 
is considered high, the conviction rate is low. The defendants were convicted of a lesser 
                                                             




charge of culpable homicide instead of murder. In his book, White Mercy: a study of the 
death penalty in South Africa, Robert Turrell provided an explanation which could explain 
how defendants charged with murder were convicted on a lesser charge such as culpable 
homicide. As discussed in chapter 1, if the defendant and the deceased are both non-white 
the sentence would often be less severe compared to if the deceased was white. Due to the 
majority of the criminal cases from the Cape Supreme Court involving non-white deceased 
and accused individuals, this could explain why the culpable homicide conviction rate is 
higher that the murder conviction rate throughout 1964-1976. 
These statistics are also indicative of trends which reflect a correlation with unfolding 
debates and discussions around the same period. It is here that the actual testimony of the 
court proceedings needs to be discussed in order to ascertain whether these debates did 
indeed seep into the judicial considerations, despite the various mental health and criminal 
law acts only being enacted much later. It is therefore from this statistical analysis that 
attention must be given to the case files in the remaining content chapters of this dissertation.   
 
2. 3. General Trends in Cases Tried for Murder, 1964-1976 
According to law Professor Andrew Novak, the concept of extenuating 
circumstances was introduced in 1935 to reduce the severity of the mandatory death penalty 
for murder. The trial judge was permitted to give a lesser sentence if the accused had proved 
the existence of a mitigating factor in these cases.  This has led the way to judicial sentencing 
discretion, which has taken two norms. According to the first norm, the trial judge has to 
determine a certain aggravating factor that places a crime into a special category for 
seriousness. This would usually merit the death penalty. The trial judge is able to review 
evidence and pass a sentence that is tailored to the crime. However, this originated in 
America and India. The other norm required the trial judge to articulate a mitigating factor 
that would be considered an extenuating circumstance, therefore the judge does not have to, 
at their discretion, implement the death penalty.19  
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2. 3. 1. The Trial Judge’s Preference 
During a trial the judge would take into account certain factors, or reject them, which 
can result in a case being reduced from murder to culpable homicide, for example. 
Understanding judges, or Justices as they were formerly known, is important for the 
interpretation of the sentences they handed down and therefore our understanding what 
legislation had an impact on said sentencing process. In the past the law had been used as a 
tool of apartheid. Under the new regime, the constitution requires that statutes be aligned 
with constitutional values. However, the Parliament of Apartheid South Africa were 
unchecked by any constraints on its legislative powers. It was taken for granted that there 
were no substantive limits on legislation and the content of statutes. Hence, the judges 
appeared to be under the duty to interpret the clearly expressed legislation as the legislature 
had intended for it to be interpreted regardless of how morally bankrupt the judges might 
find the legislation.20 
The trial judge could at their own discretion decide whether mitigating factors are 
valid. In cases where the death penalty has been handed down the trial judge has the 
discretion whether there are extenuating circumstances present that would result in a lengthy 
sentence instead. However, if there were extenuating circumstances present, the trial judge 
could still, at their discretion, hand down the death penalty. It would become clear in the 
following chapters when this dissertation begins to discuss these criminal cases at length that 
the trial judge wielded considerable power over the defendant and what sentence they would 
receive. Attention will now be drawn to the most extreme form of punishment, the passing 
of the death sentence, as a way to reflect on the power of the judges.   
 
2. 3. 2. The Passing of the Death Penalty 
In the case of the State v. A. A., the death sentence was passed because no extenuating 
circumstances could be found. It should also be noted that the convicted felon was a 
Coloured male and he had killed a white male.  
On the 19th of March 1964 the deceased’s wife was busy in the kitchen when she 
noticed the accused, A. A., in the garden. She confronted him. He left and the deceased 
                                                             





followed A. A. Mr M. returned to the house and collapsed on the pavement. He had been 
stabbed. He was bundled into the car of a neighbour and rushed to hospital. On the way, they 
had a car accident and Mr M. passed away.  
On the day of the murder, the accused was in town at the Sea-Breeze hotel and bar 
with two friends. They spent the day drinking. Unfortunately, there were problems with the 
accused’s testimony, especially since he was the only one that could testify to what happened 
when the murder took place. He left out the part where the deceased allegedly strangled him, 
and only told the Magistrate that the deceased had hit him. According to the testimony of a 
15-year-old boy named Nelson Stempe, the accused told him that he stabbed the white man 
after he felt him touching his shoulder. He told Nelson the exact same story of the events of 
the day that he told the court, except he left out the part where the deceased had choked and 
hit him twice in the face. Additionally, he told a woman, Asa Salie, that he stabbed someone 
who was chasing after him. Justice Banks believed that Nelson Stempe was a reliable 
witness, especially because of the believable manner in which he delivered his testimony in 
court. However, Justice Banks stated that maybe it would not be right to attach too much 
value on the testimony of Nelson Stempe and Asa Salie as it was possible that they did not 
tell the court everything. However, it was remarkable that the accused did not tell either of 
them about the deceased choking and hitting him.  
The Court, however, believed that the accused had stabbed the deceased when he 
touched his shoulder, yet acknowledged that the deceased could have hit the accused. The 
Court found that the accused was breaking the law by trespassing on property that did not 
belong to him and therefore, the deceased was entitled under article 24 (3) of the Criminal 
Procedure Act no. 56 (1955) to detain the accused.  The Court further stated that he was 
entitled to use a bit of force to do so.21 
In the end Justice Banks rejected all arguments that could have mitigated a lighter 
sentence than the death penalty and the accused was found guilty of murder without 
extenuating circumstances. Justice Banks said the following: 
Dit blyk uit die beskuldigde se getuienis dat hy goed geweet het wat hy gedoen 
het. Die beskuldigde het verder gesê dat hy nie bedoel het om die oorledene dood 
te maak nie- maar die hof verwerp sy getuienis. Hy het die oorledene in n 
gevaarlike plek met n mes gesteek, n mes met n skerp punt, en met geweld. Hy 
                                                             




het wel bedoel om die oorledene daar te steek. Die hof bevind om hierdie redes 
dat hy wel bedoel het om die oorledene dood te maak.22 
On 8 September 1964 the accused was sentenced to death, despite not having any 
serious previous convictions that could indicate a history of violent behaviour. However, the 
accused did appeal his case. His appeal was not against the death penalty, but the verdict that 
there were no mitigating factors present during his ordeal. His appeal was denied on 29 
September and the accused was executed shortly thereafter.23 
The death sentence was also much more easily passed when the victim was 
considered vulnerable. In the State v. J. D. in 1967, the accused was charged with murdering 
an 80-year-old woman who lived by herself in a caravan in Stanfordsbaai.24 On the night of 
her murder the deceased was on her way back to her caravan. It was on her return that the 
deceased ran into the accused along the road. According to the accused he fell off his bicycle 
and the woman offered assistance. The court believes that it was under this pretence that the 
accused wanted to rob the deceased. Justice Beyers was not concerned with what the motive 
was for the robbery, but he was concerned whether the accused aimed to murder the deceased 
or if it was an assault that eventually lead to the deceased’s death. 
According to the autopsy report the deceased died as a result of multiple injuries. At 
one point she was strangled, there were cuts and bruises over her body, and one of her ribs 
were broken. All of these injuries coupled with her age made it unlikely that the deceased 
would have survived. The accused told the magistrate that he had hit her with his fist.  
Justice Beyers found the accused guilty of murder. He rejected the accused’s 
argument that he had consumed too much alcohol on the night in question. Therefore, he 
found no extenuating circumstances and sentenced the accused to death. 
In the case of State v. G. N., the accused was charged with murder and found guilty 
of murder without extenuating circumstances.25 The trial judge, Justice Tebbutt gave the 
accused the death sentence for his crime. The accused had stabbed a constable of the police 
force that resulted in that officer’s death. G. N. was a member of the anti-apartheid movement 
                                                             
22 Translation: It would appear from the accused's testimony that he knew what he did. The accused also said that 
he did not intend to kill the deceased-but the court rejected his testimony. He stabbed the deceased in a dangerous 
place with a knife, a knife with a sharp point, and violently. The accused intended to stab the deceased where he 
did. The court found for these reasons that he did intend to kill the deceased.  
23 KAB CSC 1/1/1/599, Cape Supreme Court Records, Case no. 263 of 1964, State v. A. A. 
24 KAB CSC 1/1/1/ 980, Cape Supreme Court Records, Case no. 214 of 1967, State v. J. D. 




Poqo.26 It was during one of the group’s activities that G. N. came into contact with the 
deceased and, due to a confrontation, stabbed the police officer. Two witnesses testified that 
they saw the accused stabbing the deceased.27 
Justice Tebbutt called the crime brutal and frightful. He stated that the accused killed 
the deceased mercilessly and in doing so left his wife a widow and his children without a 
father. The accused had an opportunity to put forth any arguments for extenuating 
circumstances, however G. N. declined. The accused did however state that he only joined 
Poqo under duress. Due to the testimony of two witnesses Justice Tebbutt argued that this 
was proof of his willingness to participate in the armed struggle. In this case no mitigating 
circumstances were found. The killing of a white man by a black man was already considered 
repulsive at the time, but the killing of a policeman by an anti-apartheid activist, abhorrent.   
The case of the State v. I. B. in 1971 is an example of when multiple charges are 
prosecuted. On 12 October 1971 the deceased, a nine-year-old girl was walking to the store 
when she encountered the accused, I. B. He requested from the girl that she buy him a 
sandwich, but she cursed at him and continued on her way. Later she returned from the store 
and made her way back to her aunt’s house. The deceased again walked past the accused, 
but this time he grabbed the girl, pulled her into his house where he proceeded to rape and 
strangle her with a belt.28 
According to the pathologist’s report the cause of death was strangulation. The 
pathologist also noted that the shock caused by the injuries of the rape could have contributed 
to her death. The cuts and bruises on her throat indicated that she was strangled from behind 
with a belt. The marks did not cover her entire neck, which indicates he stood behind her as 
he strangled her. There was substantial damage caused by the rape. The rape caused a 
substantial posterior tear of the vagina. Additionally, there were tears on the anterior of the 
vulva and the vagina. According to the pathologist, these injuries occurred while the 
deceased was still alive. The markings on her back indicated that she most likely struggled 
to get away from the accused. The pathologist also noticed cuts on her left temple, her back, 
and her left shoulder. 
                                                             
26 Poqo, or the Azanian People’s Liberation Army, was the armed wing of the Pan Africanist Congress.  
27 KAB CSC 1/1/1/962, Cape Supreme Court Records, Case no. 162 of 1967, State v. G. N. 




The accused did not deny that he had raped and strangled the nine-year-old girl, 
however, his defence was that he only did what he did because he was drunk. He further 
stated that after the rape and murder he fell asleep and when he woke up, he saw the body 
lying there beside him. He could not remember much of the incident and he could not 
remember that he raped her. The accused stated that a few years ago he was in a motorcycle 
accident and since then there was “something wrong with his head”.  
It also became known that the accused had a habit of drinking too much and when he 
did, he became a “difficult man”. He also smoked marijuana while he drank, and this 
allegedly made him dangerous. The trial judge, Justice Rabie found him guilty of murder 
and sentenced him to death. The accused did apply for leave to appeal. The accused did not 
deny that he committed the crime, however he maintained that the state could not prove that 
he had the intent to kill the nine-year-old girl. Justice Rabie rejected this and the death 
sentence was upheld, and the accused was executed. 
These cases highlight how the death sentence was passed in cases where no 
extenuating circumstances warranted a deviation from the passing of the death sentence. It 
also shows how the discretion of the judge could also play a role in accepting whether 
extenuating circumstances would be accepted into testimony. Even if these mitigating 
circumstances were acknowledged, the weight given to them had to be assessed. This is most 
aptly shown in the case of the State v. N. B. in 1975. 
N. B. had broken up with his wife as he suspected she was cheating on him. She 
moved into her mother’s house where the accused jumped through the window and stabbed 
her to death.29 
During the trial, the man suspected of sleeping with the accused’s wife testified 
against N. B. The court not only believed that the murder was premeditated but also believed 
that the accused was a menace to society. The accused was described as a possessive type 
and was no doubt angered by the state of affairs. Justice Broeksma also noted that in crimes 
committed on Fridays and Saturdays, there “is always a certain amount of alcohol involved”. 
He concluded that the accused was only mildly under the influence of alcohol on the day in 
question and was therefore deemed in control of his faculties. N. B. was found guilty of 
murder with extenuating circumstances. According to Justice Broeksma the crime 
                                                             




committed was particularly savage. The accused’s previous conviction record also weighed 
against him. He had five previous convictions for assault, conviction for possession of a 
deadly weapon and housebreaking. The court could not find factors in the accused’s favour. 
He was declared a danger to the community with no regard for the rights of others. Justice 
Broeksma passed the death sentence.  
What is particularly interesting in this case is the way in which Justice Broeksma 
explains murder without extenuating circumstances during this period. The presence of 
extenuating circumstances meant that the court had the discretion not to pass the death 
penalty. In deliberating on the appropriate sentence for a crime, he suggests that three factors 
must be considered: (a) the nature of the crime; (b) the person of the accused; and (c) the 
interest of the community. In factor (c) the court also had to look at (a) to what extent would 
the punishment serve as a deterrent for members of the community who want to commit the 
same crime; and (b) will the punishment serve to protect the community. It is here that a 
clearer understanding of the differences between these categories are further explained, as 
applied in the court procedure by a judge of the time.  
Previous convictions, it should also be argued, did not necessarily warrant the passing 
of the death sentence – even under dire circumstances and in contrast to the reflections made 
above by Justice Broeksma. For example, in the State v. G. V., in 1969, G. V. was charged 
with the murder of a non-white man and with the assault of a non-white female with a 
pickaxe. 30 G. V. was found guilty of culpable homicide on the first charge and guilty of 
assault with the intent to cause bodily harm. G. V.’s sentence was largely determined by his 
previous convictions. He had committed a similar crime, murdering two people, for which 
he was sentenced to a mere six years. He was paroled after three. Justice Beyers blamed the 
parole board for releasing a danger into society and believed that they were partially 
responsible for the crimes presented before him. No extenuating circumstances were 
apparent in this case and the judge may well have passed the death sentence. However, G. 
V. was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment.  
These cases also provide a variety of other extenuating circumstances prevalent in 
the court cases during this timeframe, and quite commensurate with secondary literature on 
mitigating circumstances.   
                                                             




2. 3. 3. Most Prevalent Extenuating Circumstances in Court Cases, 1964-1976 
This section will provide some insight into how the law was applied and how 
deviations from prescribed sentences depended on the severity of the crime as well as 
extenuating circumstances. Cases which involved some element of mental disease will be 
discussed in subsequent chapters. There is little doubt that the most prevalent and consistent 
mitigating factor in sentencing practices over time is intoxication at the time of the murder.  
On the 6th of June 1964 the accused, along with a few of his friends, attended a dance 
party in Elsiesrivier at the house of a friend, Aggie.31 Later in the evening a fight broke out 
between the accused, the deceased, and the deceased’s brother. The exact circumstances of 
the fight are unclear, but the Court accepted that words were exchanged, and as a result, the 
deceased made a move that seemed like a hacking movement in the direction of the accused. 
It is not clear whether the accused was hit. There is no evidence to support this, such as an 
injury or damage to his clothing. A witness testified that the deceased and his brother decided 
to leave Aggie’s house to return home. The accused and four of his friends followed them 
home. When they arrived at the property where the deceased lived, they encountered the 
owner of the property at the gate, Ms. Swarts. She tried to refuse them entrance as the accused 
made it clear to her that he intended to fight with the deceased. He forced himself through 
the gate and past Ms. Swarts. When the deceased heard the accused outside of his home, he 
proceeded to jump out of the window. According to witnesses inside the house he feared that 
the house would be set on fire. When they later encountered the deceased again, as he re-
entered the house, he had serious stab wounds in his chest. He was bleeding profusely and 
died shortly thereafter. According to the autopsy report the deceased died due to his aorta 
being cut, resulting in massive blood loss.32 
The debate between the state and the prosecution was whether in this case the accused 
was the man who stabbed the deceased, or if it was possible that someone else could have 
stabbed the deceased. According to the accused, when he left the property, he heard the 
deceased shout for him to come outside. When the occupants of the house said that he was 
not there, the accused left. Additionally, as he walked away, he saw one of his friends, who 
had accompanied him, standing outside a window with a knife in his hands. However, the 
                                                             





accused’s friend gave the same story as the accused, that when he walked away, he saw him 
with a knife and added that the accused told him that “hy het hom klaargemaak”.33 
Justice Corbett found that it was the accused who stabbed the deceased to death. 
According to Justice Corbett this was a crime of murder, however, he concedes that there 
were two circumstances that were mitigating. The first would be the state of drunkenness of 
the accused on the night of the murder. He was not intoxicated to the extent that he did not 
know what he was doing, but he had consumed a considerable amount of liquor that night. 
The second circumstance would be the provocation that resulted from the deceased’s 
behaviour. Justice Corbett therefore found the accused guilty of murder with extenuating 
circumstances. On 16 September 1964 he was sentenced to eight years in prison for his 
crime.  
In contrast, and reflecting on the differences between murder and culpable homicide, 
on 28 October the accused, C. L.,34 pleaded not guilty to the charge of culpable homicide, 
however, before the sentencing hearing he changed his plea to guilty. Justice Corbett 
accepted that in the accused’s case there was a mitigating factor. The accused was attacked, 
without provocation, by the deceased who proceeded to twice hit him over the head with a 
whip.35 
The accused reacted by stabbing him with a knife he had in his hand for work 
purposes. Justice Corbett scolded him for using the knife so quickly, yet he took the 
testimony of his character into consideration. C. L.’s defence asked for a suspended sentence, 
and the attorney for the state, Mr Kahn supported this claim. However, Justice Corbett felt 
that the sentence of this case should not send the message that this was the typical sentence 
for such a crime. The circumstances of this case were unique as the accused acted in self-
defence. For this reason, Justice Corbett sentenced him to 18 months in prison suspended for 
three years.36 
Another common mitigating factor that arises in these criminal cases is intoxication 
and provocation. So too is a previous conviction. However, a factor in favour of the 
convicted was also his or her role within the community.  
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L. M., for example, was charged with culpable homicide on 2 June, 1965.37 The 
accused murdered her husband during a drunken brawl. Both parties were intoxicated during 
the encounter. The Court also considers that her husband had assaulted her with a piece of 
iron. She pleaded that the death was an accident. The Court rejected this but took into account 
that the accused and the deceased had four children. However, because of a previous 
conviction for a similar crime and that it is apparent that the accused had “not learnt her 
lesson”, the court was reluctant to show mercy. L. M. pleaded guilty and was found guilty 
to the charge of culpable homicide, and sentenced to three years in prison of which 18 months 
were suspended for three years.38 
At the sentencing hearing Justice Steyn said the following: 
Dit is nie maklik vir die hof om jou te straf nie. Die hof neem in aanmerking dat 
jy en jou man albei dronk was, dat jou man jou aangerand het, dat julle mekaar 
geslaan het. Die hof is selfs bereid om te aanvaar dat jou man n wapen gehad het, 
dat hy jou met n yster geslaan het. Die hof aanvaar egter nie dat dit n ongelik was, 
soos jy gesê het nie. Dit is heeltmal duidelik op die getuienis wat gegee is by die 
voorondersoek dat jy, nadat jy jou man gesteek het, weer probeer het om hom by 
te kom met die mes en moes gekeer word, anders het jy hom weer gesteek. Die 
hof is bewus van die feit dat daar nou vier kinders is en dat daar niemand is om 
vir hulle te sorg nie. Daar sal gereël word deur die Departement van Volkswelsyn 
dat jou kinders versorg word terwyl jy in die tronk is. Jy moet tronk toe gaan. Jy 
was al tevore in die tronk vir dieselfde ding en jy het nie jou les geleer nie. Mense 
wat nie hulle les leer nie en steeds n mes teen ander gebruik kan nie verwag dat 
die hof hulle met genade moet behandel nie.39 
Justice Theron shares a similar sentiment. On 9 November 1966 Justice Theron found 
the accused P. D. guilty of culpable homicide, and sentenced him to three years 
imprisonment, suspended for two years .40 The accused, initially pleaded not guilty to a 
charge of culpable homicide, yet changed his plea on the 9 November 1966, the day he was 
to be sentenced.41 
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38 Ibid. 
39 Translation: It is not easy for the court to punish you. The court takes into account that both you and your 
husband were drunk, and that your husband assaulted you, that you assaulted each other. The court is even 
prepared to accept that your husband had a weapon and that he hit you with a piece of iron. However, the court 
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them while you are in prison. You have to go to prison. You’ve been there before for the same charge and you 
did not learn your lesson. People that are incapable of learning their lesson and still use a knife against other 
people can’t expect the court to treat them with mercy. 





According to the presiding Judge, Justice Theron, it appeared to him that the events 
of the night were more of an accident than anything else. The accused killed his wife during 
yet another fight that the two had while intoxicated. According to Justice Theron it was clear 
that it was the deceased who had started the fight. She pulled the intoxicated accused from 
the bench he was sitting on and proceeded to slap him. However, according to Justice Theron 
it seemed that the accused was someone who all too often lost his temper. A much more 
lenient sentence was passed because they had children: 
Ek lê die besondere vonnis op in hierdie geval omdat jy vier jong kinders het wat 
nou deur ander mense onderhou word. Jou suster lyk vir my ‘n persoon van goeie 
karakter, sy sal vir jou help met die kinders en jy moet werk vir die kinders. Dit 
lyk vir my dat jy jou werk sal terug kry as ek jou kan vertrou om jou te gedra.42 
Another compelling circumstance was the notion of respectability of both accused 
and deceased. On 6 January 1969 J. d. P., a white male, assaulted a white female by kicking 
her and stepping on her. 43 He also proceeded to hit her and pushed her around on the ground. 
In doing this he caused her serious injuries that eventually resulted in her death. He was 
charged with culpable homicide and found guilty of assault, and fined a mere R20 for his 
actions.44 
Justice Diemont gave the accused such a light sentence due to the reputation of the 
woman. He thinks that she was the one who “caused the trouble” due to her reputation as a 
“difficult woman” who tended to get into confrontations, especially when she had been 
drinking. Justice Diemont chastised the accused for hitting her as hard as he did but justified 
his sentence by saying, “Ek het jou baie lig gestraf omdat ek dink jy was n bietjie ongelukkig 
gewees”.45 Here, not only are the possible racial biases of judges revealed but so too is their 
patriarchal notions on how a woman should behave.  
In contrast, the reputation of the accused was considered in the case against J. H.46 
He was accused of murdering his stepson with the intent of stabbing him to death. The trial 
court found him guilty of the lesser sentence of culpable homicide. Contrary to the state’s 
                                                             
42 Translation: I give you this specific sentence because of the four young children that you are responsible for 
are dependent on someone else to support them. It appears that your sister is someone of good character, she is 
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your job back if I can rely on you to behave yourself.  
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43 KAB CSC 1/1/1/ 1212, Cape Supreme Court Record, Case no. 180 of 1969, State v. J. D. P. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Translation: I sentenced you very lightly because I think you were a bit unhappy. 




assertion, the trial court determined that the accused did not intend to kill the deceased. The 
circumstances in which the crime was committed is not completely clear to the court, 
however, there existed longstanding animosity between the accused and the deceased. In the 
past it even required intervention from the police, which was brought to light during the 
trial.47 
On the day of the murder there was another explosive altercation between the accused 
and the deceased. Justice Steyn said he did not know how much provocation was present or 
if, and how much, fear the accused felt during this altercation considering that the accused’s 
arm had been amputated from the shoulder. The deceased was under the influence of alcohol 
during the altercation, therefore the accused used a knife to defend himself. Justice Steyn 
deemed the age of the accused as well as the above mentioned as factors that he considered 
when deciding on the sentence. In addition it was made clear that the accused had no previous 
convictions. 
Justice Steyn sentenced the accused to two-years’ imprisonment, suspended for three 
years. The accused made a favourable impression on the court because he was a 50-year-old 
man that have never before been convicted of a crime and because he was regularly 
employed and, all things considered, “a responsible citizen”. 
It is clear from these cases that much of the sentencing practices were determined in 
large part by the interpretation of law by the judges and the extent to which they took into 
consideration the extenuating factors.   
In murder cases the accused could avoid the death penalty if the judge was of the 
opinion that there were extenuating circumstances present. Therefore, the judge could, at his 
discretion, pass a lengthy sentence instead of the death penalty. This differs from mitigating 
factors, because the defence for the defendant could argue in any case for mitigation of 
sentence. What this means is that the accused could receive a lesser sentence due to certain 
factors being present. Extenuating circumstances morally, but not legally, affected the degree 
of the accused’s guilt. An essential factor in cases involving extenuating circumstances is 
the effect of the surrounding circumstances on the mind. There had to exist compelling forces 
that produced a mental abnormality. However, hatred, bias or prejudice towards the deceased 
was not necessarily taken into consideration. A mental disorder less than “insanity” would 
                                                             




constitute extenuating circumstances. Clouding of the mind by stress was extenuating and 
the court could also consider the mental ability of the accused, especially if the IQ was 
deemed below average. This benchmark was largely subjective but played an enormous role 
in calculating the moral blameworthiness of the accused.48 So too was due consideration 
given to the age of the accused. It is important to note that extenuating circumstances were 
not a factor of the crime, but merely a basis for reducing the punishment.49 
In Table 1, a majority of the murder cases had been reduced to culpable homicide. 
This is due to mitigating factors such as intoxication, the degree of provocation and other 
medical and mental health concerns. 
Intoxication was not a defence in a charge of murder unless the intoxication was 
involuntary or accidental, but (1) were not brought about with the deliberate intention of 
committing a crime; and (2) if the degree of intoxication was to such an extent to render the 
accused incapable of forming the intention to kill. These factors reduced the crime of murder 
to culpable homicide. However, it did not excuse the behaviour. The argument upheld was 
where one indulges in alcohol, one should be held accountable for his/her actions. However, 
the rule differed if the intoxication was brought on by the fraud, artifice or contrivance of a 
third person. The same principles applied to involuntary drug use.50 
The use of dagga featured in the criminal cases discussed in this dissertation. In these 
cases it was often used by defence attorneys as a mitigating factor due to the influence it had 
on the behaviour of those who consume it.51 According to The Cape Coloured Commission 
dagga was harmful, especially when used simultaneously with alcoholic intoxicants, and the 
resulting mental state was argued to be the main cause of crimes of violence. The 
Commission advised that the evidence given by Magistrates and the police had to be 
scientifically supported. This was in response to the 1935 Department of Public Health report 
which argued that people were being senselessly prosecuted for smoking “a harmless 
substance”. This led to several discussions on the use of dagga. In 1935 a Medical Congress 
urged the Minister of the Interior to conduct an investigation into the relationship of dagga 
use and the “ultimate production of mental degeneration”. Experiments were later conducted 
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at the Pretoria Mental Hospital. During observations it was noted that there was a universal 
“dulling of the mental faculties” and in some cases “wild motor excitement”.52 
Dagga produced different responses in different individuals. According to Bourhill 
this is where the danger lay. It is from here that the broader implications were discussed at 
length within the medical profession. The underlying personality of the smoker was called 
into question. Additionally, Bourhill noted that an “intelligent person” under the influence 
of dagga might have varied and brilliant hallucinations, but a person of “baser type” might 
have savage reactions. Therefore the danger was that violent crime would result from the use 
of dagga by those with “criminal traits and tendencies”. The discussion around alcohol 
focused on blacks and poor whites, dagga was centered on Indians and the Coloured 
population. The majority of complaints made by law enforcement officials during this period 
were waged against the coloured communities of the Western Cape.53 The nature of these 
debates and the essentialist categories created seeped into the judicial discourse.  
In some cases, provocation was a mitigating factor in a murder charge. The murder 
was reduced to culpable homicide if the accused had been so provoked by the action of the 
deceased as to be temporarily deprived of self-control. In order for this to be valid (1) the 
killing must have taken place upon receiving the provocation; and (2) only under the most 
extreme circumstances would words amount to sufficient provocation to reduce the nature 
of the crime. An overwhelming anger, originating from some internal emotion, such as 
jealousy was not in itself sufficient grounds for a plea of provocation. The court paid 
attention to the circumstances which gave rise to the anger, not the anger itself. Provocation 
was only a defence if it robbed the accused of his self-control and mastery of his actions. 
The action of the deceased had to deprive malice from the act, as there could be no 
provocation where the killing was deliberate. The murder also had to occur directly after the 
provocation. Any delay suggested a desire for revenge. Lastly, less provocation was accepted 
as a mitigating circumstance in the case of intoxication because of the weakening state of 
the mind during alcohol consumption.54 
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2. 4. Mental Illness as a Mitigating Factor 
Insanity, or mental illness as it was later referred to, is considered an important 
mitigating factor in murder cases. According to legal scholar T. B. Barlow: “No person is 
guilty of murder or culpable homicide if he was insane at the time he killed the deceased”.55 
Insanity, in this context, is defined as a mental disease resulting in the accused’s inability to 
distinguish between right and wrong, not knowing what the accused did was wrong, and 
being subjected to an irresistible impulse which made it impossible for them to control their 
actions. Additionally, an insane person was to be dealt with under the outdated Mental 
Disorders Act of 1916.   
Insanity must be distinguished from mental deficiency such as “nervous tension” and 
a “clouded mentality of a lesser type”, which may affect the actions of the accused and make 
him more liable to give way to impulse. T.B. Barlow defined mental deficiency as factors 
that have an impact on the defendant’s mental state at the time of the alleged offence whereas 
insanity is a mental disease, that is psychopathy or schizophrenia.56   
According to the statistical analysis in Section 2.2 above, there is a fluctuating pattern 
in criminal cases where mental illness was a considered factor.  Most notable is the number 
of defendants sent to Valkenberg for observation which differs from the number of cases 
where the defendant was declared a state president’s patient and sent to an institution. This 
increase, which is at its highest in 1973 and 1976, shows an increased preoccupation with 
determining the defendant’s mental state.57 
Moreover, the number of defendants sent for psychiatric observation are higher in 
some years, compared to defendants deemed mentally disordered in the same year. However, 
when mental health is concerned, factors such as traumatic brain injury or epilepsy are a 
factor on whether the defendant is deemed mentally disordered or not. Yet in some cases, 
the defendant might exhibit observable abnormal behaviour but does not necessarily meet 
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the criteria to be considered mentally disordered according to the outdated Mental Disorders 
Act of 1916.58 The nuances of mental health laws and its impact on murder cases at the 
sentencing level will be discussed in the forthcoming chapters. 
In cases where mental illness is averred there are certain medical factors that need to 
be considered. From the archival research it is clear that the dominant factors are epilepsy, 
injuries to the brain and mental deficits. In cases of epilepsy, the degree of epilepsy varies in 
severity and chronicity. Some epileptics, in severe cases, are institutionalized where they can 
receive the proper treatment they need, whereas some are out-patients. The reason for 
institutionalization in severe cases are associated with mental deficits and dementia, or 
frequent seizures that result in severe confusion or personality changes.59 Epilepsy is one of 
the most important conditions in the psychiatric field for a number of reasons. Abnormal 
mental symptoms and disturbed behaviour may either accompany or follow an epileptic 
seizure. In some cases, it may be so prolonged and severe that the label epileptic psychosis 
is merited.60 
Epilepsy is also associated with defects in consciousness, which may only be 
transient, or may be associated with partial recall and frequently have a mixed quality 
encompassing cognitive disturbances. Some of these cognitive disturbances may include 
depersonalization with emotional hallucinations. Additionally, amnesia is a characteristic of 
epilepsy that often appears, even though the patient may not appear unconscious; the 
alternation in consciousness may be severe or light. Due to the effect that epilepsy has on 
the mental state in criminal cases it is considered a mitigating factor, especially in cases 
where mental illness is averred.  
Additionally, head trauma or traumatic brain injuries could also alter the behaviour 
of defendants in these criminal cases. It has been established that for those who survive 
moderate and severe head trauma, the long-term mental consequences, such as cognitive, 
behavioural, and emotional problems outweigh the physical consequences as the primary 
cause for the difficulties encountered by these individuals in their vocational, personal and 
social adjustment. The subtle and enduring cognitive and personality changes secondary to 
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brain injury are frequently undetected until the person who suffers deteriorates from acute 
care to a chronic state of existence. The most common cause of brain injury is a rapid 
acceleration and deceleration, such as a car accident and trauma caused in falls or blows to 
the head caused by a weapon.61 
In patients with traumatic brain injuries there is often a marked social change in their 
behaviour. The person may experience an impaired capacity for social perceptiveness, an 
impaired capacity for control and self-regulation, stimulus-bound behaviour, and apathy and 
changes in emotions, including irritability, silliness, and hyper- or hyposexual behaviour. 
Conditions also include a decreased general ability or complete inability to capture 
experiences. These factors do not occur in isolation but often overlap with one another. The 
changes in someone who suffered a traumatic brain injury is often so subtle that it is only 
recognized after the person re-enters society.  
The medical field may differ in their views of what makes up cognitive, behavioural, 
or psychosocial changes, but the message is the same. The cognitive deficits, such as 
impaired recent memory and decreased intelligence, contribute more than the physical 
problems to the residual disability of moderately to severely disabled people.62 Therefore, 
due to the impact that head injuries have on the emotions and behaviour of those impacted 
by it, it was considered a major mitigating factor in criminal cases.  
 
2. 5. Chapter Conclusion 
The abovementioned cases are just a small sample of the most prevalent mitigating 
circumstances taken into consideration throughout the period under investigation. 
Sentencing has undoubtedly varied according to the proclivities of the judges as well as the 
extenuating circumstances they deemed to be of importance. This was largely framed around 
perceptions on race and class, levels of intoxication at the time of the crime of murder and 
notions of what constituted respectability. These trends are however, not unusual nor are 
they restricted to cases brought before the Cape Town Supreme Court, nor are they restricted 
to the offence of murder. They have a long historical trajectory which transcends 
geographical location and time, as reflected within secondary literature. It is, however, the 
                                                             






consideration of, and discussions on, mental health and the law which unfold within the court 
records, however scant they may be in statistical terms, which prove to be specific to the 






Mental Health, the Law and Cases of the Mentally Disordered, 1964-1967 
The assassination of former Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd in 1966 by Dimitri 
Tsafendas was a major shock to many South Africans sparking a variety of questions and 
debates, especially around the intricate link between murder and mental health.1 His death 
also sparked a long overdue overhaul of the country’s mental health legislation. Tsafendas 
was found to be mentally unstable by attending psychiatrists and he was therefore not 
sentenced to death. In the aftermath of the assassination, there were multiple commissions 
of inquiry that would begin the process of revising the outdated Mental Disorders Act No. 
38 of 1916. The first commission of inquiry in 1966, referred to as the First Van Wyk 
Commission, dealt with the matters relating to the Prime Minister’s death deemed to be of 
public interest. This commission was followed by the Rumpff Commission in 1967 that aired 
judicial, professional, and public doubts about criminality and mental illness. This 
commission recommended another commission of inquiry into the efficacy of the Mental 
Disorders Act. The Second van Wyk Commission followed in 1972 and this commission 
concluded that the Mental Disorders Act was indeed ineffective and needed to be revised 
and repealed.2 
In this chapter context is provided on the mental health legislation prior to 1916. This 
will be followed by a discussion on the role of the British M’Naghten rules in the courts of 
law. This provides a context for a discussion on the law and mental health from 1964 to 
1967. Three of the criminal cases which were sent for psychiatric evaluations during this 
period provide a foundation from which to discuss five important points of reflection as seen 
in the judicial process: the role of intelligence tests, the Mental Disorders Act of 1916, the 
psychopath, the state of psychiatry and psychology in South Africa as well as mental 
institutions. It is from these points of departure that more attention is given to the 
assassination of Verwoerd and the subsequent commissions of enquiry into his death, the 
state of mental health in the country and rising discussion on the need to transform criminal 
procedures within South Africa.  The importance of microanalysis of court cases is clearly 
                                                             
1 See also D. Posel: “The Assassination of Hendrik Verwoerd: The Spectre of Apartheid’s corpse,” African 
Studies, (68), (3), 2009, pp. 332-350. For further reading on Tsafendas see Z. Adams:  “Demetrios Tsafendas: 
Race, Madness and the Archive.” PhD Diss. University of the Western Cape, 2011. The Report of the 
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foregrounded in this chapter as being illuminating to the complex debates that arose around 
aligning the medical and judicial professions.  
 
3. 1. Mental Disorders Legislation Prior to the Act of 1916 
In Roman-Dutch law there is no explicit provisions for the detention of the mentally 
ill. In 1866 the Cape Colonial Office instructed the resident magistrates regarding the 
procedures necessary for the detention of “lunatic” patients, with further legal requirements 
outlined in 1875. The template used for much of the mental health legislation enacted in the 
region was The Colony of Natal’s Custody of Lunatics Act (Number 1 of 1868). This law 
was driven by two factors at the time. Firstly, the economic depression across much of South 
Africa in the 1860s revealed that the socially and mentally vulnerable were being 
disregarded. The need for a public asylum to incarcerate the so-called mentally ill arose. 
Secondly, the law was promoted by the Lieutenant Governor Robert W. Keate. He was 
previously the governor of Trinidad. These factors encouraged the Colonial Office to audit 
relevant facilities across the British empire. Additionally, this also led to legislative reforms 
reflective of the 19th century humanitarianism, universalism, and liberalism. The underlying 
thrust was that all men were equal before God and the law, and should therefore be treated 
in humane ways. However, the reality proved vastly different.3 
The Natal Custody of Lunatics Act determined a number of important principles. The 
act provided for the “safe custody of, and the prevention of crimes being committed by, 
persons dangerously insane, and also for the care and maintenance of persons who were 
insane, but not dangerously so.”4 The act also stated that “persons appearing mentally 
deranged or who attempted suicide”5 should be brought before a resident magistrate. The 
magistrate required that two medical practitioners swear an oath that the person was a 
“dangerous lunatic or dangerous idiot.”6 The magistrate could certify detention until 
discharge was authorized by the Supreme Court, or the lieutenant governor ordered a transfer 
to a public lunatic asylum. According to the act, relatives or guardians could also initiate 
certification of the insane. Other responsible persons such as magistrates could also make 
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the application. The Act did not attempt to define lunacy or insanity. The Act also did not 
make provision for treatment, instead it emphasized the custodial nature of restraint.7 
The Cape Lunacy Act No. 20 of 1879 was very similar to the Natal Custody of 
Lunatic Act of 1868. In 1891 the new lunacy act was more directly linked to the English 
Lunacy Act of 1890. This act acknowledged the local realities of a small population spread 
over great distances and permitted examination and certification of alleged lunatics by one 
medical practitioner. By 1897 there was an amendment made to the Act for the provision of 
voluntary patients.8 Lunacy, mental health and its implications in legal proceedings were 
also influenced by debates emanating from abroad.   
 
3. 2. The M’Naghten Rules in South African Law 
The common law rules of South Africa in regard to the application of the principle 
of responsibility in connection with insanity originated in England. The M’Naghten rules 
had been followed since 1843. The criteria laid down in the M’Naghten rules came in for 
criticism from psychiatrists and also certain jurists from the onset. The criticism of the rules 
was based on two points. Firstly, that the criteria did not make adequate provision for persons 
who were in fact insane and therefore could not be held responsible. Secondly, that the 
application of the clauses remained vast.9 
In application of the M’Naghten rules, the English court of Appeal ruled that the 
words “the nature and quality of the act” referred solely to the “physical character” of the 
act, making no distinction between the physical and the moral aspects, and that “wrong” 
meant punishable by law. With regards to the onus of proof, the courts ruled that the state of 
mind “must be clearly proved” but that the onus resting upon an accused was not the same 
as that of the state.10 It is clear that during the deliberations on reforming the laws in South 
Africa, English jurists were also debating the validity of their mental health law and reflected 
upon how pressing it was that the laws be updated and improved. 
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3. 3. South African Law and Mental Illness  
In South Africa the judges turned to English law instead of continuing to build on 
pure Roman-Dutch Law, thus saddling South Africa with the M’Naghten rules which 
England and even the United States of America were using. Prior to 1953 the law of South 
Africa had taken over the essence of the M’Naghten rules with the addition of the concept 
of “irresistible impulse.” It was in 1953 that the Appeal Court formulated the law as follows 
in R. V. Koortz 1953 (1) SA (a) 371:  
Section 29 of the Mental Disorders Act prescribes the verdict when it has been 
found that the accused person is “mentally disordered or defective” so as to not 
be responsible according to law for the act or omission charged, and the law as 
to freedom from responsibility for conduct, on the ground of mental defect, is 
stated in Gardiner and Landsdown as follows: A person is not punishable for 
conduct which would in ordinary circumstances have been criminal if, at the time, 
through disease of the mind or mental defect (a) prevented from knowing the 
nature and quality of the conduct, or that it was wrong, or (b) that he was the 
subject of an irresistible impulse which prevented him from controlling such 
conduct.11 
Although the M’Naghten rules had been a feature of South African law, the appeals court 
challenged the rules in 1953. In the 1953 court case the M’Naghten rules were changed by adding 
the irresistible impulse concept.  
It is within this context that attention will now turn to cases that appeared before the Cape 
Town Supreme Court, prior to the assassination of Verwoerd and in the context of the then existing 
rules of how mental illness was to be assessed within the judicial system.  
 
3. 4. Criminal Cases of the Mentally Disordered, 1964-1966 
The statistical analysis on court cases discussed in Chapter 2, identified the only three 
cases in which the accused was sent for psychiatric evaluation during the period 1964-1966. 
The following criminal cases are the only cases from the Cape Supreme Court, for this 
period, where mental illness was considered. It is important to discuss these cases as they 
appeared before the court before mental health reforms began to take shape, in order to 
adequately gauge the effects of the subsequent debates and changes to legislation in cases of 
mental illness from 1967.  
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3. 4. 1. State v. R. A., 196412 
The accused in this case had been charged with the murder of his common law wife 
by pouring paraffin over her and setting her on fire. She died on the 16th of March 1964. 
The accused was committed on the 24th of September to Valkenberg for observation to 
determine whether or not he was mentally disordered. On the 19th of November, Mr Hartford 
who appeared on behalf of the state, submitted a certificate from the Physician 
Superintendent of Valkenberg that declared that the accused was not mentally disordered in 
terms of the Mental Disorders Act of 1916. Mr Ryneveld who appeared on behalf of the 
accused, at the request of the court, did not argue in anyway against the evidence of the state 
concerning the manner in which the deceased met her fate. Additionally, he did not urge the 
court to accept the accused’s version that he did not pour the paraffin on his wife and set her 
alight. 
The court had relied mainly on the evidence provided by the deceased’s child, Fanie 
Fortuin. He was the child of the deceased, but not the accused. His testimony was 
corroborated by witnesses Daniels, and Freddie Jafta. According to Fortuin, on the evening 
in question, the deceased was under the influence of alcohol. She was castigated by the 
accused and the two retired to the bedroom, where he assaulted her. He slapped her across 
the face and attacked her with a scissors. The accused left the bedroom to fetch the paraffin 
that they kept in the kitchen and brought it to the bedroom. He then proceeded to pour the 
paraffin on her. He then took a candle and held it to the hem of her dress in an attempt to set 
her alight. This attempt failed. The accused went to the kitchen to fetch another candle, and 
on this occasion he was successful. 
As the flames flared up the accused attempted to pull the burning clothes off her. In 
doing so he himself sustained first and second degree burns on his hands and to one of his 
arms. He made further attempts to quench the flames by taking a blanket and wrapping her 
in it.  
As far as provocation is concerned, the Court accepted that there was a history of 
strife and disagreement concerning the deceased’s habitual drunkenness. The Court also 
accepted that her behaviour had been the subject of heated discussions, and even 
                                                             




chastisement by the accused. Justice Steyn therefore found the accused guilty of murder with 
extenuating circumstances and sentenced him to 20 years in prison. 
The extenuating circumstances presented here echo many of the court cases presented 
in the preceding chapter. However, the brutality and calculated manner in which the accused 
killed his wife, necessitated a psychiatric evaluation in order for the court to find him 
accountable for his actions. 
 
3. 4. 2. State v. F. G., 196513 
 In the State v. F. G., the accused, a 21-year-old Coloured male, murdered a 53-year-
old elderly lady, M. C. F. on the 25th of June 1965. The court documents stated that he killed 
her by kicking her face into a pulp with a booted foot. The autopsy report stated that during 
the assault he had fractured almost all the bones in her face and skull. Unfortunately, because 
of her level of intoxication it made it easier for the accused to kill her in such a manner 
because she offered little visible signs of resistance. According to the court documents she 
was “helplessly, even paralytically drunk.”  
On the night of the murder the accused was not alone. He was in the company of his 
friend Joseph ‘Josie’ Escorse. Justice Beyers was not completely convinced that the accused 
was the sole assailant in this case. According to the evidence given by the accused, Josie had 
intercourse with the deceased. He does remember kicking the deceased once. He further 
stated that he could not remember the details of the events.  
Escorse himself gave evidence for the state. According to Justice Beyers he was an 
“unsatisfactory, unlovely character” and as a witness his impression upon the court was 
extremely bad. Notably, in the case of the accused there was almost a pathetic loyalty 
towards Escorse, and an attempt to save his friend from any undue trouble. The impression 
Justice Beyers got from Escorse was the complete opposite. To quote Justice Beyers: 
I was quite convinced that he was not beyond putting all the blame upon the 
accused. His evidence is, as I have said, unreliable, and I shall not refer to him 
again hereafter, because nothing can, in my view, be built upon his evidence. 
Clearly this was a more complicated case in which the key witness had a much 
stronger psychological control over the accused. Sadly, the accused in this case also had a 
                                                             




long history of mental illness. He had been checked in to hospitals since the age of nine. He 
had since that early age shown aggressive tendencies warranting his mother to seek advice.  
The accused reportedly had a seizure after he was born, and as he got older it became 
apparent that something was “wrong”. According to his mother, as a child he would often 
stare into space and begin to scream at nothing. Concern turned to panic when he 
aggressively attacked his younger brother. 
In 1952 the accused’s mother took him to a Dr M. Russell Clarke. He was eight years 
old at the time of his first meeting with a mental health care professional. According to Dr 
Clarke the accused’s I.Q. was in the 80s as determined by an Individual Standardized 
Intelligence Test. This meant that his I.Q. was of a “dull normal” classification. His 
aggressive behaviour was, at this stage, interpreted as probably being a secondary result of 
his intellectual inadequacy, and other “psychogenic” factors. He was placed in a special 
class, and his parents and family were more sympathetic to his aggressive and explosive 
behaviour. Dr Clarke would have recommended a neurological examination, more 
specifically an Electro Encephalograph. However, Dr Clarke lost contact with the accused’s 
case. 
Interestingly, Dr Clarke was the same doctor to examine the accused while he was in 
Valkenberg. Dr Clarke visited him on the 1st and 2nd of December 1965 at Valkenberg, and 
during two testing sessions, covering a total of 2 hours and 45 minutes, Dr Clarke 
administered the South African version of the Wechsler Bellevue Adult Intelligence Test. 
He found his verbal I.Q. to be 80, his performance I.Q. to be 88, and his full I.Q. to be 82. 
The advantage of this test is that it not only provided and overall I.Q. score, but also allowed 
for an etiological diagnosis to be made. 
According to Dr Clarke’s report: 
It has been found by many investigators that certain abilities remain fairly 
constant in the face of organic change such as organic brain damage. These 
abilities are measured by the “Hold” subtests. Other abilities, more especially 
those covering memory, new learning, spatial concepts and design, are known to 
be adversely affected by organic brain damage. These abilities are measured by 
the “Don’t hold” subtests. By applying a standardized formula comparing scores 
on the constant “Hold” subtests, with those on the adversely affected “Don’t 





By applying this formula to the accused’s test performance, he was shown to have a net 
organic loss index (indicating brain damage) of 30%. A net loss greater than 10% is indicative 
of possible organic brain damage. 
As a young child the Nazareth home14 refused to accept the accused because he was 
unable to learn like other children. According to his mother he would just stare into space at 
times or scream for no apparent reason. He would frequently attack and hurt other children 
without provocation. The social worker found out that the mother, who was Portuguese, only 
married the accused’s father, a heavy drinker, to obtain South African citizenship. She also 
admitted to the social worker that she hated the accused for being like his father and attacking 
her younger child, Julian, whom both she and her husband preferred over the accused. The 
social worker made a note on the very unhappy background from which he came. In one of 
his files it is also reported that he felt unwanted by his parents and that he knew that they 
preferred his brother. 
It appears in the accused’s story that he was vulnerable to even small amounts of 
alcohol. It is reported that he often suffered “blackouts” when he consumed small amounts 
of alcohol. He denied, however, that he had suffered actual attacks of unconsciousness, 
suggestive of epileptiform attacks, but admitted, on questioning, that he had experienced 
momentary lapses of memory at times when he could not recall what he had just said or what 
somebody had just said. He also admitted to rare occasions where he would feel dizzy and a 
bit peculiar for a few seconds at a time. He complained mainly about suffering frequently 
from short attacks of severe depression and restlessness when he thought of his unhappy 
experiences in childhood and the fact that his mother never seemed to care for him and didn’t 
want him.   
During the court proceedings the psychiatrist, who had examined the accused, 
determined that he did indeed suffer from organic brain damage which could have influenced 
his memory and behaviour. The psychiatric report concluded: 
The results of the electro-encephalograms confirm, in my opinion, the probability 
that the accused is a brain damaged individual from birth who has an epileptic 
dysrhythmia from birth. In other words, he has a brain that can be caused to 
produce an abnormality of behaviour such as impulsive, aggressive violence, or 
carrying out a impulse which he is incapable of resisting, or automatic 
uncontrollable behaviour, providing certain exciting or aggravating factors or 
conditions exist which then would tend to produce an attack. These condition 
have been proved to have been present prior to and during the time of the 
                                                             




accused’s act of violence. These include excessive fluid intake, in all probability 
resulting in fluid retention due to alcoholic over-indulgence, carbohydrate 
deficiency (lack of food) over a period of 10 hours and the influence of dagga 
intoxication (the association of dagga with alcohol is known to cause seizures in 
even non-epileptics). There is also the possibility that hyperventilation occurred, 
i.e. excessive deep breathing due to excitement or abnormal emotion which is 
one of the methods of producing abnormal brain waves in an epileptic and even 
attacks in some individuals. I consider it probable, therefore, that at the time the 
accused killed this woman he was not responsible, in a psychiatric sense, for his 
actions. For, to be responsible, a person must be in full possession of his 
consciousness and so be able to pass judgment and control his actions. I am of 
the opinion that the accused probably suffered from a minor epileptic attack at 
the time of the crime which caused his brain to function abnormally, the 
abnormality of such as to impair his judgment and render him unable to fully 
appreciate the nature of his act.  
According to the report, the accused was an epileptic since birth which could cause 
abnormal behaviour such as impulsivity, aggression, and violence. Due to this he could not be 
held responsible for killing the deceased.  
During the trial the accused gave evidence in his own defence and during the course 
of that evidence doubt arose as to his animus occidendi.15 A doubt also arose in the mind of 
the court as to whether the person before the court was mentally stable enough to form an 
intention to kill and for that reason the court thought it fit to refer the accused to Valkenberg 
for investigation of his mental condition. In due course a report was received from the 
Superintendent of the Valkenberg Hospital, which details certain observations and inquiries 
conducted by the staff of that institution and in which the medical Superintendent comes to 
the conclusion: “In view of the aforegoing findings I must come to the conclusion that in my 
opinion no reason exist on psychiatric grounds for diminished responsibility”.  
The report from Valkenberg only deals with certain interviews between the accused 
and members of the mental institution and the conclusion to which Justice Beyers makes 
reference is based entirely on those interviews together with a study of the evidence given 
by the accused at the trial. The defence, however, was able to consult a private psychiatrist, 
and one whom the accused had met with in 1952, Dr M. Russell Clarke.  
It would appear the morning after the murder the accused was unaware of the fact 
that he had killed this woman. He even went to his work with his boots and his trousers 
stained by blood; and it was only after lunch on the Saturday when his attention was drawn 
to a newspaper report referring to the death of the deceased, that he realized that he must 
have been responsible for this woman’s death. 
                                                             




If one approaches his evidence the first matter that must be decided is whether he is 
worthy of credence. Neither of the psychiatrists suggested at any stage that the accused was 
malingering, nor did the defence of lesser mental responsibility really come from the 
defence. According to Justice Beyers and his two assessors it seemed to them that the 
accused was really trying to be truthful. While on the stand the accused admitted that he went 
to the deceased to have intercourse with her after his friend Escorse had intercourse with the 
deceased. Instead, he kicked her to death. It was clear that the accused struggled to remember 
the events, despite his best efforts.  
The presiding Judge, Justice Beyers was satisfied that the accused met the conditions 
set forth in the Mental Disorders Act in section 29 (2) and on the 24th of February 1966 the 
presiding judge ordered that he be kept in custody pending signification of the State 
President’s decision. 
In cases where the mental state of the accused is concerned there are also various 
themes, or factors that become apparent. According to the cases discussed here, factors such 
as IQ, epilepsy, and family history are important. In the case of F. G. we see these themes 
very clearly. It was determined that he was of low IQ and had probably suffered from 
epileptic like seizures that could have had an influence on his behaviour and impacted his 
memory. 
The State v. F. G. is a more serious case involving psychiatric pathology. This was 
proven and resulted in the accused being declared a State President’s patient – in other words, 
incarcerated in a mental health facility.  
 
3. 4. 3. State v. S. S. & S. N., 196616 
The only other case during this period where the defendant’s mental health was 
considered was in the case of the State v. S. S. & S. N. Both had been charged with murder 
of a Coloured male. The accused S.S. had been found guilty of assault with the intent to 
cause harm.  The co-accused in this case, S. N., was detained at an institution pending the 
State President’s decision according to the terms of the Mental Disorders Act. Unfortunately, 
regarding the mental state of S. N. insufficient information was made available in the 
                                                             




archival file. The only documents available are those that prove that he had been sent to 
Valkenberg, but no additional documentation on his diagnosis could be found.   
Both of the accused assaulted the deceased, however, Justice Steyn noted that either 
one could have dealt the lethal stab to the back of the deceased’s head. Due to this and 
reasonable provocation by the deceased, S. S. had been found guilty of the lesser charge of 
assault and was given 18 months suspended for three years. 
Attention will now be given to some of the components taken into consideration 
during these trials. 
  
3. 5. General Trends on Mental Health Considerations in the Cape Town Supreme 
Courts, 1964-1966 
In this section the general trends considered in murder and murder related cases at the Cape 
Supreme Court will be discussed. These trends include intelligence quotient testing, how the 
mentally disordered or defective were defined in the Mental Disorders Act, psychopaths, early 
psychiatric treatments and institutions, the State President’s Patient, and finally the position of 
clinical psychologists.  
 
3. 5. 1. Intelligence Quotient Testing 
According to psychologists, S. Laher and K. Cockcroft the medium of psychological 
testing came to South Africa via Britain. In South Africa tests were developed in the context 
of unequal distribution of resources as dictated by Apartheid policies. These psychological 
assessment practices were used to validate the exploration of black labour and to deny black 
South Africans equal access to education. Additionally, these tests also decided who gained 
access to economic and educational opportunities in South Africa. During Apartheid certain 
jobs were reserved for white individuals only. Psychometric testing and psychological 
assessment were abused to support the practice of job reservation for white individuals.17 
In South Africa, the first assessment used was the Leipoldt-Moll Scale. This scale 
was an initial adaption of the Binet-Simon scale created by Theodore Simon and Alfred Binet 
between the years of 1904-1905. This scale was commissioned by the Parisian Ministry of 
                                                             




Public Instruction to assist in identifying special needs school children. In 1973 Carl 
Brigham caused controversy surrounding cognitive assessment when he used the Army 
Alpha and Beta test to investigate the differences of intelligence between racial groups in the 
United States. In South Africa psychologist M. L. Fick commissioned a similar study and 
also used the Army Alpha and Beta tests as well as his own Fick Scale to measure the 
differences in intelligence between black and white students. According to the results of 
Fick’s study there was a significant discrepancy between the intelligence of black and white 
students, the black students scoring lower. Fick proposed cultural, educational, and social 
reasons for this discrepancy whereas Carl Brigham did not. Fick later changed his view and 
in his book, Educability of the South African Native published in 1939, where he argued that 
the differences between racial groups was because of inherent and not external factors. This 
would eventually have lasting implications for psychological testing in South Africa.18 
Separate tests would be used to assess different races and the outcome would serve as a 
means of assessing intellectual ability and explaining “normal” behaviour.  
The National Bureau for Educational and Social Research developed and adapted a 
number of psychological assessments between the 1960s and 1990s. Some of these tests 
included the South African Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, General Scholastic Aptitude 
Test, and the Ability, Processing of Information, and Learning Battery. The South African 
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale was released in 1969. This Scale was based on the 
Wechsler-Bellevue Intelligence Scale that was released internationally in 1955.19 
The history of what to do with those deemed mentally defective dates back to 1929 
when there was an interdepartmental Committee called on Mental Deficiency. The report of 
this committee was published by the Union Education Department and had an important part 
in the development of “facilities for defectives”. The mandate of the Committee was to 
“enquire into the position in the Union with regard to the mentally retarded, mentally 
defective.”20 The terms of reference for the committee was wide and covered all aspect of 
mental deficiency, backwardness in schoolchildren, legislation with regards to mental 
deficiency, and the problems of the socially unfit. According to the findings and 
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recommendations of the Committee, the position of the mentally defective persons in the 
Union was unsatisfactory and required State action.21 
By 1967 there was another report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Care of 
Mentally Deficient persons. According to Minde the recommendations of this Commission 
was unobjectionable – the was a need to build more asylums. However, they were considered 
too expensive. Unfortunately, this report also exclusively focused on the white population, 
although the terms of reference made no mention that the focus should be solely on the white 
population. It was argued that there was a lack of adequate facilities for psychiatric patients, 
especially for non-white “defectives”. The only exception was Westlake for Coloureds. The 
Commission based their findings and recommendations on the examples set in Denmark, 
Great Britain, Holland and Germany. It was argued that if their recommendations were 
implemented, it would greatly improve the treatment of mental health in South Africa.22 
Needless to say, there was a shortage of facilities for those deemed mentally unstable, let 
alone facilities for those who committed murder and sentenced to incarceration. Another 
issue that arose was who could be deemed medically insane.  It is here that one should outline 
what constituted mental deficiency in terms of the legislation in place at the time of these 
court trials.  
 
3. 5. 2. Mentally Disordered or Defective as Defined in the Mental Disorders Act of 1916 
The Mental Disorders Act 1916 was largely based on the old British Mental 
Deficiency Act of 1913 and the pre-Union laws of the provinces. Prior to 1910 each province 
in South Africa had their own laws relating to the mentally ill. The Cape Province, for 
example, had the Lunacy Act of 1897. In 1914, Parliament enacted the Lunacy and Leprosy 
Laws Amendment Act no. 14 which changed some of these provincial laws.23 It was 
accepted at the time that no treatment could cure or improve the “mentally disordered or 
defective”. It is for this reason that mental institutions were hardly a priority for the state. It 
was only since 1944 that the Department of Health was placed in charge of mental 
institutions; before that time they were the responsibility of the Department of the Interior.24 
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The Rumpff Commission noted that since 1916, the field of psychiatry and psychology, 
particularly in the prior 20 years, had made ever-increasing progress in the field of mental 
health yet the custodial care attitude, prevalent at the time of the enactment of the Mental 
Disorders Act of 1916, persisted. Relatively isolated mental hospitals were built or 
developed; sometimes in old and disused buildings. Improvements were attempted, however, 
the stigma of these institutions persisted. When people are removed from their families and 
communities this lead to the chronicity of illness and often rejection from families. The 
Rumpff Commission recommended that the public be taught to understand mental health 
problems, and the assistance of mass media such as the press, radio and television was to be 
invoked to augment the efforts made by existing voluntary associations and public 
authorities.25 
Section 3 of the Mental Disorders Act of 1916 classified mentally disordered or 
defective persons into the following classes: 
Class I: A person suffering from mental disorder, that is to say a person who, 
owning to some form of mental disorder, is incapable of managing himself or his 
affairs; Class II: A person mentally infirm, that is to say, a person who through 
mental infirmity arising from age or the decay of his faculties, is incapable of 
managing himself or his affairs; Class III: An idiot, that is to say, a person so 
deeply defective in mind from birth, or from an early age, as to be unable to guard 
himself against common physical dangers; Class IV: An imbecile, that is to say, 
a person in whose case there exists from birth or from an early age mental 
defectiveness not amounting to idiocy and who, although capable of guarding 
himself against common dangers, is incapable of managing himself or his affairs, 
if he is a child, of being taught to do so; Class V: a feeble-minded person, that is 
to say, a person in whose case there exists from birth or from an early age mental 
defectiveness not amounting to imbecility so that he is incapable of competing 
on equal terms with his normal fellows or of managing himself and his affairs 
with ordinary prudence and who requires care, supervision and control for his 
own protection or for the protection of others or if he is a child, appears by reason 
of such defectiveness to be permanently incapable of receiving proper benefit 
from the education and training in a special school as defined in section 20 of the 
vocational education and special schools act, 1928 or in any ordinary school etc.; 
Class VII: an epileptic, that is to say, a person suffering from epilepsy who is a 
danger to himself or others or is incapable of managing himself or his affairs. 
By the 1970s, these classifications were considered obsolete, however adequate 
changes could only be effected once a new act was passed.26 While these categories of mental 
illnesses continued to simmer, the judiciary, in particular, was concerned with eradicating 
society from a much more sinister and pathologically “predisposed beast”. This lay heavily 
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on a broader confusion over distinguishing between those deemed mentally ill and not 
accountable for his/her actions and those able to fool the system: the psychopath.  
 
3. 5. 3. Psychopaths 
Various investigations unfolded to discuss the problems of psychopathy. This 
included various facets: the definition of psychopathy, aetiology of psychopathy, diagnostic 
criteria, and incidence in the community, in mental hospitals and in prisons. The part played 
by the different disciplines in the handling of the psychopath, the part played by state 
departments, medico-legal aspects, the principle of diminished responsibility, the 
amendment of the law, prevention, the influence of psychopathy on married life and family 
life, and many other matters in connection with psychopathy considered important. Of 
particular interest was how prosecutable a psychopath could be.  
Initially, psychopaths were classified under the deleted Class VI of section 3 of the 
Act of 1916, “a moral imbecile, a person who from early age displays some permanent 
mental defect coupled with strong vicious or criminal propensities on which punishment has 
had little or no deterrent effect”.27 Often legislation would be amended without completely 
revising and replacing it. In the case of the Mental Disorders Act there were amendments 
made to the Act, particularly regarding definitions. In 1944 such an adaption was made by 
Section 2 (b) of Act 7 of 1944: 
A socially defective person, that is to say, a person who suffers from mental 
abnormality associated with anti-social conduct, and who by reason of such 
abnormality and conduct requires care, supervision and control for his own 
protection or in the public interest.28 
In 1957 there was another amendment made to the Mental Disorders Act. Section 1 of act 
37 of 1957 repealed the above mentioned provision and nothing was inserted in its place: 
Psychopathic disorder is a form of mental illness and it seems that the original 
Class VI as well as the provisions substituted in 1944 applied to person’s 
suffering from such illness. The existing act, however, compels a court to send 
an accused who is found to be certifiable to an institution and such a person 
cannot be tried. Generally psychopaths are both responsible and capable of 
understanding the proceedings against them and of defending themselves, and 
such persons ought to be tried if accused of a crime, and sentenced if found guilty. 
It is apparently because psychopaths could not be tried under the existing act that 
the provisions included in Class VI were repealed in 1957. If effect is given to 
                                                             





the recommendations of the Rumpff Commission, the criminal procedure act will 
draw a clear distinction between responsibility, trialability and certifiability. As 
soon as this has been done there will no longer be any reason for this excluding 
‘psychopathic disorders’ as defined herein from the definition of mental illness.29 
Confusion continued to reign:  
There has been, and still is, considerable disagreement and confusion surrounding 
this term and its application. In North America the term ‘sociopath’ is more 
frequently used today. This refers more particularly to the individual’s inability 
to form and to maintain mature and reciprocal social relationships and to his 
general failure in adjusting to society.30 
Many definitions of psychopaths are so general and vague that they have little value 
as a diagnostic device. The English legal definition of psychopathy presented in Britain’s 
Mental Health Act of 1959 is an example. It describes psychopathy as: “a persistent disorder 
or disability of mind (whether or not including sub normality of intelligence) which results 
in abnormally aggressive or seriously irresponsible conduct on the part of the patient, and 
requires or is susceptible to, medical treatment.”31 Of concern was what to do with people 
deemed psychopathic.  
 
3. 5. 4. Early Psychiatric Treatments 
By the end of the First World War psychiatry became more of a respected profession, 
due to the prominence of shell shock among men and the public recognition of the trauma 
caused by war. By the 1920s psychiatry became an academic discipline at South African 
universities, although not well subscribed or supported. The discipline of psychiatry often 
reflected state ideological and economic priorities. Psychiatric thought and practice in South 
Africa, although deeply prejudiced and discriminatory, did not boost extreme measures like 
in places such as Nazi Germany. The financial support of asylums had still not become a 
priority for the government and the needs of white men continued to be given preference.32 
The aetiology of mental illnesses continued to be influenced by ideologies of race 
and gender. Psychiatrists and other specialists from other fields such as anthropology and 
psychology emphasized factors such as “genetic heritage” and “predisposition” often 
associated with other races. There were others that stressed factors such as social conditions 
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such as poverty, place and upbringing. The beliefs of the 19th century, and earlier, regarding 
the abilities, attitudes, emotions, and psychological strength of individuals suffering from 
mental illness remained largely influential. In cases of black patients, they would most often 
receive a diagnosis of schizophrenia and white patients, depression or neurosis. However, 
even when determined that they are suffering from the same condition, different racially 
specific causes and inclinations were attributed as the cause.33 
Black patients were often described as being incapable of experiencing guilt or 
depression and therefore seldom suicidal. If suicide was attempted it was explained as the 
consequence of anger. White professionals wrote of urbanization as especially stressful for 
Africans. Therefore, they argued, this was the cause of a psychopathological state of mind. 
These views underpinned segregationist and apartheid policies, even when not directly cited 
by governments. Internationally, there were a mixture of new treatment methods tested. 
Many of these methods became controversial or were replaced by more effective treatments. 
From the 1930s treatment included convulsive therapies for manic depression and injections 
of camphor and cardiozol for schizophrenic patients. Hypothermia was used as a treatment 
for syphilitic patients. Electroconvulsive therapy and insulin-induced comas were also 
popular treatment methods.34 
An amendment to the Mental Disorders Act of 1916 reoriented psychiatric discourse 
away from disease and disorders and towards the treatment and recovery of patients. Patients 
who were suffering were encouraged to voluntary treatment and legal certification was no 
longer required. As part of the move away from custodial care, there were efforts made to 
deinstitutionalize patients. Mental health societies were established across the country to 
assist local services such as specialist schools and rehabilitation or occupational centres for 
the “mentally handicapped.” Additionally, general hospitals established inpatient treatment 
units for psychiatric patients, and treatment for alcoholism.35 
From the 1950s and 1960s drugs such as chlorpromazine, lithium, and imipramine 
became popular for effectively treating mental illnesses. The medications would not 
necessarily cure patients, but managed extreme symptoms and behaviours. Sedatives and 
hypnotics also became more widely prescribed by general practitioners.  
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Deinstitutionalization following the discovery of psychoactive drugs in the 1950s changed 
the profession of psychiatry and psychology internationally by reducing the number of 
chronically psychotic patients and in doing so changing the profile of psychiatric hospital 
populations.36 
The 1950s saw an era of new therapies in psychiatry becoming available to patients. 
In 1952 the neuroleptics, imipramine in 1956, and the inhibitors of monoamine oxidase in 
1958. These drugs had a prolonged and positive effect on psychotic symptoms that had been 
previously unresponsive to treatment methods. Therefore, physical restraint was no longer 
necessary, and the use of treatments such as insulin comas, and shock treatment could be 
minimized, or eliminated completely. As outpatient treatment became possible, the function 
of an asylum could now shift from custodial to curative care. This resulted in a dramatic drop 
in patients’ numbers in asylums.37 
Not only did new psychoactive drugs become popular in treating patients, but in the 
1950s and 1960s behaviour therapy also became popular. This method became popular with 
psychologists, whose function was different than that of a psychiatrist. With behaviour 
therapy there was an opportunity to become involved in an “approach to treatment” whose 
general intellectual justification was firmly rooted in psychology rather than psychiatry. We 
see psychologists begin to work independently and develop their own models.38 
The 1960s saw a move towards a move progressive psychiatry. An example of this 
would be inter-disciplinary approaches, academic specialties, and the inclusion of psychiatry 
into general nurse training. There were arguments highlighting the pressing need for black 
psychiatrists. The idea was that they will serve their own communities, therefore freeing 
white psychiatrists to assist white patients. The influence that these new drugs had and the 
changes they permitted did not escape the attention of parliament. A member of parliament 
had pointed out as early as 1959 that the psychiatric system in the country needed to shift 
from custodial to curative care. Notably, there was no corresponding policy change, and it 
was only in 1961 that the Minister of Health stated that the new drugs and treatments offered 
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the hope of cure and emphasized early intervention as to avoid detention at a mental facility, 
and that this was to be the rule.39 
The annual reports to the Minister of Health by the Commissioner for Mental Health 
clearly reflected the impact of these new antipsychotic drugs. In 1960 the report of the 
Commissioner noted a rise in admissions and discharges for South African asylums, along 
with voluntary admission, improved treatments, and a change in attitude from communities. 
According to the Commissioner, psychotic patients had benefitted the most from the change 
in regime.40 
 
3. 5. 5. Early Psychiatric Institutions  
The treatment and care for mental illness existed since the earliest occupation of 
Southern Africa. According to historian Julie Parle treatment was sought across all 
communities from indigenous healers through local medicines, religious or spiritual guides, 
and rituals. Sustainable care and control of those deemed mentally ill have only been 
formalized since the 1800s.  Sadly, before then the only option was to restrain those deemed 
mentally ill in jails. The detained were not treated differently than the other criminals in the 
jails. Spaces were eventually made available in hospitals or annexes.41 
The first hospital to offer some care for the mentally ill was the Somerset Hospital 
established in 1818. The facilities were woefully inadequate. In 1846 the colonial 
government converted the Robben Island prison into a facility for lepers, chronically ill and 
mentally ill patients. Geographically it was cut off from the mainland and reserved for 
disruptive patients. According to Parle the situation at Robben Island was often described as 
dire and there was evidence of abuse of patients. Medical treatments favoured at the time 
included hypnotics, bromides, and calomel, all of which had serious side effects. Records 
also show that alcohol, chloral hydrate, laudanum, tincture of opium, cannabis indica, and 
hemlock juice were administered to patients. After 1891 white patients had a segregated 
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mental hospital at Valkenberg Hospital. Only after 1916 were black patients accommodated 
at separate buildings on the same estate.42 
In 1892, Valkenberg, situated on the outskirts of Cape Town, was the first hospital 
in the Cape designed to specifically cater for the mentally ill. The Valkenberg hospital’s 
focus continued to be on severely psychotic disorders. In these hospitals, services were 
largely custodial. Custodial care meant containing those suffering from mental illnesses in 
asylums. This was due to the lack of adequate treatments available at the time.43 The 
favoured treatment for black patients was manual labour. Mechanical restraints were 
eventually phased out, yet straitjackets and seclusion remained a way to control and subdue 
unruly or suicidal patients. For white men the most common explanations for insanity were 
alcohol abuse, epilepsy, mania, dementia praecox,44 and “general paralysis of the insane”, 
which was the tertiary stage of syphilis.45 
During this period little was known about the causes of mental illness among the 
“Coloured, Native, or Asiatic” inmates. 46 Additionally, in most cases, the asylum staff rarely 
spoke African languages and made little effort to understand their diagnoses. The main cause 
given for illnesses among black men included insangu47 smoking. Paperwork demanded 
detailed information yet “unknown” was the most common term noted for the cause of 
mental illness for black patients.48 
During the Apartheid government’s tenure most of the state’s psychiatric institutions 
remained centrally administered by the national government’s Department of Health. After 
1944, when the management of mental health services shifted to the Department of Public 
Health from a separate division known as the Department of the Interior, mental health policy 
remained the same until 1973. There were only two legislative changes during that period. 
In 1957 an amendment transferred the cost of a non-South African migrant to the patient’s 
home country. Additionally, the amendment changed the name of the Commissioner for 
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Mental Disorder to the Commissioner for Mental Hygiene. The second amendment came in 
1961 which extended free treatment to voluntary patients who could not afford care. The 
procedures for the management of mentally ill patients remained as set out in the 1916 
Mental Disorders Act, with only minor amendments, as discussed above.49 
 It is within this climate that a convicted felon suffering from a mental illness could be 
declared a State President’s Patient or be sent for psychological help. 
 
3. 5. 6. The State President’s Patient 
Convicted felons declared as State President patients were initially incarcerated 
indefinitely in mental institutions. With changes within the disciplines of psychiatry and the 
emergence of psychology and social work as related and emerging disciplines, new ways of 
treating these patients appeared. State president’s patients were discharged provisionally. It 
was recommended that they be placed under the supervision of social workers only if it 
appeared that they would benefit from the intervention. The services of social workers was 
to be utilized merely for the purposes of ensuring some measure of control.50 In cases where 
the defendant was declared mentally disordered, s/he was deemed a State President’s patient 
decision. Therefore, s/he was subject to the mercy of the State President. Due to the lack of 
special institutions and existing institution’s ability to handle and care for the criminally 
insane, these patients would often spend their time in the hospital section of prisons or in the 
few institutions that could accommodate them. It was also in this context that the role of 
psychologists, and clinical psychologists in particular, was considered important. 
 
3. 5. 7. The Position of Clinical Psychologists 
Compared with the services in some western countries, clinical psychological 
services were relatively underdeveloped in the republic: 
Clinical psychologists may register with the SA medical and dental council, the 
latter regards them as paramedical (as is the case with physiotherapists, 
radiographers, etc.) with the result that they do not enjoy professional recognition 
or status. Many medical aid funds refuse to accept liability for the accounts of 
clinical psychologists. This state of affairs exists despite the fact that a clinical 
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psychologist’s course lasts six years including 12 months as an intern at an 
approved psychiatric hospital.51 
Government notice R. 1727 of 30 October 1964 states that a clinical psychologist 
may examine and treat patients only if he is a member of a team of which at least one member 
is a medical practitioner. Because of this lack of status medical practitioners were reluctant 
to refer patients to a clinical psychologist. Their salaries were relatively unattractive, with 
the result that very few students were attracted to the occupation. Furthermore, very few 
posts were available for clinical psychologists.52 
Many psychiatrists and medical practitioners’ felt that psychologists were not 
qualified to enter the field of psychotherapy and were therefore to be confined to tasks such 
as psychological testing and research. This period was marked by vast improvements in 
accepting psychology and psychologists as instrumental to the welfare of convicted felons 
enhancing the status of clinical psychologists as part of a multi-disciplinary team.53 
It was in the aftermath of the assassination of Verwoerd that the disciplines of 
psychiatry, psychology and jurists were brought closer together.  
 
3. 6. The Death of Hendrik Verwoerd and the Beginning of the End for the Mental 
Disorders Act No. 38 of 1916 
The Commission of enquiry into the assassination of Verwoerd was essentially a 
detailed investigation into the life of Tsafendas. Tsafendas was the illegitimate child of a 
non-white Mozambican mother and a white Greek father. According to South Africa’s racial 
classification he was considered a Coloured. Since his early days his life was one of 
transience and marginality, with little sense of family or home. He lived his adult life as a 
nomad. Travelling from one destination to another. Notably, Tsafendas was, during his many 
travels, often detained in psychiatric institutions. Repeatedly he was diagnosed with various 
serious psychiatric illnesses. In 1946 he was classified as a “schizophrenic with deterioration, 
prone to assaultiveness and agitation, smearing the walls with his faeces, experiencing 
hallucinations.”54 In 1952, he was diagnosed with “manic depressive psychosis” and this 
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diagnosis came with reference to the tapeworm that Tsafendas said had been bothering him 
since 1937. During the periods that Tsafendas experienced mental stability, he spent his time 
at sea.55 
Another concern for the Commission was how Tsafendas was able to obtain 
employment in parliament as a messenger. By the mid-1960s the National Party government 
had implemented aggressive affirmative action policies for whites in the public sector. Work 
such as the one Tsafendas had received in parliament was reserved for those in the lower 
levels of civil service, particularly for loyal supporters of the National Party. The work he 
had obtained in parliament was therefore reserved for a white person and preferably an 
Afrikaner Nationalist. Considering that Tsafendas was a “half-caste”, and someone with 
alleged communist leanings, it was spectacular that he had gained employment in parliament. 
The Commission was told that Tsafendas was only appointed because of the desperation of 
the state which was reduced to employing “incompetents”. This was a consequence of the 
labour shortages caused by its affirmative action policy. The parliamentary official 
responsible for Tsafendas’s appointment told the Commission that “he was the best of the 
loose spineless applicants” making themselves available for such employment. There had 
been no effort made to do a background check on Tsafendas before he was employed. “In 
short, in rendering Tsafendas’s personal biography, the commission established a version of 
Verwoerd’s assassin as a ‘half-caste,’ illegitimate, ill-educated, psychotic man, roaming 
aimlessly, without a stable family – a man without an identity, without a home, without any 
attachments, and without any coherent version of a cause”.56  
The report of the Commission of Enquiry into the death of Verwoerd, or the First van 
Wyk Commission as it is also known, recommended that another commission of enquiry be 
set up to look into the matter of the mentally deranged. This became known as the Rumpff 
Commission of 1967. This in turn led to another commission of enquiry, the Second van 
Wyk Commission. Although the First van Wyk Commission was not a focus point of 
discussion in this study due to the abundance of literature already available on the subject, it 
is nevertheless important due to the other Commissions of Enquiry that stemmed from it. 
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3. 6. 1. The Rumpff Commission of 1967 
In the aftermath of Verwoerd’s assassination a one man commission of inquiry was 
appointed, headed by Justice J. T. van Wyk. This commission is referred to as the first van 
Wyk Commission. That commission found that “it is probable that a large number of 
assassinations, if not the majority are committed by mentally disordered persons. They are 
pre-eminently the ones who could be used to commit a murder.”57 The first Van Wyk 
Commission recommended that the “advisability be investigated of compelling all medical 
practitioners-including all psychiatrists to submit to the Commissioner the names of all 
patients who are mentally disordered and who, in their opinion, are likely to become a danger 
to others at some time in the future.”58  
In 1967, the Rumpff Commission was appointed to “inquire into and report on the 
efficacy or otherwise of existing statutory provisions and legal rules regarding (a) The 
adjudication of criminal cases involving persons alleged to be suffering from some form of 
mental derangement; (b) the responsibility and the criminal liability of such persons; and (c) 
the prevention of acts by such persons which are dangerous to others”.59 The Rumpff 
Commission also had to make recommendations concerning any law reform considered 
necessary and pragmatic in the interests of such persons and in the public interest. The 
commission produced its report in 1967.60 The Rumpff Commission concluded that a 
commission of inquiry be appointed to inquire and revise the Mental Disorders Act No. 38 
of 1916. That commission was appointed in 1972 and referred to as the Second van Wyk 
Commission.61 
The Rumpff Commission highlighted a problem that had been persisting in South 
Africa before Verwoerd’s assassination. It was clear that in cases where the accused’s mental 
health is a factor, the law and psychiatry did not work with each other. This is highlighted in 
the memorandum submitted by the National Council for Mental Health to the Rumpff 
Commission. In this memorandum Dr. R. W. S. Cheetham stated: 
I would like to respectfully plead with the Commission that, where possible, the 
points of contact between psychiatry and law be expanded and, where possible 
the points of difference be minimized. On behalf of the South African National 
                                                             
57 A. Kruger: Mental Health Law in South Africa, p. 24. 
58 Ibid., pp. 24-25. 
59 Ibid., p. 25. 
60 J. H. van Rooyen: “The Psychopath in South African Criminal and Mental Health Law,” The Comparative and 
International Law Journal of Southern Africa, (9), (1), 1976, p. 4. 




Council for Mental Health and also another member of the executive committee 
of the Society of Neurologists and Psychiatrists, I beg to disagree, in principle, 
with the current concept that the aim of Law is to ‘protect’ society and that 
psychiatry attempts to ‘protect’ the individual, at the expense and to the danger 
of society.62 
According to Dr. Cheetham the differences could be bridged in time, provided that 
the jurist and the psychiatrist each discharged their task in a responsible manner and, in 
practicing their profession, especially in the trial of criminal cases, look beyond their own 
interests, remembering that the interests of society was at stake.63  
Ironically, the gap had been bridged when psychiatrists were called to act as expert 
witnesses. In effect, what the recommendation implied was an alignment of the goals of each 
of these professions within the judicial system.   
 
3. 6. 2. Psychiatrists in the Dock: Psychiatrists as Expert Witnesses 
The Rumpff Commission discussed impressions of the existing legal system that 
dated back to 1924 with a specific focus on a report published in the South African Law 
Journal. It is a report from a symposium held by representatives of the local Bar and the 
medical profession on mental disease and criminal liability. According to Dr. C. C. Elliot 
who was in attendance at the symposium, the discussions were summarized as follows: (a) 
the necessity for a skilled psychiatrist being available to the courts for advice to the assessors, 
or in a consultative capacity; (b) the absurdity of both the prosecution and the defence calling 
medical witnesses, when there could be an impartial board of experts to examine the case 
and report to the court; (c) that it was undesirable to, as a jury, decide whether a person is 
insane or mentally deficient; (d) that it is necessary for lawyers to be better acquainted with 
the subject of mental deficiency; (e) the advisability of punishments being graded according 
to the degree of responsibility present; and finally (f) the superiority of South African law to 
English law in regard to the subject of mental deficiency.64 
According to Dr. E. Swift, the then Physician Superintendent of Valkenberg, English 
law only recognized disorder of the cognitive and intellectual faculties that affected 
responsibility, whereas conduct and responsibility were largely influenced by disorder of 
                                                             
62 RP 69/1967, Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Responsibility of Mentally Deranged Persons and 
Related Matters, p. 5.  
63 Ibid. 




other faculties of the mind such as emotions, instinct and will. Dr. Swift defined mental 
disorder as a morbid condition of the whole organism and argued that it should be recognized 
that the normal restraining influences may be compromised in a way not particularly 
associated with the intellect or will. With reference to the M’Naghten rules, Dr. Swift also 
supported the idea that a rigid test for responsibility should be abolished and that it should 
be recognized that there are degrees of responsibility.65 
Dr. R. A. Foster, the Physician Superintendent at the Alexander Hospital also 
considered that the M’Naghten rules should be abolished. According to him the quest ion of 
ascribing criminal responsibility was quite impossible for the majority of psychiatrists, 
especially considering the way the M’Naghten rules were governed. He contends that “the 
rules intended to apply to the herd, can only be applied to a few individuals”.66 
The commission received various representations concerning the criteria of 
responsibility and the application of the M’Naghten rules. The then Attorney-General of the 
Transvaal was of the opinion that the M’Naghten rules, as such, did not constitute part of the 
law, although they were used by some judges. He recommended that since it is impossible 
to draw up rules which would cover the circumstance of every possible case, the question of 
whether a person was insane or not should be decided in each case on the evidence. The 
various jurists across the country had mixed opinion of the M’Naghten rules. Some believed 
that it should be done away completely, others believed that it was common sense legislation 
and should therefore stay, and lastly there were those who felt that the M’Naghten rules 
needed to be expanded upon and modified, but not done away with completely.67 
It is this very dissention, difference of opinion and clearly different applications of 
the various laws throughout the country, and how they are applied to specific cases that 
require studies such as this to ascertain the impact of legislation on particular types of 
offences. It also necessitates an investigation on how the criminal procedure was to be 
implemented to somehow formalize what was clearly a fractured medical and judicial 
system. 
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3. 6. 3. The Trial of Individuals Suffering from a Mental Disorder 
The first part of the Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Responsibility of 
Mentally Deranged Persons and Related Matters deals with the technical aspects of the law 
such as mens rea and the M’Naghten rules. It is the second part of the report that is arguably 
more important to this study. As a starting point it is important to refer to section 182 of the 
Criminal Procedure Act of 1955 which reads as follows:  
If at any time after the commencement of any trial it is alleged or appears, that 
the accused is not sound of mind, or if on such a trial the defence is set up that 
the accused was not criminally responsible, on the ground of insanity, for the act 
or omission alleged to constitute the offence with which he is charged, he shall 
be dealt with in manner provided by the law relating to mental disorders.68 
Additionally, section 164 of the Criminal Procedure Act of 1955 which deals with 
the fitness to stand trial, reads as follows: 
If, when, (a) the accused is called upon to plead to a charge, it appears to be 
uncertain for any reason whether he is capable of understanding the proceedings 
at the trial, so as to be able to make a proper defence, the procedure described in 
section 28 of the Mental Disorders Act of 1916 shall be followed. If the jury or 
the court, as the case may be, find that he is capable, the trial shall proceed as in 
other cases; (b) if he is found to be not capable, the accused shall be dealt with in 
accordance with the provisions of section 28 of the Mental Disorders Act of 1916; 
and (c) if a person is found to be incapable of understanding the proceedings at 
the trial may thereafter be again indicted or charged and tried for the offence at 
any time when he is so capable; and lastly (d) the provisions of this section shall 
be read as being additional to and not in substitution for the provisions of section 
28 of the Mental Disorders Act of 1916.69 
The abovementioned sections of the Criminal Procedure Act of 1955 are the 
provisions for dealing with accused persons who are perceived to be mentally disordered, 
and incapable of understanding the trial process or the charges made against them. This 
section is not concerned with criminal responsibility. It is a procedural provision in terms of 
which an inquiry has to be made into the mental condition of the accused at the time of his 
alleged offence. These provisions are necessary because the accused has to be present at his 
trial, has the right to cross examine the opposing witnesses, and to give evidence himself. 
Therefore, it was necessary that he be mentally capable. However, it was argued that this did 
not only pertain to those suffering from mental disorders. “Deaf mutes” were also found unfit 
to stand trial. The accused had to understand the proceedings in order to make a proper 
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defence.70 When the court was in doubt, they have to follow the procedure set out in section 
28 of the Mental Disorders Act of 1916. 
In the Mental Disorders Act there are classifications of the different types of classes 
of mentally disordered states that could afflict the accused. For this study, it is important to 
refer to Class VI. This class had originally made provision for those with anti-social 
behaviour, which is a feature of psychopathy. That class was deleted from the Mental 
Disorders Act of 1916 in 1957. This class read as follows: 
A socially defective person, that is, to say, a person who suffers from mental 
abnormality associated with anti-social conduct, and who by reason of such 
abnormality and conduct requires care, supervision and control for his own 
protection or in the public interest.71 
The commission made inquiries as to why this part of the Act was deleted, 
considering the then current events and how psychopathy had come to the fore. According 
to the Department of Health it was desirable to delete this passage because it was redundant: 
Section 3 of the Act is a classification of section 2 (1) in which a mentally 
disordered or defective person is defined, This implies that the mental 
abnormality referred to in Class VI must amount to abnormality which falls 
within the definition; Section 2 (1) of the Act. As this is so, any person whose 
conduct is anti-social by reason of mental abnormality-if the abnormality is a 
mental disorder or defect within the meaning of Section (2)-can be classified 
under the Classes I, II, III, IV, V or VII. Since class VI was inserted in the Act in 
1944, when the Act was amended, it had given rise to a great deal of confusion 
in the courts of law. Advocates for the defence had on numerous occasions raised 
the plea that the accused was a socially defective person as described under Class 
VI of the Act and had tried to prove that he was a psychopath and therefore 
mentally abnormal and that as the abnormality was associated with anti-social 
conduct he was not responsible for his criminal acts. It was difficult for the 
psychiatrist called by the state to get the magistrates or judges to accept the fact 
that the mental abnormality must amount to an abnormality which fell within the 
definition (Section 2 (1) of the Act). Usually the psychiatrists called by the state 
were psychiatrists in the mental hospital service and they succeeded in clarifying 
the position-but there were occasions when they did not and on occasions when 
a psychiatrist, who was not in the service, was called to give evidence for the 
state the plea by the defence almost invariably succeeded. A great deal of time 
was wasted in the courts when his plea was advanced by the defence.72 
In light of this explanation from the Department of Health it is clear that in practice, 
confusion arose concerning the concept of non-responsibility and the concept of certifiability 
under the act. The Act did not define when a person is regarded mentally disordered nor did 
it define a permanent mental disorder. Additionally, it was not possible to infer a definition 
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of mental disorder or mental defectiveness from the classification given in section 3. The 
Act did not define responsibility and was only referred to in passing in section 29 of the Act. 
That section only provided that when an accused at trial is found to be not responsible on 
account of mental disorder or permanent mental defect, a special verdict had to be returned 
that stated that s/he was guilty of the act but was mentally disordered or defective.73 
Sections 27, 28, and 29 of the Mental Disorders Act are the most important sections 
of that legislation relating to this study. In section 27 the provision was made for a person 
under detention for the purposes of their preparatory examination or trial sentence. If the 
Attorney-General concerned, or prison officer was of the opinion that the accused was 
mentally disordered or defective, the magistrate had to be advised accordingly as to what 
steps could be taken in terms of the Mental Disorders Act. According to section 28 when the 
accused was found to be mentally disordered or defective before or during his trial, and 
whose trial is stayed, his condition must be inquired into. If the court is satisfied that the 
accused meets the criteria, he is declared a State President’s patient. If the court was in doubt, 
the accused was to be detained for observation and the Physician Superintendent had to 
submit a report. Lastly, section 29 stated that if an accused was actually capable of standing 
trial and in the trial there was an inquiry as to whether the accused was mentally disordered 
or defective at the time of the act, he was not to be considered responsible according to the 
law. If the accused was found to be not responsible, a special verdict was to be returned that 
the accused was guilty of the act but was mentally disordered or defective.74 These sections 
were to be revised and included in Chapter 13 of the proposed Criminal Procedure Bill that 
had lapsed in 1973, which will be discussed in greater length in the next chapter. Therefore, 
these sections were retained and unrevised in the new Mental Health Act of 1973.  
The inclusion in the Mental Disorders Act No. 38 of 1916 of provisions relating to 
criminal procedure and the provision in section 182 of the Criminal Procedure Act of 1955 
gave rise to a host of problems and misconceptions. The Mental Disorders Act had its own 
purpose which essentially had little to do with responsibility or fitness to stand trial. That 
was the purpose of the criminal procedure act. It was to regulate the procedural problems 
arising from those concepts. The commission was of the opinion that it could never have 
been the legislature’s intention that every person who may have been deemed to be mentally 
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disordered or defective under the Mental Disorders Act of 1916, would be found unfit to 
stand trial. Psychiatry did not deny that there were in fact cases, even though they were the 
exception, where a person may be deemed to be mentally discorded or defective within the 
meaning of the Act while they may be nevertheless capable of standing trial.75 It is here that 
one is reminded of the statistics from Chapter Two which support this observation.  
The provision of section 28 of the Mental Disorders Act of 1916 and the provision 
of section 161 of the previous Criminal Procedure Act no 31 of 1917 created an impression 
that when the accused was deemed under section 28 to be certifiable under the act, s/he must 
be declared a State President’s patient without any necessity of going into the question of 
whether he is fit to stand trial. There were steps taken which confirmed that impression as 
the correct one and this was done by the addition by Act 29 of 1955, of sub-section (5) to 
section 161 of Act 31 of 1917 and its retention in the successor to the Act of 1917-Act 56 of 
1955.76 
There were persons who made representations about the above-mentioned legislative 
problems. It was suggested to the commission that the procedural provisions regarding the 
examination and trial of accused persons should be removed from Act 38 of 1916 and be 
incorporated in the Criminal Procedures Act with the necessary amendments so that the 
distinction between non-responsibility, unfitness to stand trial and administrative 
certifiability was not obscured. The head of some mental hospitals argued that even if an 
accused were incapable of understanding proceedings against him, the trial against him 
should proceed and the court should arrive at a decision whether he was guilty of the act he 
was charged with. The commission firmly disagreed with this.77 The role of the psychiatrist 
in these court cases, and through the findings of this commission, seriously questioned the 
weight that had been placed on psychiatrist’s testimony during trials of this nature.  
According to the commission two possibilities arose during the trial of persons 
alleged to be insane. In the first scenario, the accused would admit his act, but would allege 
that he was insane at the time of committing the offence. In the second scenario, the accused 
would deny that he committed the act, but plea in the alternative that if it be found that he 
committed the act, he was insane at the time of the offence. In the first scenario the 
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circumstances of the admitted act would be used as evidence in support of the plea of 
insanity. In the second scenario, if the accused was found unfit to stand trial and the plea was 
advanced on his behalf that he did not commit the act, something which seldom happened in 
practice (if the statistics are anything to go by), it would be impossible for the court to arrive 
at a decision as to whether the accused did indeed commit the offence. If the court were to 
proceed to decide whether the accused did commit the act, not only would the rights of the 
accused be disregarded, but the trial could be by no means effective. The results might be, 
in the words of the commission, grotesque.78 
The heads of these hospitals also recommended that Class VI, which was deleted in 
1957 from section 3, be reinstated. According to the commission, if the law was amended as 
they recommended, the reason for Class VI’s deletion would disappear. In fact, the 
commission considered that in the event of their recommended amendment of the law in 
regard to responsibility were to be accepted, it would be desirable to revise the entire section 
three to bring it into line with contemporary trends and ways of thinking in the disciplines 
of psychology and psychiatry.79 
 
3. 6. 4. The Feasibility of Preventing Dangerous Acts Committed by Mentally Disordered 
Individuals 
The final discussion of the Rumpff Commission centred around the efficacy of 
existing statutory provisions and legal rules regarding the prevention of acts by mentally 
deranged persons. Due to the often unpredictable behaviour of the mentally disordered 
person, they were often regarded with fear. After the assassination of the Prime Minister 
there was a tendency to assume that there were a number of potentially dangerous mentally 
disordered persons at large in the country. According to the commission, it was with 
contemporary knowledge and diagnostic methods, that many potentially dangerous mentally 
disordered persons could be detected before they committed potentially dangerous acts.80 
According to the Commission, a mentally disordered person, whether obviously 
disordered or not, who talked about murdering and expressed intense aggressive drives and 
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impulses against a particular person, usually a relation, or people in general, could be 
summarily placed in safe custody by the proper authorities. Other concerns were raised: (a) 
how to deal with mentally disordered persons who for some reason or another had not been 
certified; (b) detention facilities for those certified as dangerous mentally disordered; (c) 
after-care of the certified patient on his discharge from hospital; (d) escaped certified 
mentally disordered persons-even those who had not yet shown signs of being dangerous.81 
 
3. 6. 5. Mentally Disordered Persons Not Yet Certified 
Here two concepts are diametrically opposed to each other. Firstly, the welfare of the 
community and secondly, the freedom that every citizen of a democratic country regards as 
a fundamental right.  However, the commission believed that the welfare of the community 
must take precedence over individual rights. The solution that they provided is twofold. All 
dangerously mentally disordered persons should be kept in hospitals and must be accepted 
and carried as a community risk. The other extreme is that all mentally disordered persons 
must be detained in mental institutions.82 
Even if it were possible to test all persons suffering from some form of mental 
disorder it would have been impossible to make any kind of accurate assumption regarding 
their potential danger. Due to this there existed no simple and reliable method of eliminating 
the potential danger of mentally disordered persons. Although there was admittedly no 
simple way of screening potentially dangerous mentally disordered persons, it still appears 
that there were deficiencies in the existing lawful preventive measures against such persons 
that had to be remedied. There existed a variety of potentially dangerous categories. The 
National Council for Mental Health of South Africa submitted the following categories: (a) 
the aggressive psychopathic personality; (b) the anti-social high-grade defective; (c) the pre-
psychotic paranoidal individual with unrestricted use of, for example, firearms; (d) 
alcoholics, drug addicts, and hallucinogenic drug users.83 
The necessity for an institution for the detention of convicted psychopaths was 
stressed, among others, by the National Council of the Social Services Association of South 
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Africa. This council considered individuals with the following markers as dangerous: (a) 
their behaviour is threatening and aggressive; (b) they have been repeatedly convicted of 
violent crimes; (c) a psychiatrist has diagnosed them as being psychopathic or suffering from 
a mental condition that makes them incapable of controlling their behaviour; (d) they cannot 
be detained in mental hospitals because they are not certifiable in terms of the Mental 
Disorders Act. Category (b) contains potentially dangerous persons, some of whom are often 
sent after committing a crime to a mental hospital where there is no provision for proper 
attention, treatment and rehabilitation. Regarding category (c) there was a request made that 
their firearms be removed and that they not be able to gain legal access to firearms in the 
future.84 
Regarding the reporting of mentally deranged individuals, Justice A. J. Smit 
proposed that a legal requirement be made of medical practitioners to report to a magistrate 
every case of suspected mental disorder, upon which the magistrate was to take steps for the 
case to be certified. There was a recommendation made to the commission for the creation 
of a central register that was advocated by some, and strongly opposed by others. The 
Department of Justice suggested that the Commissioner for Mental Health should have at his 
disposal a Central Bureau for mentally disordered persons to which medical practitioners 
could submit reports. The Department of Justice acknowledged that this approach would 
have its problems. It was also doubtful whether it would afford an effective means of 
preventing serious crimes by mentally disordered persons. The persons reported to this 
Central Bureau would be examined by a panel of psychiatrists with a view to treatment. 
There was another suggestion made to keep track of patients who were psychopathic - 
placing them in an institution for psychopaths where they could be treated and controlled.85 
The First Van Wyk Commission recommended that particulars of all persons who 
were receiving or had received treatment for mental defects in any hospital or similar 
institution should be sent to the Commissioner for Mental Health who would compile a list 
of such persons, and that any psychiatrist or psychologist consulted by the Security Police in 
connection with a security investigation, would be entitled to ascertain from the 
Commissioner whether the name of the person concerned appeared on the list. Additionally 
the First Van Wyk Commission also recommended that an inquest be conducted on the 
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viability of compelling all medical practitioners, including psychiatrists, to submit to the 
Commissioner the names of all patients who were mentally disordered but not in an 
institution and who were in their opinion, likely to become a danger to others at some time 
in the future.86 It is here that one can see an attempt to draw psychiatrists into the oppressive 
state arm of the police under the apartheid government.  
Those who were strongly against that recommendation stated that it would be an 
encroachment upon the liberty of the individual and that medical ethics did not permit it as 
it would undermine the trust between doctor and patient. Additionally, it was impossible, as 
stated before, to predict who was potentially dangerous. The recommendation was also not 
practical due to the extensive administrative machinery that would be required. It was also a 
concern that this register could lead to malpractices since malicious persons could submit 
the names of their enemies to the registry. After consideration of the advantages and 
disadvantage of such a measure it was determined that the disadvantages outweigh the 
possible advantages and that the institution of such a register would be impracticable and 
undesirable.87 
The dangerous certified mentally disordered persons, both white and non-white, were 
scattered all over the country in all the existing mental hospitals. This state of affairs was 
deemed unsatisfactory because: (1) None of the existing hospitals, except in Bloemfontein, 
had effective “maximum security” wards to prevent escapes; (2) there was a world of 
indifference to the planning, design, architecture, and administration of a “maximum security 
unit” hospital and the facilities required for neurotic and harmless psychotic patients; (3) the 
modern permissive approach which was being applied and developed in mental hospitals 
was not suitable for dangerous mentally disordered cases. It precluded the maintenance on 
the same premises as the rest of the hospital of a maximum security unit, which would 
moreover aggravate the stigma attached to these hospitals. (4) The staff at a maximum 
security hospital were to be specifically selected and trained to be able to control inmates; 
and, (5) at the time, malingerers sometimes reported themselves in order to try to evade 
imprisonment.88 
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The commission also set out the requirements for such a place. These requirements 
were: (1) In the planning, provision was to be made for the compartmentalization of different 
diagnostic entities; (2) Although security was to be the main objective, the treatment, 
whatever nature or form, was not to be neglected. It was suggested that (a) inmates would 
receive physical as well as psychological care and treatment and (b), an active program of 
rehabilitation in preparation for ultimate return to the community was to be worked out and 
applied. Lastly, (3) strategies had to be implemented to address the lack of therapeutic 
facilities which was said to be harbouring mutual resentment between inmates and the staff.89 
 
3. 7. Chapter Conclusion 
Following the assassination of Verwoerd, it could be argued that the climate of 
excessive concern, bordering on a witchhunt for possible mentally deranged individuals in 
the country, could be considered a type of moral panic of the late 1960s and early 1970s. 
However, out of the proverbial madness came significant and long-overdue debates and 
discussions which ultimately led to a closer formal working relationship between the mental 
health and legal professionals over the treatment of the mentally unstable who appeared 
before the judiciary, much in the same vein as the volunteers of the Cape Mental Health 
Society, which will be discussed in the next Chapter. It is clear that legislation alone could 
not compensate for poor psychiatric services provided by the state, and therefore adequate 
and satisfactory treatment facilities were considered a priority. According to the 
recommendations submitted to the commission, it was clear that the Mental Disorders Act 
of 1916 was out of date. Additionally, the problems with the prevention, detention, proper 
and adequate accommodation and treatment, discharge, and the need of integrating 
psychiatric and psychological services, made the urgent revision of the outdated Mental 
Disorders Act essential. The Rumpff Commission concluded by suggesting that another 
commission of enquiry should be appointed to revise the Mental Disorders Act No. 38 of 
1916 and to investigate the possibility of restructuring the administrative control of mental 
hospitals.90 
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The investigation of the case files proved useful as it already highlighted some of the 
issues prevalent in subsequent discussions during the commissions of enquiry. In the next 
chapter, criminal cases that were sent for evaluation during these discussions will be 
presented in order to assess if and how these contentious issues were negotiated by the 
judicial system during this interim phase. Attention will also be given to the recommendation 

























Mental Health in the Courts, Parliamentary Debates and New Acts of Parliament,  
1967-1973 
During the commission of enquiry into the death of Hendrik Verwoerd and the 
subsequent Rumpff Commission of 1967 which led to discussions on reforming the 
mental health system in place in South Africa, cases continued to be tried for murder at 
the Cape Town Supreme court. In five of the cases which appeared before the court, in 
1968, 1970 and 1971, the suspects were sent for mental evaluations. During this period, 
debates unfolded on the need to institute a new Mental Health act as well as reform 
criminal procedure to deal with cases that involved those deemed mentally ill. Of 
significance was the Botha commission of 1971. By 1973, a new mental health act was 
passed. Although this was only enacted it 1975, it did require adjustments to what was 
perceived to be an ineffective Criminal Procedure Act of 1955. This led to the second 
Van Wyk Commission of 1972 as well as an enquiry into the biggest oppositional voice 
to changes in mental health in South Africa, the Scientologists. The 1972 report on the 
Commission of Enquiry into Scientology also provides some context to the debates 
around changing mental health legislation. By 1973, all foundational discussions had 
been concluded and the results of this are evaluated in Chapter Five. 
This chapter will begin by reviewing the five cases which were sent for mental 
evaluations. Attention will then be given to the Botha Commission, the second Van Wyk 
Commission of 1972, the Commission of Enquiry into Scientology and the unfolding 
debates of parliament around the Criminal Procedure Bill of 1973.  
It is argued that elements of the 1960s discussions and debates, as presented in 
Chapter Three, are visible in the cases brought before the courts in 1968, 1970 and 1971. 
These dates correlate with these debates and discussions. Interestingly, no cases appeared 
in 1967, 1969 and 1972 – one year after Verwoerd’s assassination in 1966 and one year 
after the Botha Commission of 1971, neither in the years during the second Van Wyk 
Commission of 1972 nor the Commission of Enquiry into Scientology of 1972. The latter 
commissions already predetermine some of the shortcomings of the legislation to be 





4. 1. Mental Health Evaluations in the Cape Town Supreme Court, 1968-1971 
The murder and murder related cases, in the period after Verwoerd’s assassination 
will be discussed, as well as the cases where mental illness was averred. This will provide 
context as to how the courts dealt with defendants in the immediate aftermath of Verwoerd’s 
death and ascertain whether the broader discussions presented in the previous chapter were 
in any shape or form reflected in the court proceedings.  
 
4. 1. 1. State v. J. O., 196891 
On the 8th of March 1968 J. O. was charged with the crime of rape and murder. The 
accused was a young Coloured male who raped his sister-in-law while she was asleep. 
According to her, this was the second time he had done this. On the night in question, he got 
on top of her and pinned her arms to her side. Before she realized it, he proceeded to have 
sex with her. The deceased was a neighbour who was alerted by the commotion after the 
accused’s sister-in-law had pushed him off her and a scuffle had broken out. The deceased 
slapped the accused twice in the face and the accused retaliated by stabbing him in the chest. 
According to the report from Valkenberg, the accused was certified on the 12th of March 
1968. The report said: 
A history obtained about the familial background has revealed that his father 
suffered from involuntary movements and died at a relatively early age. The 
patient under observation has shown to have myoclonic contractions as well as 
fits of Grand Mal epilepsy which are followed by very prolonged and profound 
confusion lasting from 12-20 hours which may very well have influenced his 
actions at the time of alleged offence, provided that there was a history of a 
preceding seizure. His intellectual development is that of the dull normal group 
and he must be regarded as mentally disordered in terms of the Mental Disorders 
Act, for which he needs care, supervision and treatment. 
According to the testimony of C. S. the accused lived on the farm Wolwekloof with 
his mother. She stated that he had suffered from “vallende Siekte”.92 She had witnessed his 
epileptic fits when he had them. He used medication infrequently, but when he took his 
medication he had no attacks. The accused had stayed with them from the Friday until 
Sunday morning. She stated that she did not witness him having an attack when he was at 
their house. On the Saturday, she and the accused and her husband along with others went 
to town. They bought half a “gelling” wine and took it home with them. According to her 
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everybody had a bit to drink, but they were not drunk. Her husband and the accused later left 
to do some work on the farm. When they returned, both were visibly drunk. She clearly states 
that she was sober. Later, both passed out outside and she pulled her husband into the house 
and left him by the table in the kitchen. 
She left the accused in the doorway where he was sleeping. She and her three kids 
went to bed. Later that night she felt someone on top of her and she realized this person was 
having “relations” with her. She stated that his “privates were inside her” and she first 
thought it was her husband. It was dark. She realized the voice belonged to the accused and 
said “J. O, is dit alweer jy, dit is nou die tweede keer wat jy dit aan my doen.”93 He held his 
arms around her body. He said nothing. She started to struggle and pushed her one hand in 
front of accused’s chest and the other hand onto the bed. Eventually, she managed to get out 
from under him. She moved into the kitchen but he followed her. He pulled her on her skirt. 
She noticed a bottle of wine and used that to hit him on the head. She woke her husband. Her 
husband’s stepfather, “Kaffer”94 Erasmus, and the deceased arrived. She told them what the 
accused had done to her. The accused then came back in to the house and sat down on the 
couch. The deceased tried to convince C. S. to lay a complaint against the accused at the 
police station. The accused then said to the deceased “jou moer.”95 The deceased then 
slapped him twice. After the deceased slapped him, he took the knife that was on the table 
and went outside. When she and the deceased walked outside, the accused stabbed him in 
the chest.  
The deceased went into his house and C. S.’s husband, J. S., confiscated the knife 
from J. O. The deceased went to lay on his bed but was bleeding profusely from a wound in 
his chest. He died a little while later. 
The accused did not plead to any of the crimes he was charged with. For his sentence 
he was ordered in terms of sec. 28(4) of Act 38 of 1916 to be kept in custody in an appropriate 
institution pending the outcome of the State President’s deliberation. On the 30th of May the 
commissioner for mental health, P. Naudé issued a warrant for his detention as a State 
President’s Patient. 
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4. 1. 2. State v. H. B. & B. M., 196896 
Both accused where charged with the crime of murder on the 9th of May 1968. Both 
parties pleaded not guilty to the charges. Both were also found guilty of murder. However, 
H. B. was found guilty of murder with extenuating circumstances. B. M. was found guilty 
of murder without extenuating circumstances. H. B. was sent to a reform school and B. M. 
received the death sentence. B. M. was sentenced on the 30th of May 1968 and H. B. was 
sentenced on the 9th of August 1968. The delay was due to a pending report from the parole 
officer. 
The deceased and her friend walked to Paarl from the farm where they lived, on the 
morning of 25 September 1967. In Paarl, they visited a bottle store and a bar. There they met 
two female Coloured persons, Anna Marthinus and Siena Barnes. They returned to Anna’s 
home. She later laid down on her bed as she had recently suffered an injury. The deceased 
and her friend Francis sat in the kitchen and that was when one of the accused entered and 
sat down. Shortly after, the deceased and Francis left to go back to Agterdam, the farm where 
they lived. The two accused then followed them to steal their wine. They robbed them and, 
in the process, assaulted them. The deceased turned back to report the incident in Paarl and 
her friend Francis made her way back to the farm where they lived. Her body was found on 
the 27th of September 1967 about 700 yards away from the point where the deceased had 
turned around back to Paarl. Apparently, the accused encountered her on her way back to 
Paarl and B. M. told her to go home, but she refused. He proceeded to hit her with a stick. 
This did not deter her, and he threatened to stab her to death if she did not return. This also 
did not deter her, and he stabbed her in the right side of her neck. 
Both of the accused admitted that on the day of the murder they followed the 
deceased and her friend, Francis Pienaar. They did admit that both of them had something to 
drink on the day of the crime. During the questioning of H. B., his lawyer, Mr Immerman, 
asked them if they were smoking something when they were following the women. He 
admitted that they were smoking dagga. According to H. B., during cross-examination, B. 
M. told him to hold the feet of the deceased during the attack. When asked why he did so, 
he admitted that he was scared that B. M. would also cut him with the knife. Apparently, two 
years before the murder, B. M. had literally stabbed him in the back. He also says that it was 
B. M. that tried to severe her head, not him. While he was holding the feet of the deceased, 
                                                             




B. M. kneeled on her chest and proceeded to cut her head off. It was this action that led to 
the psychiatric evaluation.  
According to the Department of Social Welfare and Pensions report for H. B. he 
received no schooling. His previous convictions include crimes such as theft and assault with 
a piece of iron. He never knew his mother and his father died 12 years before. According to 
the report all his family members were mentally and physically normal, except his great aunt 
who was an epileptic. He was raised by his ‘grootouers.’97 They had a tight bond and he 
deemed them to be his true parents. According to the report he had made friends with the 
wrong people as he got older, especially with his grandparents’ one son, the accused B. M. 
It appears that he had a strong hold over H. B. and was an extremely negative influence on 
him as well. He realized that his regular alcohol use as well as B. M.’s hold over him was 
the reason he found himself in his present predicament at the tender age of 16 years old. 
Unfortunately, there is no Valkenberg report included or any other document that 
detailed his time at Valkenberg. The only information was Dr Simons from Valkenberg’s 
opinion that although the accused had demonstrated a certain degree of intellectual 
backwardness, he was not considered certifiable in terms of the Mental Disorders Act. 
 
4. 1. 3. State v. D., 197098 
The case of the State v. D. v. D is unique due to the pathology of the accused’s mental 
difficulties being psychological, and not physical. The accused was a young white male who 
strangled a 13-year old white female, after which he allegedly attempted to have intercourse 
with her corpse. Here is an account of what had happened according to the accused: 
Dit was Woensdagaand the 25ste Maart 1970- kwart oor agt het ek na die 
waenhuis toe gestap. Toe het die oorledene op haar fiets verby gery. Sy het toe 
gestop en gevra of ek plate het om vir haar te leen. Ek het ja gesê. Sy het saam 
met my in die huis ingestap. Ek weet toe nie wat gebeur het nie maar toe ek my 
kom kry het ek haar verwurg. Dit was in ons huis. Ek het haar fiets verder in 
Townsendstraat opgevat en het dit in n oop erf ingestoot. Ek het toe weer terug 
geloop huis toe. Omtrent half elf dieselfde aand het ek haar in die pad uitgesleep. 
Toe het ek weer huis toe gekom.99 
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On the 18th of June 1970 the accused was found guilty of culpable homicide. The 
court was of the opinion that the accused did not intend on killing the deceased. There were 
an ample number of witnesses to testify that the accused had shown to be an intelligent and 
hardworking school boy. However, there was some undeniable evidence that the accused 
was psychiatrically or emotionally disturbed although he was not certifiable in terms of the 
mental health law. Prof Van Wyk, deputy-commissioner of mental health testified that it 
would be best for the accused to be institutionalized for an extended period in order to 
conduct further investigations on his condition. 
A report on the accused’s condition was filed on the 30th of July 1970 by the clinical 
psychologist J. C Maritz who had worked with the accused while he was at Stikland Hospital. 
According to the report he was accepted on the 8th of July 1970 as a willing patient at the 
Neuroclinic with the aim to receive treatment for certain aspects of his personality which 
had not developed fully during the process of becoming and adult (puberty). These aspects 
of his personality included a lack of proper socializing, reduced affect-response that led to 
isolated behavioural problems, and an over-inhibited personality that resulted from the first 
two problems. Over a period of three years, the accused had received treatment from various 
doctors that included a Dr Roux that had built a relationship of trust with the accused. Dr 
Geyser focused on behavioural therapy, and Dr Wait took over the case after Dr Geyser’s 
death in 1971. He not only focused on die behavioural conditioning process, but also paid 
attention to the psychodynamic aspects. Mr J. C. Maritz, the clinical psychologist focused 
on reinforcing the positive behavioural patterns that the accused had learned, helping him 
find inner control instead of external control, helping him to develop and reinforce good 
morals and principles. Lastly, the accused had also received speech therapy at the Tygerberg 
medical campus for his speech difficulties. 
The defence in the accused’s case included a specialist psychiatrist, Dr A. A. Zabow 
who also testified at his trial. He saw the accused on the 5th of April 1970 at his private 
practice. He conducted an examination under methedrene and amatyl. What this meant was 
that Dr Zabow was not satisfied with the initial information he had received about the 
accused from the accused and his mother. He decided to do an examination using a 
combination of drugs – methedrene which was a stimulant and sodium amatyl which was a 
central nervous sedative used to get rid of a maximum amount of inhibition. Dr Zabow and 
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the doctor wanted to better understand his inner feelings. Additionally, he also wanted to see 
if there were any factors which were either being suppressed or repressed, that the accused 
was either consciously withholding or dissociating at an unconscious level. 
According to further testimony by Dr Zabow he viewed the crime committed by the 
accused as a sexual offence. He had this encounter with this young girl, as he told Dr Zabow, 
because she had invited him to have sex with her. He already knew her, or thought he knew 
her to be a girl of easy virtue and the circumstance of their being alone in an empty house 
had already aroused him sexually. When the deceased allegedly made this invitation to him, 
very clumsily and without any experience at all, he grabbed for her. The deceased’s reaction 
to him grabbing her was such that she started to struggle and being sexually aroused at the 
time, frustrated and perhaps aggressive at being rebuffed, the accused seemed to have lost 
sight of what was happening. The accused’s aim was to go through with the sexual act. To 
have her sexually. When, as a result of this initial struggle in which he put his arm around 
the neck of the deceased, she collapsed to the ground, there were still these sexual emotions, 
frustration and aggression, but this was now accompanied by a further emotion of panic over 
what he had done. A terrible fear that when she regains consciousness, she would tell 
someone what had happened. In this state of this mixture of emotions and sexual arousal, 
frustration, aggression and panic for fear of being shamed, he then went on to make use of 
the toilet brush and broom to cover his tracks. According to Dr Zabow, when the act was 
completed it was as if he had come back to reality, realizing what he had done. That is when 
the accused decided to cover his tracks by using the broom and the toilet brush to clean up. 
He then took a suitcase from his mother’s room and used it to help pull the body outside to 
hide it. However, before he had dragged the deceased’s body outside, she was still lying in 
the passageway of the house. He opened her brassiere, pulled down her pants, touched her 
breast, interfered with her genitals, bit her thigh and then also, attempted some form of sexual 
penetration with her corpse. 
Dr Zabow was asked if he thought that this was a lust-murder. According to him it 
did not fall into the category of a lust murder, in that the accused had not gotten any sexual 
pleasure out of any sadistic attack. Dr Zabow had also told the court that the accused had 
told him that he never ejaculated during the event. He had told the doctor that the attempt 




According to the doctor the accused’s father was an absent parent and he never had 
a warm relationship with his mother. Therefore, there was no opportunity to form a 
significant and warm relationship with an adult during his formative years. He therefore 
never learned how to deal with certain feelings and emotions, especially feelings of love, 
aggression, frustration, and sexual feelings. It was also noted that the accused did not have a 
circle of emotionally matured friends who could have been a positive influence in his life. 
According to further testimony of Dr Zabow, one of the major inhibited areas in his 
development was that of sexuality. Sex for him was associated with something which one 
does not talk about, one does not show one’s feelings about it and one tries as far as possible 
not to acknowledge its existence. Except that it does exist and biologically it was there. The 
court asked Dr Zabow whether or not the accused was mentally ill and according to him he 
was not. According to Dr Zabow the accused was not mentally ill in terms of the 
contemporary understanding of mental disorder or mental illness. 
The next question the court asked Dr Zabow was whether or not the accused was a 
psychopath. The doctor did not believe that the accused was a psychopath. Dr Zabow 
elaborated on this point and said the following: 
There are writers who describe this sort of offence as being the act of a sexual 
psychopath. I have up until now used the term ‘sexual offender’ or spoken of a 
sexual offence for this reason. There is some confusion about the meaning of the 
word ‘psychopath.’ In fact, recently in the world classification it has been 
changed to the term sociopath so that one knows more or less what one is talking 
about, a person who is inclined to outbursts of aggressive, impulsive behaviour: 
who is not able to benefit from experience; who shows no anxiety, guilt or 
remorse and whose acts tend to be anti-social. And who, in their developed 
mental history indicates evidence of persistent anti-social behaviour. Now, on the 
other hand the word ‘sexual psychopath’ has been used by some writers merely 
to indicate not psychopath or sociopath in the terms I have just described them, 
but rather that the committal of an offence associated with sexual behaviour in 
which the other party is harmed.100 
Dr Zabow suggested to the court that the accused could be classified as an introverted 
schizoid. Such a person would be unable to form adequate relationships and they tended to 
withdraw from relationships, such as the accused did in this case. However, Dr Zabow agreed 
that he would respond to treatment and would be able to better himself.  
Justice Steyn, however, was not satisfied that the accused was not mentally 
disordered, because psychiatric testimony concluded that he was not mentally disordered or 
                                                             




defective because of a physical defect such as epilepsy, but psychiatrically disordered. The 
accused had experienced problems with his sexual development, which manifested in 
abnormal behaviour which resulted in the death of the deceased female. Therefore, Justice 
Steyn found the accused guilty of culpable homicide, however, he agreed that the accused 
did suffer from some psychological ailment and was in need of psychiatric assistance. His 
sentence was therefore suspended for three years on the condition that he submit himself as 
a voluntary patient at Stikland Hospital for treatment during those three years. 
 
4. 1 .4. State v. G. J. P., 1971101 
G. J. P., a white 16-year-old male was found guilty of murder with extenuating 
circumstances after he had strangled a 59 year old white male to death. The man the accused 
murdered was a guard from the industrial school, Die Built. The deceased was supposed to 
accompany the accused on a train ride back to Die Built School in George from which he 
had escaped. However, the deceased wanted to escape from the train and therefore he 
strangled the deceased with the chain that connected his handcuffs. The accused had shown 
throughout his life certain behavioural problems, particularly fits of rage. However, he did 
not commit this act in a fit of rage like his previous indiscretions. He admitted that he 
committed this act in an attempt to escape. The accused had been known to revolt under 
circumstances of restraint. 
The welfare report document presented to the court dated back to 1968. It was a 
record of his problems. In 1968 the accused saw a psychiatrist for his behavioural problems. 
The psychiatrist who saw him recommended that he be sent to Boys Town Kinderhuis102 in 
the Transvaal. Whether this had occurred was not known, because it was not in the record. 
According to the testimony from an officer of the welfare department, the accused’s mother 
accused him of being uncontrollable. According to his mother, the accused had violent fits 
of rage and refused to go to school. When he did go to school, he did not put in any effort 
into his schooling. 
His parents were immigrants from the Netherlands. They managed to maintain a 
South African standard of living and they were accepted as such. His dad was a relatively 
sick man and his mother was a homemaker. She used to work but had to stop due to the 
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accused’s behavioural problems. The father earned R160 per month and was the sole 
breadwinner in the house. They had to move to a new area due to the problems caused by 
the accused at their previous residence. According to the officer they had lived above their 
means. The family’s relationships with each other were extremely tense due to the 
behavioural problems of the accused. The officer noted that there was nothing wrong with 
the intelligence of the accused. 
His untrustworthiness resulted from his serious fits of rage. The intensity of his fits 
increased whenever he was contradicted or constrained. Whenever he did something wrong 
his mother usually punished him by not giving him food until he apologized. On one 
occasion he had put a knife to the neck of his younger brother and threatened to cut his throat 
if his requests were not adhered to. He had a tendency to break the neighbour’s windows and 
he would climb onto roofs and refuse to come down. During a visit to the district surgeon 
for an evaluation he had gotten into a fight with the doctor and the police had to be called. 
During another visit to a psychiatrist at the Karl Bremer hospital in Bellville he tried to hit 
his mother over the head with a chair, in the presence of the psychiatrist. He had received 
treatment at the Karl Bremer hospital. They had performed EKG103 tests at the Jan Kriel 
School for epilepsy in Kuilsrivier, and at Karl Bremer hospital. According to these tests there 
was a light cerebral dysrhythmia present that got worse whenever he was at home. However, 
there was no definitive epileptic symptoms present. 
He had also spent time at Tenderden in Wynberg. It was a type of safe house. His fits 
of rage actually improved when he was discharged from Tenderden. The accused was also 
obsessed with gaining weight. He was afraid of being small and delicate like his father whom 
had shown no real interest in the accused. The accused however longed to find a friend in 
his father to talk to about the things boys and men are interested in, but his father did not 
reciprocate. His mother was overprotective and treated him like he was a small child. He 
acted out against this treatment. He refused to be associated with anything small, because it 
made him feel small, powerless, and worthless. 
The fact that he felt humiliated and hurt by his father’s lack of interest and by his 
mother’s overprotective behaviour only seemed to fuel his fits of rage. It is during these fits 
that he could validate his feelings and he got some satisfaction from the idea that other people 
feared him. According to the principal at Tenderden, the accused was a capable, honest and 





hardworking man that could have achieved many things if he was treated right and 
understood. The report concluded that the accused should not be returned to the custody of 
his parents until they adjusted their conduct towards the accused. 
Before Justice Steyn made a decision about the fate of G. J. P, he asked Dr Zabow, 
the psychiatrist who testified at the trial and treated the accused, some important questions. 
According to Dr Zabow the accused suffered from a severe form of personality disorder best 
described as psychopathy which was exhibited from an early age. He was prone to 
aggressive, explosive outbursts of violence, usually when provoked. He also exhibited other 
hallmarks of psychopathy such as truancy. He admitted to lying at times and he had shown 
a complete indifference to the feelings of other people and how his behaviour had affected 
other people. 
Dr Zabow states, however that he made this observation on the basis of the records, 
before the events of the crime were revealed during the actual trial. This was not a post hoc 
diagnosis, but based a diagnosis on his record up until the time he was fetched from his home 
in Bellville and taken to the train. The diagnosis was not dependent on the accused’s crime 
but on his previous personality and previous record and his crime confirms that, although in 
this instance he was not provoked in the same way as the instances previously related to the 
court, there was once again the impulsive behaviour to conquer with no consideration of the 
consequences. 
Justice Steyn wanted to know what the cause of the psychiatric disorder could be. 
This was difficult to answer. What was known about the accused was that he was the second 
born child of five children. He was from an immigrant family that were experiencing 
economic difficulties. The accused also had a very poor relationship with his mother and 
father. His mother had experienced a prolonged and difficult birth. He was at one stage 
dropped on his head, and was dazed and lost his breath for a while. Therefore, these were all 
possible interacting factors between physical and constitutional aspects of psychopathy and 
the more familiar aspects in which very often there was a history of early poor relationships 
with parental figures. 
Dr Zabow viewed him as a potential threat to society. Justice Steyn wanted to know 
from Dr Zabow what the course of treatment should be for the accused. In South Africa there 
was little experience of this and this was one of the reasons why the Van Wyk Commission 




Zabow mentioned the US, Great Britain, and Denmark as countries that had shown that 
psychopathic personalities are best treated in specialized mental institutions which were 
neither mental hospitals nor conventional prisons. They were institutions under the direction 
of, or at least the guidance of, psychiatric personnel, with the assistance of psychologists, 
and social workers. The aim of this type of institution was to achieve a degree of social 
maturity. 
Justice Steyn found the accused guilty of murder with extenuating circumstances and 
sentenced him to 12 years imprisonment. Additionally, Justice Steyn determined that the 
accused should be committed to what was referred to as a young adult first offender’s prison 
in Kroonstad, with a further recommendation that the accused be transferred to Weskoppies 
Psychiatric Hospital in Pretoria at the earliest opportunity. The court indicated that the 12-
year sentence was imposed for the protection of the public. Justice Steyn stated that should 
the accused respond favourably to treatment, the authorities could, in the court’s view, 
review his sentence.  
The accused did apply for leave to appeal against the verdict. According to Justice 
Steyn it was reasonably possible that another court would have come to a different 
conclusion, that is, that the accused should have been convicted of culpable homicide. 
Therefore, leave to appeal was granted.  
This was not a case where the degree of moral guilt of the accused was a dominant 
factor in the determination of penalty. It was the undisputed view of a psychiatrist called by 
the defence that the accused, by reason of a severe personality disorder, was someone against 
whom the public required protection. His recommendation was that the accused should be 
isolated from the public for an undetermined period. No such authority vests in the court 
under the provision of the criminal code and it was obligated to determine detention for an 
arbitrary period, which the court coupled with certain recommendations in an attempt to 
safeguard the interests of the accused in the event of his responding favourably to treatment. 
In the Supreme Court of South Africa appellate division in front of the Honourable 
Justices Homes, Potgieter, and Trollip the conviction of murder with extenuating 
circumstances was set aside and substituted with a verdict of guilty of culpable homicide. 
The sentence of 12-years’ imprisonment was also set aside and substituted with a sentence 




debates on mental health appear within the court proceedings but also how the law can be 
interpreted in such a vastly different manner, especially if the accused was white.  
 
4. 1. 5. State v. M. B., 1971104 
The accused in this case was charged with murder after stabbing a man in the chest 
resulting in his death. He and a friend were on their way to a club for a night out. On their 
way there they ran into the deceased and two of his friends. The friend of the accused and 
the deceased were familiar with each other and started a conversation. The accused 
overheard the deceased say “is die mental sonny ook saam jou?”105 This comment deeply 
offended the accused. He proceeded to slap the deceased and then a fight broke out between 
the deceased and the accused. According to the testimony of the friends present, they fled 
the scene when they saw something resembling a knife. It was during this altercation that the 
accused must have stabbed the deceased. 
Due to his paranoid tendencies he was sent to Valkenberg to see a psychiatrist. 
According to an officer from the Department of Coloured Affairs the accused had been 
diagnosed as mentally retarded. According to the Superintendent at Valkenberg there was a 
life pattern, starting in early childhood, of behavioural disturbance which was so severe as 
to require medication in an attempt to control it. During his observation period at Valkenberg 
there was no evidence found of mental defect, and he gave a clinical impression of someone 
with an IQ of 81. In the ward, he had not been placed on medication and did not exhibit signs 
of impulsivity, for which he had been previously treated. His mood and state had been 
“appropriate” to his situation and his thought processes was deemed clear. There was no 
evidence, objective or subjective, of hallucinations and he did not express delusions or 
psychotic behaviour. The psychiatrists deemed him not mentally disordered in terms of the 
Mental Disorders Act. 
In light of these factors, Justice Steyn stated that the court determined that he did not 
have the intention to kill the deceased. The accused was found guilty of culpable homicide, 
and not murder. Justice Steyn sentenced the accused according to the terms of article 352 (1) 
(a) of the criminal procedure act of 1955. His sentence was to be suspended for a period of 
three years and the accused was to be released on the condition that he subjected himself to 
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the training, treatment, supervision and control of the Cape Mental Health Society located in 
Observatory. The court had also requested that the Cape Mental Health Society submit 
reports to the court every six months on the accused’s progress. 
 
4. 2. Sentencing Trends, 1967-1971 
For some accused where their mental health was brought into question, their previous 
observation period in mental institutions was an extenuating factor in the sentencing process. 
In the cases State v. P. d. S of 1967, State v. D. of 1970, State v. M. B of 1971, and the State 
v. G. J. P of 1971 their previous observation periods in mental institutions were considered 
a factor for the trial judge to consider because it showed a history of mental illness. In the 
case of State v. P. d. S106 there was a possibility that the accused had been wrongly treated 
for gonorrhoea or that he might have already contracted syphilis the first time he was sent to 
Valkenberg. Syphilis does have an effect on the mental condition of the person afflicted and 
therefore the accused’s mental state could have been afflicted for a while before he 
committed his crime. He did have a history of grandiose delusions-symptomatic of syphilis 
according to the psychiatrists at Valkenberg; however, he was treated for gonorrhoea and 
given penicillin. His delusions dissipated and he was released from Valkenberg, possibly 
suffering from syphilis. 
Epilepsy was a factor in these cases that features more prominently than other 
conditions. The effects of epilepsy can include confusion, affected mood, and in some cases 
cause issues with memory recall.  The IQ of the accused was often discussed in these cases 
considering certain behavioural problems that sometimes accompanied these individuals. 
This could have an impact on their ability to either understand the court proceedings or to be 
able to make a proper defence. The effects of dagga and alcohol also feature heavily in these 
cases. In some cases, the accused admitted to using both, usually chronically, or before they 
committed the act they were accused of.107 
In the cases of the State v. D. of 1970 and Stave v. G. J. P of 1971, the discussions 
around their mental health became more interesting because their behaviour could not have 
been blamed, essentially, on conditions such as epilepsy, or dagga and alcohol abuse. The 
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accused D. was a young white male guilty of strangling a white 13-year-old female. The 
psychiatrist that testified at his trial was of the opinion that he was not mentally disordered 
and that he was not mentally disordered at the time of the act he committed. According to 
the psychiatrist D. was not a psychopath, but someone with a Schizoid personality type.108  
In his case his personality never fully developed during puberty, and he had an inhibited 
attitude towards sexuality. This meant that to him sex was something not to be talked about 
or to be acknowledged. His relationship with his mother and father was also an important 
factor considered by the courts. He had an absentee father and he never had a warm 
relationship with his mother. Additionally, he had no friendship group from which to learn 
how to deal with certain feelings, or friends to help and support him for that matter. 
In the case of the State v. G. J. P. of 1971, much like D., his mental illness was not 
caused by organic factors such as epilepsy. He had displayed behavioural problems early in 
life, usually in the forms of extreme fits of rage. His poor behaviour was likely aggravated 
by his poor family life based on the history of his mentally disordered behaviour. G. J. P. did 
not have a meaningful relationship with his parents. His father had shown no real interest in 
him and his mother was overprotective of him. The way she had treated him made him feel 
inferior and worthless. He longed for a meaningful relationship with his father, but this was 
never reciprocated. His behavioural history was important in the case, because he did not 
commit his crime in a fit of rage, which he was prone to, but it does explain from what place 
his actions could have come from. 
In the cases where mental illness was not a factor, as discussed in Chapter Two, there 
were other mitigating factors to be considered on a case by case basis. Death penalty cases 
are interesting because the point of mitigating factors is to lessen a charge or to avoid the 
death penalty. In the case of the State v. J. D. of 1967 the accused stabbed a police Constable 
to death. This was a capital offence. For the accused there were no extenuating circumstances 
and the accused was sentenced to death. The fact that he was a member of the group Poqo 
probably did not help his chances. However, it was not clear whether the death penalty was 
politically motivated, it was clear that the trial judge was disgusted with the accused that he 
had caused the death of a police officer. Rape was also a capital offence and whether the 
                                                             




death penalty was handed down depended on who the victim was. In the State v. I. B. the 
accused raped a nine year old girl for which he received the death penalty.109 
In the cases where mental illness was not a factor, the accused would have to rely on 
other mitigating factors. In the State v. J. H., the accused received only a suspended sentence. 
He was perceived favourably by the trial judge because in his 50 years he had never been 
convicted of a crime. Additionally, he had his one arm amputated from the shoulder, 
therefore, when the altercation with the deceased escalated he was at a considerable 
disadvantage and it ‘made sense’ that he would use a knife to defend himself.  
In certain cases, it can be argued that being white was a mitigating factor. There was 
a tendency to give white offenders the lesser sentence in criminal cases, depending on the 
severity of the crime, type if crime, and the type of victim. In the State v. J. D. P. the accused 
killed a woman by assaulting her. He was found guilty of culpable homicide and only fined 
R20 for his crime. The trial judge insinuated that the deceased had started the trouble, 
because she had a reputation as being a difficult woman, especially when she drank. 
For some accused persons their previous convictions counted against them. In the 
State v. G. V. the accused had been convicted of culpable homicide, twice. According to the 
trial judge there was certainly provocation present but this was his third murder. The judge 
deemed him a dangerous man and gave him a lengthy sentence. 
Of significance, is the way in which mental health and the changes in how psychiatry 
was developing in the country started to enter the courts. To accommodate these changes, 
and to ensure that these new definitions could serve as extenuating circumstances within 
sentencing practices, required a re-evaluation of the Criminal Procedure Act. It is here that 
the commissions of enquiry and parliamentary debates become important.  
 
4. 3. The Commission of Enquiry into the Criminal Procedure Act of 1955 – The Botha 
Commission of 1971 
In 1970 a commission of inquiry into criminal procedure and evidence was called. 
This commission was headed by Justice D. H. Botha. The commission had to inquire into 
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and report on various aspects of criminal procedure and evidence. This commission 
published its report in 1971.110 
The object of substantive criminal law is to protect society as well as the offender 
themselves, against harmful and dangerous conduct. The law of criminal procedure and the 
law of evidence prescribe the procedure to be followed for the proper enforcement of the 
substantive criminal law. The ideal criminal procedure and evidence act would ensure that 
the guilty offender is never acquitted, and that the innocent person is never condemned. 
Sadly, such an ideal can never be achieved due to human failings and because of the 
presumption of innocence. Every system of criminal procedure should be so designed as to 
ensure, as far as possible, but with the observations of fairness, the conviction of the guilty 
without creating any danger of the condemnation of the innocent.111 
A recommendation was made to the commission regarding the onus of extenuating 
circumstances in murder cases. According to existing legislation, a sentence of death was to 
be imposed in terms of section 330 of the criminal procedure act on a person convicted by a 
superior court of murder. Where the court found that there were extenuating circumstances, 
this could be waivered. The onus to prove the existence of extenuating circumstances on a 
balance of probabilities, rested upon the accused. That is in accordance with the generally 
accepted principle that with reference to any sentence the onus rests upon the accused to 
prove the existence of circumstance which he alleges had an extenuating effect. The General 
Council of the Bar of South Africa suggested that the onus of proving the absence of 
extenuating circumstances be shifted to the state. The result of this would be that if any 
evidence of extenuating circumstances is given to the court, the court would be able to 
impose any sentence other than the death penalty unless the state proves, either beyond a 
reasonable doubt or on a balance of probabilities, the absence of such circumstances. 
According to Justice Botha no reasons had been given for this suggestion, and the reason for 
the change is not self-evident.112 Where the legislation states that the trial court may impose 
a sentence other than the death penalty, this is where the trial judge’s preference can exert 
influence.  
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In the Criminal Procedure Act extenuating circumstances are not defined for the 
purposes of section 330, but there are circumstances which can be considered such as the 
accused’s mental capacity or emotions on the day of the alleged offence. This determines 
blameworthiness. The trial court is required, therefore, to determine in a particular case 
whether there were circumstances present which would have affected the mental capacity or 
emotions of the accused, whether such circumstances did in fact influence the accused, and 
whether the influence was, according to the final view of the court, of such a nature that it 
reduces the reprehensible nature of the accused’s crime. This inquiry is purely a subjective 
one. No one knows better about the accused’s mental capacity and emotions than the accused 
themselves, and no one better could testify on their behalf than themselves. If the accused 
knows how to prove it, he ought to be given the chance to do so. How the state is to prove 
the absence of such influences is not clear. An accused’s belief falls peculiarly within his 
own knowledge, and it is almost self-evident that the existence thereof should be proved by 
him, and that it cannot be expected of the state to prove the absence thereof.113 
It is not contended that because the onus of proving the presence of extenuating 
circumstances rests upon the accused, that this could result in an injustice. It is conceded that 
the courts do not in practice require a high degree of proof of the existence of extenuating 
circumstances from the accused, and that where there is any doubt with regard to the 
existence, or not, of such circumstances the executive usually commutes the sentence. 
However, it is difficult to foresee the practical effect in all possible cases of the proposed 
shifting of the onus to the state, but it could have the effect of placing the imposition of the 
death sentence within the complete discretion of the trial court in a considerably larger 
number of murder cases. This recommendation which could have such an effect fell outside 
of the commission’s terms of reference. Therefore, according to Justice Botha the proposal 
could not be supported, and no recommendation was made.114 Although this 
recommendation was not accepted, it is interesting to see that this type of change was 
suggested, especially considering that it could have impacted a considerable number of 
murder cases where the death penalty could have been passed. 
In view of what is alleged to be the considerable number of executions in South 
Africa, and the alleged doubtful value as deterrent, in all circumstances, of the death 
sentence, a suggestion was submitted to the Commission on behalf of the Institute for the 
                                                             





Prevention of Crime and the Rehabilitation of Offenders to consider the possible abolition 
of the death sentence, except in the following circumstances: (a) treason; (b) murder with 
premeditation; (c) murder on a policeman or prison official in the course of his duties; (d) 
murder committed in perpetrating the crime of rape, robbery, housebreaking or theft.115 
The institute also submitted to the commission, for its information and for a 
recommendation, a memorandum on penal reform and punishment in general. According to 
Justice Botha penal reform or punishment clearly did not fall within any of the commission’s 
specific terms of reference. Neither was it an aspect of “criminal procedure and evidence” in 
the general mandate to the commission. Additionally, it was apparently also so understood 
by the legal profession and the general public, because no other memoranda or 
representations were received by the commission on this difficult matter with regards to 
which sharp differences of opinion existed especially amongst experts in the field. Therefore, 
Justice Botha declined an invitation to consider the suggestion and make a recommendation 
thereof.116 
The commission concluded that a new Bill on criminal procedure and evidence 
should be drafted. The new Bill was prepared in consultation with this commission. The 
alterations which are not mentioned in the report are not alterations of principle and are not 
contentious, and for the most part are purely textual alterations. Interestingly, Justice Botha 
did not think it was necessary or possible to mention and to deal with all those alterations in 
this report. The commission did mention a few examples to illustrate what kind of alterations 
they were referring to. For example Section 243 of the Criminal Procedure Act made it 
possible for the state to cause the evidence given by a witness at a preparatory examination 
to be handed in at the trial where the witness concerned was dead, or could not be found or 
could not for some reason or another, be called to give evidence. It was recommended that 
this section be amended to enable an accused to also have the evidence of the witness, who 
at the preparatory examination gave evidence for the accused or testified in his favour, 
handed in at the trial.117 Therefore, it is clear that the Botha commission did not contain 
information that is pressing to this study, other than showing that there were interesting 
recommendations made concerning the onus of extenuating circumstances in murder cases, 
and capital cases. How this affected cases in which the accused was deemed to be suffering 
                                                             






from a mental illness is more clearly discernible in the subsequent commission of enquiry of 
1972.  
 
4. 4. The Commission of Enquiry into the Mental Disorders Act No. 38 of 1916 – The 
Second Van Wyk Commission of 1972 
This commission was appointed as a result of the recommendations made by the 
Rumpff Commission of 1967. It recommended that a commission of enquiry should be 
appointed to “revise Act 38 of 1916 in the light of the problems today, and to investigate the 
desirability of reorganizing the administrative control of mental hospitals.”118 
It should be emphasized that this commission was not concerned with the procedural 
provisions regarding the examination and trial of persons alleged to be suffering from mental 
illness. The provisions in the existing act relating to these matters, namely section 27-29 bis, 
were not included in the new Act, but were dealt with in the revised criminal procedure act. 
These two acts were to come into operation simultaneously, otherwise complicated provision 
would be necessary. For example, if the new proposed act was enacted before the 
aforementioned sections were incorporated in the criminal procedure act, the repeal of the 
existing act by the new proposed act was not to include these sections.119 It is here that 
reference was made to the changes occurring within the mental health system. A most 
pertinent question raised was how does one define a psychopath and what should the courts 
do with one defined as such?  
 
4. 4. 1. The South African National Council for Mental Health 
The Commission mentioned a large number of registered voluntary welfare 
organizations which, as part of their family-welfare services, attended to the mentally ill and 
their families. There was however, one organization, namely the South African National 
Council for Mental Health, to which the commission made reference. As a registered welfare 
organization, under the National Welfare Act of 1965, it enjoyed special recognition as a 
national welfare organization which coordinated the mental health services of voluntary 
welfare agencies. This council operated largely under the control of a director who was in 
                                                             
118 A. Kruger: Mental Health Law in South Africa, p. 25. 




turn under the control of the executive committee. This was a multi-disciplinary body, 
composed of psychiatrists, clinical psychologists, registered psychiatric nurses, social 
welfare officers, ministers of religion and lay representatives of the societies, all of whom 
provided invaluable services on a voluntary basis. The council endeavoured to enlist the co-
operation of all organizations or bodies concerned with mental health and not only to 
promote the prevention of mental illness, but also to undertake treatment and care, including 
after-care. One of its major tasks was the education of the general public and the cultivation 
of a well-informed public opinion. It can truly be said that this council advanced mental 
health on a broad front.120 It also provided a model on cooperation between professional 
bodies.  
Several day-centres and homes for the “mentally retarded” were affiliated to the 
council. Because the psychiatric services rendered by the public authorities in the community 
were considered inadequate owing to a shortage of staff, these societies had concentrated on 
the psychiatric treatment of mentally ill persons. This was done by means of psychiatric 
clinics staffed by state psychiatrists, on a sessional basis, assisted by social workers. The 
national council controlled 15 psychiatric clinics. The Department of Health provided the 
services of the state psychiatrists and psychiatric nurses as well as drugs. Motor transport 
was provided by the department of transport and accommodation and furnishings by the 
Department of Public Works.121 
The South African National Council for Mental Health and its societies played an 
important role in the country’s mental health services. By reason of their composition and 
activities they were very closely associated with the community, and this enabled them to 
play a major role in a multi-disciplinary community orientated mental health service. 
According to the evidence many patients had to wait from one month to four months for an 
interview with a psychiatrist. On account of the large number of patients, psychiatrists often 
found it impossible to devote more than five to fifteen minutes per consultation. The 
inevitable result was that the clinics could not provide satisfactory psychiatric services.122 
This therefore called into question the ability of expert witnesses to testify in trails where the 
accused was said to be suffering from a mental illness. Essentially, the argument being made 
was that the country did not have adequate facilities and trained staff to accommodate the 
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enormous number of people who were suffering from what was now being considered a 
mental illness nor were they in a position to recommend that those deemed dangerous to 
society, such as psychopaths, should be incarcerated in a medical facility. 
  
4. 4. 2. Recommended Definition for Psychopathy 
With regards to the definition of “psychopathic disorder” in the British Mental Health 
Act, the Commission were of the opinion that it was not desirable that the definition of 
psychopath should include a provision for the recommendation of medical treatment. 
According to the Commission it was doubtful whether most psychopaths could really benefit 
from medical treatment. It was preferred that a person whom from an early age, before or 
during puberty, had suffered from a persistent disorder or disability of mind (whether or not 
including subnormality of intelligence) which resulted in abnormally aggressive or seriously 
irresponsible conduct, should be considered a psychopath.123 
Therefore, psychopathic disorder was defined as a persistent disorder or disability of 
mind (whether or not including subnormality of age) which existed from an age prior to that 
of 18 years and which resulted in abnormally aggressive or seriously irresponsible conduct 
on the part of the patient. Psychopaths as defined were to be considered mentally ill 
irrespective of whether the disorder required, or was susceptible to, medical treatment.124 
Psychopaths who were able to respond to medical treatment were to be dealt with 
differently from “lost causes”. This is not to suggest that no medical efforts were to be made 
to treat the latter. The danger, as the Commission saw it, was that if the definition of 
psychopath stipulated that the disorder should require or be susceptible to medical treatment, 
cases for which there was as yet no effective treatment would be excluded (Section 2 (b) of 
the new act). The Commission deemed psychopaths as a disruptive influence in South 
Africa’s prisons. They constantly violated rules and regulation, formed gangs, organized 
fights and caused the authorities endless trouble. Little could be done to prevent these people 
from committing these acts. Ideally, so it was argued, they were to be removed to a hospital 
prison for psychopaths.125 However, in the context of scarce resources and undertrained staff, 
a different recommendation had to be made.  
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4. 4. 3. Recommendations Made by the Commission on Psychopaths 
The commission concluded that certified psychopaths under sentence of death 
may, notwithstanding any provision in the act, be executed. For the protection of the 
public, provision was also to be made by legislation for the establishment of a hospital-
prison for psychopaths where psychopaths who were a danger to the public could be 
detained for long periods and where they could be treated.126 
The Commission recommended that section 10 be amended and that it should 
compel a psychologist, medical practitioner, or a psychiatrist, to notify a magistrate if 
they deemed an individual to be particularly dangerous. Furthermore, a maximum 
security hospital that catered only for state president’s patients was deemed an urgent 
necessity. Class VI of defined mental illnesses which was deleted in 1957 was to be 
reinstated. But the whole of section three was to be revised and brought in line with 
accepted modern concepts of psychology and psychiatry. Lastly, the procedural 
provisions regarding the examination and the trial of persons alleged to be suffering from 
a form of morbid mental disorder was to be removed from Act 38 of 1916. The said 
provisions belonged in the criminal procedure act and was to clearly distinguish between 
those deemed by law to be not responsible for their actions, unfit to stand trial and 
certifiable under the Mental Disorders Act.127 These procedural provisions were sections 
27-29 of the Mental Disorders Act and they, according to the Commission, were to be 
included in Chapter 13 in the proposed Criminal Procedure Bill of 1973. 
 
4. 4. 4. Sections 27-29 of the Mental Disorders Act of 1916 
Sections 27 dealt with the procedure if an accused person is found mentally 
disordered or defective prior to arraignment or sentence, section 28 with the procedure if an 
accused person was found mentally disordered or defective on arraignment or during trial, 
section 29 with accused persons found to be mentally disordered or defective at the time of 
committing an act or omission that would, but for his mental condition, have constituted a 
criminal act, and section 29 bis safeguarded the powers of prosecuting authorities to 
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withdraw charges in respect of certain persons referred to in sections 28 and 29. As already 
indicated, these matters were now to be dealt with in the criminal procedure act.128  
This final decision helped resolve the issues of aligning new definitions of mental 
illness with judicial practices. This is not to suggest that the process was smooth. One rather 
vigorous campaign against the new law reforms on mental health can be seen in the 
Commission of Enquiry into Scientology in 1972. Subsequent debates in parliament around 
the proposed Bills also reflect some of the shortcomings of the legislation which was to be 
implemented in 1973 and 1977.   
 
4. 5. The 1972 Commission of Enquiry into Scientology  
The anti-psychiatry activities of Scientology in South Africa are of interest to this 
dissertation due to their campaign against psychiatric practice in South Africa. The Church 
of Scientology129 and its subsidiary, the Citizens Commission of Human Rights (CCHR)130 
had not always positioned itself against the apartheid state. The organization tried to ally 
itself with the National Party claiming that the true enemies of the state were psychiatrists. 
The CCHR had their own self-serving agenda for attacking psychiatry. Scientology rejects 
psychiatry completely in favour of its own dogma as a means to obtain mental clarity. The 
organization never managed to form a relationship with the National Party government. 
Instead they played a role in publicizing the overall conditions in hospitals and began a series 
of investigations that would culminate in the international community ostracizing the South 
African government and those working within its constraints.131 
Ironically, it might have been Hubbard’s attempts to contact Prime Minister 
Verwoerd that intensified the police investigation into the organization. In the aftermath of 
Verwoerd’s assassination, Hubbard publically insinuated that the assassination of the Prime 
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organization wanted to partake in psychological research. Their aim was to partake in a sort of pseudo-psychiatry 
to ultimately eclipse the work of psychiatrists. 
130 The CCHR was meant to be an independent body, regardless of its affiliation to the Church of Scientology, 
set up to investigate human rights violations in the psychiatric field. 




Minister was a plot by the psychiatric profession to overthrow the government. He 
elaborated: 
In 1966 I wrote to Dr. Verwoerd the South African Prime Minister a letter that I 
had information that a dangerous situation might exist in his vicinity. He wrote 
back thanking me. I was suddenly made persona non grata in Southern Africa. 
Shortly afterwards Dr. Verwoerd was assassinated by a psychiatric patient.132 
It became clear to the Church of Scientology that the government had no interest in 
paying any attention to them and their cause. The organization published multiple attack 
articles in the media, often accompanied by pictures depicting the evils of psychiatry. One 
such picture depicted the grim reaper straddling the Republic of South Africa holding a 
scythe inscribed with the word psychiatry. Another article insinuated that there were 
incidents of “psychiatric patients involved in political assassination”. This comment echoes 
statements made by Hubbard that Tsafendas was a tool used by psychiatry to assassinate 
Prime Minister Verwoerd as part of their communist plot. Yet, the article once again, 
declared loyalty to the South African government. In this specific article the organization 
also made a few suggestions for what the government should do to address this problem 
within its borders. Notably, majority of these recommendations suggested that the 
government investigate the allegations made by the organization against the discipline of 
psychiatry.133 
The organization also began to distribute bulletins defaming prominent psychiatrists. 
For example, in 1968, they sent out an information letter to all the members of parliament 
defaming Dr. E. L. Fischer. In this letter the organization claimed that Dr. Fisher was a secret 
communist. Interestingly, Dr. Fisher was a trained psychiatrist and member of parliament 
who was pushing for a commission of inquiry into Scientology. Due to their attacks on 
psychiatric practices worldwide, they began to receive pushback from the media and 
governments abroad. The English newspapers in South Africa published a few negative 
articles about the organization and in response the organization sued the South African 
Associated Newspapers Limited for slander, however they later withdrew their case. This 
was only the beginning of a series of lawsuits launched by the organization.134 
In 1969 the organization sued T. J. Stander from the South African National Council 
for Mental Health (SANCMH). However, by 1977 they withdrew their case. During the same 
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period, they also sued Jan Hendrik du Plessis, the former South African police Captain, who 
promised them a meeting with B. J. Vorster and other members of parliament and never 
followed through. Members of the organization began to write letters to the Minister of 
Health claiming that Scientology was being distorted and that the organization remained 
completely loyal to the country. However, during their attempts to align themselves with the 
Apartheid government, they underestimated the close relationship between some psychiatric 
practitioners, mental health associations, and government members. Interestingly, not only 
were some members of the government mental health practitioners, former Prime Minister 
Verwoerd also trained in the field of psychology.135 
Pushed by mental health practitioners, the government set up the Commission of 
Inquiry into Scientology in 1969 which reported their findings in 1972. The commission 
dealt the organization some great blows. The commission recommended to extend legislation 
that would control the use of psychotherapy, which they thought that Scientology was 
attempting to do. It was also recommended that any security checking and intelligence 
actions by independent organizations such as Scientology be outlawed. Moreover, the 
commission also suggested that any “inaccurate, untruthful and harmful information in 
regard to psychiatry and the field of mental health in general”, be prohibited. Additionally, 
the Apartheid government denied all allegations made by the organization and argued that 
the organization was simply engaging in a vendetta against psychiatrists. The government 
insisted that many of the allegations of abuse were simply unwarranted and argued that many 
patients in private institutions chose sub-standard conditions themselves.136 
However, the Church of Scientology and their subsidiary the Citizens Commission 
of Human Rights (CCHR) did not cease their attacks on the actions of psychiatrists. 
Disillusioned by their failure to ally themselves with government officials against 
psychiatrists, they began to attack the Apartheid government. The organization began to 
exploit the burgeoning international concerns about racial discrimination that existed in 
South Africa. During the 1970s the organization sent press reports to various news outlets 
that highlighted the atrocious conditions within mental institutions. They purposely ignored 
the legislation and continued with their attacks against psychiatry, sometimes brazenly 
sending information to government officials. Their persistence and damaging publications 
about the conditions in mental institutions sparked both domestic and international outrage 
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at the abusive treatment of psychiatric patients. Perhaps their best act of defiance happened 
in 1979 during the annual Convention of Psychiatry held at the University of Cape Town. 
The international participants arrived to find a publication in their hotel rooms from the 
Church of Scientology repeating many of their accusations of human rights abuse. At the 
conference some of the international participants, much to the dismay of the Minister of 
Health, suggested contracting the Church of Scientology to gain further information 
regarding conditions in institutions. The actions of the Church Scientology resulted in an 
international awareness of the injustices of Apartheid.137 
The government published the commission report in 1972 detailing as much 
information about Scientology as possible, particularly the organization’s activities in South 
Africa. The document consists of 15 chapters containing all the information the government 
could gather about the organization, its founder and their activities in South Africa. The 
organization was very intolerant of criticism or opposition, whether it came from the outside 
or within their own ranks. According to their terminology, a source of trouble, from inside 
or outside the organization, was referred to as a suppressive person or group. The suppressive 
person or group is “one who actively seeks to suppress or damage Scientology or 
Scientologists by suppressive acts.” Additionally, suppressive acts were defined as “actions 
or omissions undertaken knowingly to suppress, reduce or impede Scientology or 
Scientologists.”138 
The founder of Scientology, L. Ron Hubbard provided a lengthy list of what 
constituted an attack on Scientology for Scientologists. The list contains 22 points. This list 
reflects their fear of legislation curtailing their freedom and those who could possibly testify 
to the acts of the organization or undermine the authority of the organization. The concern 
over former members speaking publically about the organization was also condemned. So 
too were its members who refused to disconnect from the suppressive person or group.139 Its 
enemies were considered fair game and could be persecuted.  
The harshness of this fair game policy and the willingness to deceive and destroy was 
demonstrated in the case of Dr. Fisher, a member of parliament. Dr. Fisher was the elected 
MP of Rosettenville, Johannesburg. In that capacity, and as a medical practitioner, Dr. Fisher 
received complaints from members of the public with regards to the practice of Scientology. 
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He raised the issue in parliament on several occasions and requested a commission of enquiry 
into Scientology. This conduct on the part of Dr. Fisher was seen as an attack on Scientology 
and resulted in him being deemed as a suppressive person and therefore fair game. As news 
of Dr. Fisher’s comments about the organization reached Hubbard, he insinuated that during 
an investigation into Dr. Fisher, the organization had found evidence of embezzled funds, 
moral lapses, and “a thirst for young boys”.140 
The commission concluded that although members of the organization promoted the 
claim that Scientology is a religion and a church, however, it cannot be considered as a 
religion or a church in South Africa. Additionally, the commission recommended that the 
government, with regard to the principle of freedom of religion, might consider it useful to 
define the minimum standards required before an organization can be registered as a Church, 
in terms of the Companies Act or other relevant legislation. Due to the claim from the 
organization that Scientology was beneficial and vital to monitoring mental health, the 
commission recommended that legislation should be enacted to provide for the registration 
and control of psycho-therapists and persons practicing psychology and for the prohibition, 
subject to prescribed exceptions, of the application of psycho-therapy and the practice of 
psychology. The practice of disconnection, public investigation and fair game law was to be 
declared illegal by appropriate legislation. Notably, the commission recommended that the 
distribution of incorrect, dishonest, and damaging information regarding psychiatry and the 
field of mental health in general, was to be prohibited in terms of legislation. This 
recommendation came due to concerns that the conditions in mental institutions would be 
made public.141 This is suggestive of the deplorable conditions at state-run mental health 
facilities.  
Despite the controversy around this Commission of Enquiry and a clear indication of 
a particular religious agenda coming to the fore, one can read into the criticisms lodged 
against the state into the poor handling of psychiatric services in the country as well as the 
use of psychiatry in Apartheid’s racialized politics. It is within this unstable climate and 
opposition to psychiatric services in South Africa that the government had to set about 
making requisite changes to the legislation, as recommended by the various commissions of 
enquiry. This too was no easy feat and these debates also reflected on what was to become 
the sustained shortcomings of dealing with psychiatric patients after they were deemed 
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mentally ill and convicted in a court of law. The debates had to also become more inclusive 
and were subsequently tabled in parliament.  
  
4. 6. Parliamentary Debates: The Mental Health Act of 1973 and the Criminal Procedure 
Bill of 1973 
The Parliamentary debates on the Mental Health Act and the Criminal Procedure 
Bill are important to this study due to the information that it provides regarding those 
acts. The debates provide insight in to the importance of changing the mental health 
legislation, the need to amend the criminal procedure and reasons as to why the Bill of 
1973, lapsed. They also lay a foundation from which to analyse the challenges faced in 
the cases tried during the interim period, as discussed in the next chapter.  
 
4. 6. 1. The New Mental Health Act of 1973 
Parliament had its first reading of the proposed Mental Health Act of 1973 on the 7th 
of February 1973. The Bill was only read at this sitting. The draft Bill of the new Act had 
been sent to approximately 32 different organizations for perusal and comments. It received 
constructive criticism that had been incorporated into the Bill. However, it excluded the 
criticisms of the Scientologists.142 
On the 1st of March 1973 at the second reading the new Act was debated. Again 
Parliament mentioned the Rumpff and both Van Wyk commissions and gave reasons for 
why those commissions where necessary. Parliament constructed the new Act in accordance 
with the recommendations made by these commissions. The Minister of Health emphasized 
that the Bill did not include the procedural provisions regarding the examination and trial of 
persons alleged to suffer from mental illness. These provisions in the present Mental 
Disorders Act – sections 27-29 bis would be dealt with in the proposed revision of the then 
existing Criminal Procedure Act of 1955.143 
The post of Commissioner for Mental Health was created following the Union of 
South Africa when health was the function of the Department of the Interior. Due to the 
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changes happening in legislation the Bill proposed that the reference to Commissioner for 
Mental Health be omitted and replaced with Secretary for Health, and that the secretary be 
entrusted with the responsibilities of the commissioner. This change would bring the Act in 
line with modern organizational practices. Parliament acknowledged that psychiatric 
services had changed enormously over the past decade. In South Africa there was a great 
shortage of psychiatrists, especially those working for the state. Therefore, optimum 
utilization of existing psychiatrists was the main goal.144 
The government made an important decision regarding the psychiatric services 
rendered by the state and in the provinces. In the provisions of the new Act, the Van Wyk 
Commission recommended that provincial administrations were to render psychiatric 
services to acute psychiatric patients in provincial hospitals, and the Department of Health 
was to be responsible for community psychiatric services in state hospitals. Additionally, the 
Van Wyk Commission recommended that sterilization and abortion should not form part of 
the legislation.145 
The debate shifted to clinical psychologists. The commission stated quite clearly that 
compared to some Western countries, clinical psychological services were underdeveloped 
in the Republic. The commission recommended that greater recognition be given to the 
profession in regard to the clinical psychologist’s role as a psychotherapist, especially with 
regards to psychopaths. However, the Minister of Health disagreed with the commission’s 
recommendation that psychologists be empowered to certify people as mentally ill. He 
argued that mental illness often varied and might be physiological and not only 
psychological, thus falling outside of the expertise of a clinical psychologist. According to 
the debates, the clinical psychologist was not trained to diagnose physiological or somatic 
diseases and defects. Therefore, in cases of that nature it could happen that a person could 
be certified as mentally ill when their illness could have been cured by a surgical, or other 
procedure. In South Africa medical practitioners received comprehensive training and it was 
therefore argued that they were better equipped to make a correct diagnoses. Therefore, 
parliament concluded that it was in the interest of the public to retain the status quo in 
empowering only medical practitioners to certify patients.146 
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Regarding Chapter One of the new Act, the Minister of Health made some 
observations regarding some of the definitions. Regarding the definition of mental illness, 
the commission pointed out that the definition of a mentally disordered or defective person 
in the Mental Disorders Act defined such a person in terms of practical effects. It seemed to 
the commission that practical effects should be as far as possible be excluded from the 
definition, but should be taken into account when detention, care or treatment were 
considered to be incomplete.147 
The Commission, therefore, recommended that the term “mentally ill” should be 
used in the place of mentally disordered or defective and that this definition should be broad 
enough to include inter alia all possible classes of mentally disordered and defective persons. 
Also, to avoid possible misinterpretations, it was advised that psychopaths should be 
expressly included and that an indication should be given as to what this entailed. The term 
patient was considered adequate to define a patient as a mentally ill person, or person 
suspected of, or alleged to be, mentally ill. The patient, however, was to be deemed mentally 
ill to such a degree that they need to be detained, supervised, controlled or treated.148 
The Bill of the new Act was based on the principles of the existing Act, which, 
according to parliament, had proven effective over the previous 57 years. The draft 
legislation recommended by the commission, however, was of considerable assistance. The 
Bill of the new Act made enough provisions for the protection of not only the public, but of 
the rights of the individual. This Bill created the opportunity to consolidate the existing 
legislation and modernize the existing Act. In the light of the then existing psychiatric 
knowledge, provision was made in the regulations for (a) the establishment of maximum 
security hospitals for dangerous patients; (b) establishment of institutions for psychopaths; 
(c) the establishment of institutions for the State President’s decision patient; (d) 
establishment of child guidance clinics and child psychiatric units; (e) observation and 
treatment of alcoholics and drug dependents who were mentally ill; and (f) provision of 
community psychiatric services after-care and follow up services.149 
It should be noted that some of the above mentioned recommendations had already 
been implemented: (a) alcoholics and drug dependents had been admitted and treated in state 
mental hospitals; (b) child guidance clinics and child psychiatric units were established in 
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various centres by mental health societies and other bodies; sections (c) and (f) had already 
been established; and (d), a maximum security ward in Weskoppies hospital150 had been 
erected to accommodate 100 white male patients.  
Dr. Fisher praised the Bill as being well investigated and thorough. He also echoed 
the comments made by the Minister of Health about the acute shortage of trained personnel. 
He believed that the government had been able to give adequate service until then but that 
this needed to be upgraded. According to him South Africa had been able to cheaply treat 
mental illness however, mental institutions were under-financed and poorly managed.  He 
suggested that money be spent to modernize Valkenberg Hospital, instead of building 
another state psychiatric facility in Cape Town. He was shocked when he saw the difficulties 
the staff were confronted with and the poor conditions under which some of the patients had 
to be accommodated. Whether the new hospital at Stikland was going to be a relief for this 
position, he was unsure.151 Despite the religiously motivated protests made by the 
Scientologists, there was some consensus over the poor conditions at mental institutions in 
the country.  
Fischer suggested that new institutions be built in the cities and even the Bantu 
homelands and that hiding the mentally ill should be a thing of the past. Of great significance 
was the call to treat those with mental illness with compassion. He was also perturbed by the 
poor number of psychiatrists in the country and even suggested that Bantu doctors be given 
facilities to enable them to become specialist psychiatrists. In fact much of the unfolding 
discussion was about the poor number of psychiatrists who could deal with the different 
races in the country. This also developed into a heated discussion on how to improve 
facilities for the racially segregated mental patients. These reflections would suggest a much 
more compassionate and racially inclusive consideration of mental health issues on the part 
of Fischer. It is worth noting that he was often called to testify in trials at the Cape Supreme 
Court. This would further suggest that his analysis of those sent for evaluation would be 
focussed on the mental state of the patient rather than reflecting an explicitly racist 
undertone.  
Another member of parliament, Dr. Viljoen, who was also a psychiatrist, brought up 
the issue of preventative measures concerning children. Psychiatrists agreed that the origin 
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of mental illness could virtually always be traced back to an incident in a patient’s childhood. 
Therefore, although it mainly appeared to be discussed in court trials as a social problem, he 
argued that the social condition was inherently connected to psychiatric condition. The Bill 
also made no attempt to prescribe any arrangements with regard to preventative measures. 
Dr Viljoen was adamant that this needed to be discussed. He believed that this was mainly 
an educational problem, concerning children, particularly with regard to special education.152 
Here, the importance of evaluating intelligence and educational performance, as was 
prevalent in courtroom trials, is made explicit. It also indicates that this approach was far 
from being formalised in law, despite its prevalence in legal trials.  
Despite some reservations, the Mental Health Act of 1973 was passed into law. The 
dissonance between mental health considerations and legal procedure, however, was 
discussed in relation to the amendment of the Criminal Procedure Act of 1955. The new 
Mental Health Act could not be ascended to unless vital changes were made to the Criminal 
Procedure Act.  
 
4. 6. 2. The Criminal Procedure Bill of 1973 
The first discussion of the new criminal procedure act, hereafter referred to as the 
Criminal Procedure Bill, was first debated in parliament on the 10th of April 1973. 
According to the Minister of Justice, the criminal procedure had to change due to points of 
friction that had arisen over the years. The Minister of Justice described it as a “manpower” 
shortage in the country and that cumbersome procedures served no purpose and was no 
longer sustainable. New aids had been developed to enhance the efficiency of the courts. 
However, outdated ideas and methods had proven to be a handicap. Therefore, change was 
necessary because the pattern of crime had changed. Rules that were originally designed for 
the protection of ignorant accused persons were being manipulated by the outdated 
system.153  
The Minister believed that it was necessary to adjust the 1955 Act, as was being 
reviewed in countries such as England at the time. He confirmed that all interested 
stakeholders had been involved in the process and that no objections had been raised about 
the stipulations of the new proposed Act. One would therefore have expected an expedient 
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outcome. While the Minister of Justice emphasized that the criminal procedure was a 
document that was above politics and above self-interest, in his closing remarks he stated 
that the existing criminal procedure act was for the large part being retained.154 This was 
despite the earlier observation that the existing Act was redundant. Nevertheless, the 
amendments made to the proposed Mental Health Act were actively enmeshed within the 
new procedural Bill.  
The proposed Bill stated that if an accused by reason of a mental illness or mental 
defect does not have the capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his act, or of acting in 
accordance with that appreciation, he should not be held criminally responsible. In such a 
case he should be found “not guilty by reason of mental illness” and declared a State 
President’s decision patient. Similarly, an accused who was not capable of understanding the 
proceedings so as to make a proper defence, should also be declared a State President’s 
decision patient. To assist the court with this inquiry, the accused needed to be examined by 
a panel of psychiatrists.155 
The proposed Bill also provided for two new procedures. Firstly, there was a 
provision whereby a petition for mercy by a condemned person, based upon evidence 
relating to such a person’s conviction, or the death sentence imposed upon them, and which 
was discovered after all the recognized legal procedures had been exhausted, or were no 
longer available, could be referred by the State President to a court to hear such further 
evidence and all other evidence. The court to which the petition had been referred to was to 
hear the matter and submit its report thereafter to the State President. Another provision 
provided that whenever the Minister of Justice is in doubt as to the correctness of the 
conviction of a person who has been sentenced to death, and the convicted person does not 
appeal against his conviction, he could refer the matter to the Appeal Court.156  
The first Member of Parliament to comment on this Bill was Dr. E. L. Fisher. He 
admitted that he approached the Bill as layman, but he wanted to talk about Chapter 13 which 
dealt primarily with the issue of sick people. This chapter dealt with special circumstances 
which could occur when a person who is accused of a crime appears to be mentally ill. Mental 
illness and mental defects were not defined in the Bill, but rather in the Mental Health Act, 
which was recently passed by the House. According to Dr Fisher’s definition, mental illness 
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was any disorder or disability of the mind, and included any mental disease, any arrested or 
incomplete development of the mind, and any psychopathic disorder.157 
According to this definition mental illness therefore included a congenital disease, or 
a mental disease acquired through some inflammation or growth or accident, and it also 
included all stages of mental disease. By extension, this would include maniacs (which could 
lead to even more crimes being committed), schizophrenics, paranoias or simple phobias. 
All these were included in the definition of mental illness. Some diseases, he argued, were 
chronic and incurable, while some were acute. Some lasted for short durations, and others 
longer. His concern was around how a non-medical professional would determine the 
severity of the mental illness as well as accountability of the accused at the time of 
committing the crime. His argument lay in the fact that psychiatrists would be called to 
testify in a case after having little exposure to the patient.158 It is here that one is confronted 
with a state that wants to change its legislation to align with other western societies but 
without the capacity to effectively ensure that the procedure was adequately followed.  
He mentions these facts to demonstrate how vast the field of mental illness is, how 
carefully one has to be in making a diagnosis, how convinced one has to be in making the 
correct diagnosis, the tricky proceedings in court and the final decisions which the 
magistrates or judges would have to make based on the testimony of the medical practitioner. 
For that reason Dr. Fisher argued that the provisions which were made in the Bill should 
provide for the report of a psychiatrist to be made under better conditions.159 
Essentially, the psychiatrist determined whether the accused was fit to stand trial. He 
could save the man from the death penalty, but he could also be responsible for sending a 
man to a mental hospital for the rest of his life. That man, who goes to a mental hospital for 
the rest of his life, could possibly, be kept in a security section of a mental hospital for the 
rest of his life. This is based on the report of the psychiatrist in cases where the man may not 
be responsible for a violent crime but may be suffering from a mental disease.160 
Dr. Fisher wanted to further probe clause 79 of the Bill, and what he thought were 
certain deficiencies in the Bill. In clause 79 of the Bill, the procedures to be taken concerning 
the examination of the accused were set out.  According to him they were divided into two 
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categories. These included the procedures stipulated where the death penalty is, or could be 
involved, or not. The accused was to be examined by the Superintendent, and at the request 
of the court, a psychiatrist not in service of the government. If the accused wished he could 
be examined by a psychiatrist appointed by himself. Therefore, the minimum number of 
psychiatrists that could examine the person were two. In cases where the death penalty was 
not being considered, the Bill was only suggesting that the accused be seen by one 
psychiatrist.161According to Dr. Fisher this was discrimination and unwarranted. He felt that 
the severity of the disease and the severity of the offence should be taken into 
consideration.162 
The discussion continued on the 12th of April 1973. Although nothing concerning 
mental health legislation was discussed, the United Party did make it clear that they rejected 
the Bill in toto.163 The Bill moved to a committee stage on Friday the 13th of 1973. Again, 
no discussion regarding mental health took place. According to the debates the Bill was read 
again on the 20th of February 1974. There was a second reading of the Bill on the 25th of 
February. However, there were points made about the section of the Bill dealing with fines, 
but the Bill was not discussed. In 1975, on the 6th of March the Bill was read again.164 The 
delays were the result of an intermediary Commission of Inquiry launched in 1974.  
In 1974 the Viljoen Commission inquired into the penal code, or penalty system of 
South Africa. Therefore, the decision was made to wait until the Viljoen’s commissions 
report was available.165 The Viljoen commission did make recommendations that have an 
immediate bearing on this study, especially the declaration of offenders as habitual criminals. 
Parliament thought it was important enough to discuss. The goal of the commission was to 
make recommendations to improve the penal code, not to revise it. It is important to note 
that the mandate of the commission did not include the question of whether the death penalty 
should be kept or not. The report of this commission had to be completed before 1977 sitting 
of parliament and submitted to the relevant authorities.166 
The Viljoen commission did recommend that the compulsory sentence for corrective 
imprisonment for the prevention of crime should be scrapped. The commission determined 
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that there were certain offenders who will simply continue to commit certain offences. The 
commission agreed that the sentence and declaration of a habitual criminal should therefore 
stay, but that only a superior court could hand down such a sentence. However, the Minister 
of Justice believed that would be a strain on the Supreme courts, and after consultation with 
members of the legal profession, they recommended that magistrates too be allowed to hand 
down such a sentence.167 By 1977, after a lengthy period of discussion and debate, the 
Criminal Procedure Act of 1977 was ascended.  
 
4. 7. Chapter Conclusions  
This chapter discussed the criminal cases that appeared before the Cape court in 
the immediate aftermath of Verwoerd’s death. Notably in this period the findings of the 
Rumpff commission was published. The most important recommendation made by that 
commission was that a Commission of Enquiry into the Mental Disorders Act of 1916 
be set up. Additionally, the Botha Commission also published its findings that 
recommended that the Criminal Procedure Act of 1955 be revised and improved upon. 
In this period interesting discussion unfolded in the criminal cases regarding the mental 
state of defendants brought before the court. Notably, these discussion were already 
prevalent in the criminal cases, before they were enacted in legislation that is in the cases 
of the State v. G. J. P, 1971 and the State v. D., 1970. 
The unfolding debates and discussions also show how the difficulties in defining 
a mentally ill criminal in terms of health and law can lead to undue pressure on the 
medical profession and confusion within the judiciary when legislation is not aligned. 
These debates clearly point to contention and deep reflection and are adequately 
delineated in the next chapter when attention is drawn to how cases were tried during this 
transitional period. What does become apparent is the level of intervention and relative 
importance of state psychiatrist in determining the outcome of death sentence cases 
during this period. It could therefore be argued that while judge’s proclivities need to be 
considered when reflecting on sentencing practices, here, the vision and personal 
proclivities of the medical professionals called to testify in murder cases share an equal 
role in the outcome of said sentence, even in a state of legislative and medical confusion. 
                                                             





Mental Health and Sentencing in the Courts, 1974-80 
This chapter investigates the twenty-three cases which appeared before the Cape 
Town Supreme Court during the period, 1974-1980. The Mental Health Act of 1973 was 
only ascended in 1975, and the necessary changes to the Criminal Procedure act of 1955 
only became law in 1977. However, as will be shown, during this period the proposed 
legislation was already being applied in the criminal case discussions. By 1976, eight of 
the accused were sent for psychiatric evaluation. This is in contrast to the two sent in 
1975, after the Mental Health Act of 1973 was implemented. Prior to this, in 1973 and 
1974, already seven and six cases, respectively, were referred. This suggests a lack of 
cohesion and correlation between the passing of the act and judicial procedure. 
It would have been useful to assess these trends between 1977 and 1980 to gauge 
if indeed these acts had been formally implemented within the judicial system. However, 
cases after 1976 could not be accessed. The study had to rely on the clearly deficient 
governmental statistics on murder and culpable homicide and law reports which only 
record how the new Mental Health Act of 1973 were adapted in subsequent years. While 
hugely deficient, this does show the importance of the archived court case in contrast to 
the selective law reports normally found in the public domain. 
    
5. 1. Criminal Cases for Murder, 1973-1976 
The criminal cases for this period are pivotal to this dissertation due to the discussions 
surrounding the new legislation that unfold within the trials. Additionally, the cases also 
focus on the concept of psychopathy and the institutions that can accommodate them, an area 
of major concern for the medical and legal professionals.  
  
5 .1. 1. State v. P. L., 19731 
In the State v. P. L., the accused had been charged with murder. He had stabbed a 13 
month old child to death. He was sent to Valkenberg for observation before the trial 
commenced. According to the report from the psychiatrist, the accused was well behaved 
                                                             




and co-operative, with the appropriate mood during his observation period. The accused also 
exhibited a clear and coherent thought process. The accused denied that he experienced 
hallucinations. P. L. was considered to not be deluded and on clinical assessment the accused 
was deemed intellectually intact. The accused agreed with the psychiatrist that he was 
mentally normal during his observation period, however he said that since 1967 he had 
suffered “episodes” lasting two days to two weeks during which he became mentally 
deranged. 
These episodes would start with insomnia and then he would begin to hear voices. 
According to the accused, these voices would start to discuss him in the third person, and the 
content of what they were discussing was threatening. According to the accused, he would 
become intensely afraid when this happened. The accused was told that during his episodes 
he would start to talk nonsense. Previously he sought the help of witch doctors. These 
episodes would occur at variable intervals, being a few months to a year apart and persisted 
after the accused had been alcohol free for a year. Additionally, the accused had stopped 
using dagga for many years. 
According to the psychiatrist, the details of the accused’s feelings and experiences 
during these periods were strongly suggestive of a schizophrenic illness and were of such a 
sophisticated nature that it seems very unlikely that they could have been simulated by a man 
of his background. The psychiatrist testified to the trial court: 
I am of opinion that this man in all probability suffered psychotic episodes and if 
his story is accepted, may well have been psychotic at the time of the alleged 
crime. He is however, not mentally disordered in terms of the Mental Disorders 
Act, at present. 
Justice Beyers found the accused guilty, and sent him to jail in terms of section 29 (1) and (2). 
 
5. 1. 2. State v. B. M., 19732 
The case of B. M. centred on the jealousy and possessiveness the accused felt towards 
the deceased, his wife. The accused and the deceased had experienced problems in their 
marriage due to his abusive behaviour towards her. She had left him and he tried to convince 
her to come back to him, but she refused. Due to her rejection the accused took an overdose 
of pills in an attempt to kill himself. After his suicide attempt she arranged for him to see a 
                                                             




psychiatrist. After the first suicide attempt he began to plead his case and asked the deceased 
to come back to him, and again she refused. When the deceased rejected the accused again, 
he tried to commit suicide by throwing himself in front of a truck. 
However, before the accused tried to commit suicide he assaulted his wife after she 
had refused, yet again, to get back together with him. The deceased went to the hospital to 
visit the accused after his second suicide attempt where he proceeded to threaten her that he 
would kill her if she did not come back to him. According to a witness, her alleged lover, he 
saw how the accused had tried to assault the deceased. He and the accused had gotten into a 
confrontation about the deceased and the accused proceeded to stab him four times, luckily 
not fatally. In light of these facts the accused was sent to Valkenberg for observation due to 
his two suicide attempts. 
According to the assistant superintendent at Valkenberg, Dr. Pascoe, the accused was 
a person of normal intelligence, but someone who suffered from a personality disorder, 
displaying hysterical, dependent and psychopathic features. Dr. Pascoe stated that there was 
a long-standing pattern of maladjustment in society. The accused was a selfish type of person 
who wanted his wife back, probably not so much because he had loved her, but because he 
felt humiliated that she had left him. It was his pride and self-esteem more than anything else 
that was affected. Dr. Pascoe concluded his report by stating that the accused had a low 
frustration tolerance which would have affected his reactions under extreme conditions of 
stress.  
Dr. Pascoe certified him as not mentally disordered in terms of the Mental Disorders 
Act. This was enough for Justice Banks who sentenced him to 20 years in prison for stabbing 
his wife to death. 
 
5. 1. 3. State v. D. M., 19733 
In the State v. D. M the accused shot a white female with a pistol. He was sent to 
Valkenberg for observation. According to the report from Valkenberg, the accused had a 
history of chronic alcohol addiction for which he was hospitalized twice in 1961. Physically 
the accused showed signs of mild chronic bronchitis in the region where he had a previous 
chest operation. He showed no sign of neurological or electroencephalographic abnormality. 
                                                             




During his observation period he had shown no lapses in consciousness, thought disorder, 
delusions or hallucinations. The accused had suffered no amnesia, except for a circumscribed 
short spell at the time of his alleged crime. 
However, the accused’s memory of the other events of that day was good. His 
amnesia was of the dissociative type with an onset after a distressing event. The mood of the 
accused had been appropriate and at times he had been tense and tearful, with slight 
impairment of his concentration. Clinically his intelligence was within normal limits, but 
psychometric tests had proved invalid due to his failure to co-operate. The report concluded 
that although he was addicted to alcohol, he was not mentally disordered in terms of the 
Mental Disorders Act and therefore he was fit to stand trial. 
Justice Theron found him guilty of murder with extenuating circumstances and 
sentenced him to 12 years in prison. He could well have received the death penalty and 
despite being declared mentally fit according to the Mental Disorders Act, the extenuating 
circumstances of his affliction resulted in a lower sentence. 
 
5. 1. 4. State v. W. l. R., 19734 
In the case of the State v. W. l. R. the accused had stabbed the deceased which 
resulted in his death. He was charged with murder and sent to Valkenberg for observation. 
The court wanted to assess his mental condition because the accused had a history of 
convulsions in childhood since the age of eight years. Subsequently, no fits occurred during 
his observation period and he was never treated for epilepsy, nor was he regarded as an 
epileptic. According to the accused he had amnesia for a period extending from the 
commencement of the alleged incident until he found himself in his bedroom after the 
murder. 
The psychiatrist at Valkenberg determined that his amnesia was not consistent. The 
accused was helpful, friendly and co-operative during the period of his observation. He had 
no hallucinations or delusions either and his intelligence was considered satisfactory and his 
judgment was unimpaired. Therefore he was not mentally disordered in terms of the Mental 
                                                             




Disorders Act. Justice Banks found him guilty of culpable homicide and sentenced him to 
one year imprisonment suspended for three years. 
 
5. 1. 5. State v. L. B., 19735 
L. B. was charged with the crime of raping and murdering a non-white woman. Due 
to the crimes he was charged with, the accused was sent to Valkenberg for observation where 
it was determined that he was not mentally disordered in terms of the Mental Disorders Act. 
However, he was a heavy drinker and a regular dagga user. He did have one syncopal6attack 
once, however he never had any other epileptic seizures during his life. Justice Watermeyer 
found him guilty of culpable homicide and sentenced him to seven years imprisonment of 
which two years were suspended for three years. 
 
5. 1. 6. State v. G. d. P., 19737 
The accused stabbed a man in the chest while he was out on parole, resulting in the 
man’s death. After his arrest his lawyer arranged that he be transferred from Polsmoor prison 
to Valkenberg for observation. Unfortunately there was no report from Valkenberg included 
in the case file. However, the case file noted that he was found not mentally disordered and 
sent back to Polsmoor for the duration of the trial due to the accused’s bail being revoked 
when he was sent for observation at Valkenberg. Justice Beyers found him guilty of murder 
and sentenced him to death. However, the State President commuted his death sentence to 
12 years imprisonment. 
 
5. 1. 7. State v. K. S., 19738 
Unfortunately this case was one of the incomplete case files. There was a note made 
on the cover of the case file that the accused was sent to Valkenberg for observation, however 
no report was included in the case file. The accused in this case was charged with murder, 
however the case against them was dropped by the state. The case file did note that he was 
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declared “kranksinnig”9and declared a State President’s patient by the trial judge, Justice van 
Heerden. 
 
5. 1. 8. State v. J. M., 197410 
In the State v. J. M. the accused was charged with several charges, namely murder, 
rape, and two counts of housebreaking and theft. Additionally, 18 months before he was 
arrested the accused was convicted of rape. Due to the missing documents in the case file it 
is not clear what the exact nature of each crime was, however it is possible to piece together 
the details of his observation period at Valkenberg. 
Before the trial commenced the accused was incarcerated at Polsmoor prison. His 
lawyer proceeded to request that the accused be transferred from Polsmoor to Valkenberg 
hospital because he allegedly had an epileptic seizure. When the guards came to his cell he 
was lying extremely still and when stirred he seemed confused and did not know what was 
going on around him. They suspected that he was suffering from epilepsy and therefore there 
could have been brain damage which would have made him not responsible for the alleged 
crime. According to the accused’s father he would always foam at the mouth during 
convulsions, he would soil himself, and he would bite his tongue. His father also said that 
for the last two years the accused had been using alcohol which could have aggravated brain 
damage that was already present. 
At Valkenberg Dr. Pascoe examined the accused. According to Dr. Pascoe he was 
well-behaved and was somewhat simple and childish. The state of his mood was appropriate 
and there was no thought disorder. There was no objective or subjective evidence of 
hallucinations or delusions. His memory was intact, except for the period of amnesia 
covering the alleged crime. The accused’s intelligence was also low. There was a history of 
epilepsy obtained from his father. His EEG11 showed a mild abnormality which supported 
this. Serological examination showed that he suffered from cerebral syphilis and that his 
judgment was impaired. According to Dr Pascoe he was certifiable in terms of the Mental 
Disorders Act and was in need of care and treatment. 
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At the trial the presiding judge, Justice van Heerden asked Dr. Pascoe some questions 
regarding the accused before he made his decision. The Justice wanted to know if the accused 
should be kept in an institution or a jail. According to Dr. Pascoe the accused was considered 
dangerous and would have been a danger to the community. The security at Valkenberg was 
lax and the accused could escape. Dr. Pascoe felt that from what he knew of this case, that it 
would be better for the accused to be kept in a prison or prison hospital where he could 
receive the necessary treatment. 
In response to Dr. Pascoe’s answer, Justice van Heerden wanted to know what type 
of mental jail was available, or jail hospital. He was aware of one in Bloemfontein. Dr. 
Pascoe informed Justice van Heerden that at that time there really wasn’t such a place. There 
was a high security section being built at Valkenberg that would house Coloured males when 
completed, but there wasn’t another one in the country. He suggested that the accused be 
held in the hospital section of Polsmoor prison. Justice van Heerden was satisfied with Dr. 
Pascoe’s answer and proceeded to inquire about the syphilis diagnosis. In this particular case 
there were three combinations of factors: (a) his innate low intelligence; (b) his epilepsy; and 
(c) positive tests for cerebral syphilis. This suggested that there might have been some brain 
damage that needed to be considered. Dr. Pascoe told Justice van Heerden that he regarded 
this damage as permanent. The treatment for cerebral syphilis would almost certainly arrest 
the progression of the illness, but it would not repair the existing damage. The accused would 
remain an epileptic of low intelligence. Therefore the accused needed care and control of a 
permanent nature. 
Justice van Heerden deemed that the accused was a person in need of care and 
treatment in terms of the Mental Disorders Act. The accused was accordingly committed to 
the hospital sector of the Polsmoor prison at the pleasure of the State President. 
 
5. 1. 9. State v. G. C., 197412 
The accused was arrested on 15 different charges. The charges were two counts of 
housebreaking, three counts of robbery, seven counts of assault with intent to commit 
murder, and three counts of murder. The massive amount of charges were accompanied with 
a report from the Department of Coloured affairs stating that the accused had a history of 
                                                             




poor behaviour and that his parents struggled to control him. The kind of friends that he had 
made also aggravated the situation. During his crime spree the accused stole multiple 
firearms each time he broke into someone’s house, and oddly, milk. He also committed three 
murders, and shot a woman in the leg. 
The accused’s lawyer did make a compelling case for mitigating factors. He was only 
18 years old at the time of the crime and under the influence of dagga and alcohol. Most 
importantly, the lawyer argued that his client was a psychopath. During one of the murders 
the accused had drank about one litre of wine and was probably ‘gedagga.’13 The intention 
of this murder could have possibly been dolus eventualis.14 
In the murder of the second person his lawyer argued that he was more intoxicated 
than the previous murder. This was a circumstance of dolus directus,15 but there were factors 
present that could be considered limited mitigating factors. Again, the lawyer argued that the 
accused’s alcohol and dagga use, and that the accused was 18 years old and a psychopath, 
was a mitigating factor. Regarding the murder of the third person, of which the accused was 
only found guilty of assault with the intent to commit harm, his lawyer argued that he was 
slightly intoxicated and under the influence of dagga. There was provocation from the 
deceased, therefore there was reduced moral blameworthiness. According to the deceased’s 
lawyer these factors, cumulatively, reduced his moral blameworthiness and therefore there 
were mitigating circumstances present in this case. 
What made this case particularly interesting was the discussion about the new Mental 
Health Act, which would soon to become law in 1975. The defence for the accused argued 
that the court, when dealing with a psychopath, must be realistic and should refer to the new 
Act which would soon become law. However, according to Justice Vos the court had to apply 
the law as it currently was, and not as it will be. Nevertheless, he continued to entertain the 
discussion on what the new law said about psychopaths. The commission of inquiry into the 
Mental Disorders Act defined three concepts that is important when dealing with the 
mentally disordered. Namely, trialability, certifiability, and responsibility. 
Therefore, before the new Mental Health Act No. 18 of 1973 could be properly 
interpreted, all the other relevant legislation needed to become law first. Based on the new 
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proposed act, section 30 would have provided a provision for people given the death penalty. 
Sub-article one said that if it seemed to the Minister of Health that an incarcerated inmate 
appeared to be psychopathic, he then can take certain steps, but it specifically excluded the 
person be given the death penalty. Sub-article two said the same. It laid out what the officer 
in charge of inmates at a jail should do when he finds out that one of his inmates is a 
psychopath. However, it excluded inmates that are psychopaths. Sub-article seven states that 
such persons that are psychopaths, could still be given the death penalty and executed. 
Therefore, the interpretation of these provisions was that one was compelled by sub-article 
one, two, and seven of section 30 of this new law, as the lawmakers intended for it to be 
interpreted, to give the psychopath the death penalty, if deemed applicable.  
This interpretation was supported by a paragraph in the report of the committee into 
the Mental Disorders Act that said, “Soos alreeds hierbo vermeld, moet n bepaling bygevoeg 
word dat gesertifiseerde psigopate wat die doodsvonnis opgelê is, nieteenstaande enige 
bepaling van die Wet, tereggestel kan word”.16 
According to this, Justice Vos therefore did not agree with the accused’s lawyer that 
the new act now meant that a psychopath cannot be given the death penalty, or if it happened 
that they were given the death penalty before the new act they could not be executed. Justice 
Vos gave the accused the death penalty for the first two murders, he considered the 
circumstances around the death of the third person to be less serious and therefore he did not 
pass the death sentence for this murder. 
The accused was sent to Valkenberg where Dr. Pascoe examined him. According to 
Dr. Pascoe the accused was a danger to the community, and to property. He gave the court a 
definition of a psychopath. “Although he can distinguish between right and wrong he has no 
forethought, he is heedless of consequences, and he loses control of himself”.  
Justice Vos wanted to know if the psychopath has a conscience, and he wanted Dr. 
Pascoe to give his definition of a psychopath. According to Dr. Pascoe he was not aware of 
a satisfactory definition, but he did have a list of particular properties of this type of 
individual. According to Dr. Pascoe’s list the psychopath could be considered as: 
One that is not psychotic and that the facts of character that one sees are not a 
result of a psychosis. Then one would find a pattern of dishonesty, untruthfulness, 
a lack of remorse, a lack of shame at what he has done, an apparent inability to 
learn from this. His pattern of life would be egocentric, that is, with little thought 
                                                             




or feeling for other people. A much diminished capacity for forming warm 
emotional relationships with other people. 
Again, Justice Vos wanted to know if the accused had a conscience, and Dr. Pascoe 
determined that conscience would fall under a lack of remorse or shame. Therefore, one 
could have said that the psychopath has a lack of conscience, or a very badly developed one. 
Quite often there was abuse of alcohol and drugs associated with this particular unbecoming 
and anti-social behaviour while under the influence of drugs and quite often a sexual pattern 
that shows the lack of feeling for any particular partner and that this may be diffused in more 
than one outlet. 
What Dr. Pascoe meant by this is that they may be homosexual as well as 
heterosexual and possibly have other “sexual perversities in the pattern”. These, according 
to him, are the major features and one expects to find these not in isolation, in isolated 
instances only, but very much as a life pattern. This type of person, he concluded, lacks any 
forethought and does not foresee the consequences of his actions, and is frequently 
impulsive. Justice Vos however, passed the sentence of death, despite the protracted 
discussions and references to the upcoming Mental Health Act.  
 
5. 1. 10. State v. G. M., 197417 
In the State v. G. M., the accused was charged with the rape and murder of a ten year 
old girl. He was sent to Valkenberg for observation because the accused had suffered from 
depression, and to ensure that he was ready for his trial. However, according to Dr. Pascoe 
it can be disregarded that the accused had suffered from any form of depression during the 
committal of the rape and murder. Dr. Pascoe based this on the fact that the accused had a 
very strong sex drive and that this could not be reconciled with any serious depressive state. 
Additionally, the accused’s behaviour after he committed the crime and during the rest of 
the day was also not that which is associated with someone suffering from some form of 
depression. 
Dr. Pascoe also pointed out that the accused was looking for company that day and 
spent time with people, even participating in a soccer game. However, it was known that the 
accused had tried to commit suicide in May of 1973. According to Dr. Pascoe this indicated 
                                                             




that there was some form of emotional instability. He was not found to be mentally 
disordered in terms of the Mental Disorders Act. Justice Steyn was thoroughly disgusted 
with the details of the case though. He called the crime that the accused committed, 
“Gruwelik, wreed, n seksmisdaad van n brutale aard, en dies meer”.18 
Justice Steyn was right to be disgusted. According to the autopsy report the 
deceased’s hymen was torn. Additionally, there was also blood present, not just by her 
genitals but from the mons pubis to the anus. Justice Steyn found no extenuating 
circumstances present and the accused was found guilty of murder and guilty of contravening 
article 14 (b) No. 23/1957. The accused was sentenced to death. 
 
5. 1. 11. State v. E. A., 197419 
In this case the accused was charged with the murder of a 12 year old non-white girl. 
He stabbed her in the chest which resulted in her death. E. A. was also charged with the rape 
of an eight year old girl. He had committed both these crimes on the same day. The accused 
had no previous convictions. He was sent to Valkenberg for observation. The report from 
Valkenberg stated that the accused was just your average man. There was nothing wrong 
with him. There was no psychiatric reason for diminished responsibility or diminished 
blameworthiness. 
Regarding the rape of the eight year old girl, her injuries were horrific. According to 
the medical examination, “Daar is inderdaad aansienlike geweld aan haar privaatdele 
toegedien en soos ek gese het, is dit geskeur”.20  
Due to the nature of these crimes committed against two female children, Justice Vos 
passed the death penalty. 
 
5. 1. 12. v. N. F., 197421 
In the case of the State v. N. F. the accused was charged with murder after he killed 
the deceased by stabbing the deceased various times over various parts of the body. N. F. 
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and three of his friends were sitting on the stairs at a flat complex smoking marijuana when 
they saw the deceased and another person coming their way. They decided to rob the 
deceased and the person accompanying them. The court requested that the accused be 
removed from Polsmoor prison and be taken to Valkenberg in order for the superintendent 
to determine whether his epilepsy had any impact on his moral blameworthiness. 
According to the report from the superintendent at Valkenberg the accused was alert, 
well-behaved, and co-operative during interviews. He expressed himself fluently and 
spontaneously without thought disorder or evidence of retarded cerebration. The accused 
denied having hallucinations or evidence of any sort except in immediate association with a 
fit. Neither did he express delusions and was fully oriented in all spheres. His intelligence 
was assessed as being within limits and his memory for both remote and recent memory was 
intact, including his memory of the events of the alleged crime. He was capable of giving a 
clear and detailed account of himself and was in touch with reality. 
According to the accused he had been suffering from grand mal epilepsy since the 
age of six years with brief auras of dizziness and a headache that followed a fit. After a fit 
he experienced periods of confusion lasting about 90 minutes. He consistently gave this 
description. However, he did give an inconsistent story of hearing noise, either just before 
or just after a fit. He had received, and benefitted, from anti-epileptic medication. His EEG22 
showed a mild abnormality, which was consistent with an inter-ictal23 record. The accused 
denied having a fit on the day of the alleged crime. The superintendent was of the opinion 
that the accused was not mentally disordered in terms of the Mental Disorders Act and could 
find no evidence to suggest that his epilepsy had a bearing on his moral blameworthiness. 
Justice Vos found him guilty of murder as charged and sentenced him to 20 years 
imprisonment. 
 
5. 1. 13. State v. P. K., 197424 
The accused in this case was a female who stabbed a non-white male with a 
screwdriver resulting in his death. Unfortunately this case was not complete, however it was 
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possible to ascertain that the magistrate had sent the accused to Valkenberg. Justice van Wyk 
found the accused guilty of culpable homicide and gave her seven years imprisonment. 
 
5. 1. 14. State v. A. B., 197525 
In the State v. A. B., the accused assaulted a non-white male resulting in his death. 
The case was postponed in order for the accused to be sent to Valkenberg for observation. 
The court requested that the Department of Coloured Affairs also submit a report on the 
background of the accused. According to the report both of the accused’s parents were farm 
labourers and had no formal schooling. There was no history of mental illness in the 
accused’s family. There was only a family history of asthma from the father’s side. The 
family relationship was a tight one and they seemed to all get along with each other. 
According to the report, after the crime the accused would frequently talk to himself. 
He told his family that the deceased talked to him and that he also regularly walked around 
with him. He occasionally went back to the scene of the crime and sat there for a while. The 
report concluded that the accused’s alcohol use could have possibly had an effect on his 
mental condition. It appeared that the accused was disorientated and that he experienced 
hallucinations and delusions. The accused seemed to show remorse, however he did not have 
any understanding of the implication of his actions. 
According to the report from Valkenberg, Dr. Pascoe felt that the accused was polite 
and co-operative. His mood state was appropriate to this situation and his thought processes 
were rational and relevant. There was no evidence of hallucinations and delusions. His 
memory for remote and recent events was intact and his intelligence on psychometric testing 
was assessed as being in the borderline category. Taking his ward behaviour into 
consideration, Dr. Pascoe was of the opinion that the accused was not certifiably defective 
or psychotic in terms of the Mental Health Act. Justice van Winsen found the accused guilty 
of culpable homicide and sentenced him to three years imprisonment suspended for three 
years. 
 
                                                             




5. 1. 15. State v. N. K., 197526 
In the State v. N. K. the accused assaulted a non-white woman and killed her in the 
process. He threw a glass bottle at her face. The accused then proceeded to hit her in the face 
with the bottle. The case was postponed so that the accused could be sent to Valkenberg for 
observation. According to the report from Valkenberg the accused gave a consistent and 
exculpatory account of the alleged crime. However, he gave a vague and longitudinal 
account of his life in general. His behaviour was at times mannerist and bizarre, and he was 
preoccupied and appeared to be talking and mumbling to himself. In the ward he was a 
helpful patient who mixed well with other patients. At other times he became withdrawn, 
asocial and preoccupied. He expressed ideas of passivity and influence. It appeared that there 
was something in his head trying to interfere with his thoughts. He admitted to having 
auditory hallucinations that would tease him and try to influence him, but he was not able to 
explain this further. His mood was inappropriate and at times rather fatuous. The accused 
was of low normal intelligence and his EEG27 exam was normal. According to the 
psychiatrist who examined him, his judgment and insight were both defective. He was 
deemed mentally disordered in terms of the Mental Disorders Act and therefore unfit to 
plead. Unfortunately this case did not contain information about whether the accused was 
declared a State President’s patient, or any other information regarding the case for that 
matter. 
 
5. 1. 16. State v. B. H. H., 197628 
As in the State v. G. C., the discussion in this case was also regarding whether the 
accused was a psychopath, or had any psychopathic features. The deceased in this case was 
a non-white woman that the accused assaulted with a knife causing her death. The accused 
had two previous convictions against him for assault. The accused was a white male from a 
poor family background. His father was a heavy drinker and he would frequently assault his 
wife. The father was a man that was easily excitable and prone to fits of rage. The accused’s 
mother died in March of 1975 and was very close with the accused. She frequently tried to 
shield him from his father’s animosity. The father accused his wife of sheltering and 
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overprotecting the accused. She was a soft-hearted woman who was completely dominated 
by her husband whom she feared. 
During his formative years the accused made no progress in school. He had a sub-
normal intelligence and was difficult to control in a class situation. He left school before he 
could obtain any certification. The father of the accused blamed the school. In his opinion 
he did not get a proper education because the school did not discipline him. His father stated 
that for the accused, the only thing that worked was a belting. The father went as far as to 
report the principle of the accused’s school to the Department of Education, and he would 
frequently go to the school and cause a scene in the principal’s office. The principle, Mr. 
Venter had felt extremely sympathetic towards the accused and there developed a 
relationship between them. According to Mr. Venter he would often see the accused bruised 
and covered in blood. The accused told him that he lived in fear of his father. Mr. Venter 
never reported this to the police, because he was afraid that the accused would suffer 
repercussions and stop confiding in him. 
According to the report from Valkenberg the accused was co-operative during 
interviews and his behaviour was appropriate for the situation he was in. There had been no 
spontaneous show of remorse except when asked direct questions. His thought process was 
clear and logical and he was able to give a coherent account of himself. There was no 
evidence, objectively or subjectively, of hallucinations or delusions, and his remote and 
recent memory were intact except for periods when he had been intoxicated. He could recall 
the period immediately prior and after the alleged crime, but claimed amnesia for the events 
of the murder. 
The accused was fully orientated in all spheres, and maintained normal conversation 
throughout a lengthy interview. Testing by a clinical psychologist placed his IQ at 89. He 
was assessed as falling within the dull-normal range of intelligence and no indication of brain 
damage could be elicited. Additionally, his EEG29 also fell within normal limits. It was felt 
that his poor functioning at school was the result of emotional difficulties and poor 
adjustment, rather than a reflection of a low intelligence or brain damage. According to the 
psychiatrist the factors that might have indicated psychopathy included egocentricity, 
impulsivity, a life without set goals, repeated and persistent anti-social acts which were at 
times of an aggressive nature, and a failure to profit in a socially acceptable sense of past 





experiences. This was complicated by an abuse of alcohol and various drugs leading to a 
diminution of already precarious self-control. 
For the purposes of assessing the diagnoses of psychopathy, the psychiatrist was of 
the opinion that it was necessary to assess the degree to which he persistently reacts 
impulsively, without planning or apparent hope of gain and that if a persistent pattern such 
as this was present other features of psychopathy must have been present. After consideration 
and consultation with colleagues, the accused was certifiable as a psychopath in terms of the 
Mental Health Act, but was not psychotic, brain damaged or defective in terms of that Act. 
The accused was charged with murder, but Justice Grosskopf found him guilty of 
culpable homicide and sentenced him to eight years imprisonment. Additionally, he 
recommended that the accused be treated in terms of Section 30 of the Mental Health Act. 
 
5. 1. 17. State v. P. E. C., 197630 
The case of the State v. P. E. C. is unique because the accused was not disordered 
due to some pathology, or psychological issue. The accused was charged with murder. He 
was a 21 year old white male. The medical report from Valkenberg stated that he was in 
good health, except for an old injury to his leg and knee. According to the welfare report he 
came from a home where his father’s influence was a bad one. His mother was meek and 
uneducated, and his older siblings were also not a good influence. The accused expressed 
behavioural problems since his school days. It was clear that the accused was not suffering 
from mental illness. There was nothing to indicate that he had ever behaved in an abnormally 
aggressive way. He was at Die Built industrial school and spent time in the army during 
which “he had shown no homosexual tendencies”.31 He was of bright normal intelligence 
according to his behaviour in the interview. The accused’s behaviour had been appropriate 
considering his situation. 
The accused had expressed remorse for his crime. There were also no evidence of 
hallucinations or delusions or other psychotic phenomena present. The accused said he had 
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no memory of the crime due to his intoxication. When the crime was discussed the accused 
would become tense, blushed and looked distressed, and this emotional reaction was 
particularly marked when the sexual aspects of the case were discussed. It is acknowledged 
that the accused was under provocation and according to the medical report he was provoked 
by something that would not provoke a normal person. The provocation that the report refers 
to was the possibility of whether the deceased had intercourse with the accused against his 
will.  According to the accused that was the case. The deceased tried to seduce him and told 
him “come on [redacted], have some of daddy.” This provoked the accused and he assaulted 
the deceased resulting in his death. 
There were clinical features of personality disorder present, but these features were 
not of a degree or persistence to warrant a diagnosis of psychopathy in terms of the Mental 
Health Act. He was therefore mentally fit to stand trial. Justice Theron found the accused 
guilty of culpable homicide and sentenced him to three years imprisonment of which two 
and a half were suspended for three years. Additionally, Justice Theron recommended that 
he see a prison psychologist.  
 
5. 1. 18. State v. D. M. & Others, 197632 
The crime in the State v. D. M. & Others took place while the defendants were 
incarcerated. All of the accused were found guilty of murder and each received lengthy 
sentences. The first three offenders were given the death penalty, including the accused, 
which is the focus of this case. He was sent to Valkenberg for observation. He, and his fellow 
eight offenders were charged with murdering a fellow inmate by stabbing him 49 times. The 
reason D. M. was referred to Valkenberg was because his lawyer was of the opinion that he 
was a socio-or psychopath. He wanted to determine whether this was true or not. 
According to a Dr. Stock called by the accused’s lawyer, the accused lost both his 
parents before he was ten years old. He only stayed in school until standard six. By the age 
of twelve the accused was in and out of institutions and later prisons. The impression he gave 
was that he was of a poor personality type and easily influenced by others. He was also 
unstable and displayed anti-social behaviour. In the opinion of Dr. Stock he would classify 
him as a sociopathic personality or a psychopathic personality. However, the accused did 
                                                             




have insight into his actions. He was aware of what was wrong and what was right. He 
rationalized that where he had done something wrong, others were to blame. 
Dr. Stock was called to examine the accused to determine whether further 
examination by a psychiatrist at Valkenberg was necessary. The court agreed and the accused 
was examined by Dr. Pascoe at Valkenberg. According to Dr. Pascoe the accused was in 
good physical health and a routine examination revealed a faintly positive blood test for 
syphilis. Cerebrospinal fluid was positive, however, other tests were negative. The accused 
could not be considered as brain damaged due to infection. It is clear that some features of 
psychopathy were present, but the accused remained loyal to his group within the prison and 
was in turn accepted by that group. This was probably not abnormal in terms of standards of 
the sub-culture in which he had recently been active in the prison. 
The reason for the debate on whether the accused was a psychopath was due to certain 
features of psychopathy that were present. He showed little remorse for the act of which he 
was accused. The accused seemed to regard himself as belonging to a culture that was against 
society.33 This is common among those in prison or had been in prison. He did not speak 
with warmth about his family. According to Dr. Pascoe a person can act like a psychopath, 
but that does not make them one. One needed to look for mental abnormality or instability. 
Therefore, the accused’s social factors and history was the reason that he was in this problem, 
not psychopathy. 
Dr. Pascoe had formed the opinion that the accused was not a psychopath in terms of 
the Mental Health Act. There was no evidence, objective or subjective, of psychosis and his 
intelligence was in the average range. He was fit to stand trial and was not ill in terms of the 
Mental Health Act. Justice Broeksma gave the accused, including the other two guilty of 
murder the death penalty. The three who were given the death penalty appealed against the 
sentence. The trial judge granted leave to appeal for the accused against the verdict and the 
sentence. For the other two he granted leave to appeal the guilty verdict. The appeal judge, 
Justice Rabie denied their appeal. He determined that the trial court did not err in its decision. 
All three men were executed. 
 
                                                             




5. 1. 19. State v. C. L. & A. P., 197634 
In the State v. C. L. & A. P., the accused murdered a 79 year old white man in 
Rondebosch. They were working in his garden and decided to steal things from the house. 
According to one of the accused, A. P. and C. L. went to look for work in Rondebosch and 
this was where they encountered the deceased. The deceased gave them work to do in his 
garden. C. L. asked the accused for water and A. P. followed him and the deceased to the 
back door. C. L. took a rake with him and he hit the deceased with it. He then entered the 
house and proceeded to take things. According to the testimony of A. P. he was upset with 
what C. L. had done and was shocked. They left the premises. 
The accused, A. P. was born on a farm and illiterate. Psychometric testing placed the 
accused’s intelligence on the borderline group, but not certifiability defective. There was no 
evidence of hallucinations, delusions or other psychotic features. Dr. Pascoe added that the 
accused’s handicap did not significantly reduce his moral blameworthiness. According to 
the Valkenberg report of A. P. his left eye was severely damaged. He had no vision in that 
eye. The injury was caused by a ball when he was 13 years old. The injury had likely been 
frequently infected. Dr. Pascoe concluded that the accused was not suffering from a mental 
illness and he was not mentally ill in terms of the Mental Health Act. 
According to the Valkenberg report for C. L. he had a bone deficit on the parietal 
bone on the right side of his skull. According to the Tygerberg hospital records he was 
admitted because he had a depressed fracture of the skull, and paralysis on his left side. He 
recovered after they operated on his skull. The reflexes on his right side had still not 
completely recovered. Although the recovery of strength of movement was almost complete, 
some clumsiness of the affected limbs persisted. The accused had occasional attacks of grand 
mal epilepsy. He was given medication at the Tygerberg hospital to control his epilepsy. His 
EEG35 exam showed mild slowing at times and was reported as a possible mild abnormality. 
C. L. received a disability grant because of his physical disability. An x-ray exam 
showed that there was no cranial or intracranial disease. The neurosurgeon’s examination 
revealed no abnormality of the nervous system. Unfortunately for the accused he had friends 
of the anti-social type. He smoked dagga since he was 17 years old and regularly drank wine. 
The accused was tested by a clinical psychologist and no valid results could be obtained. It 
                                                             





seemed likely to the psychologist that he was purposely malingering. He expressed 
behaviour and emotion appropriate to his situation and the accused expressed no 
hallucinations or delusions. 
Dr. Pascoe concluded that he had a head injury that resulted in physical disability and 
epilepsy. The alleged crime did not occur in relation to a fit. He was not certifiably brain 
damaged. He was not a psychotic, although there were features of psychopathy. In the 
opinion of Dr. Pascoe, the accused was not psychopathic in terms of the Mental Disorders 
Act. He was fit to stand trial and not mentally ill in terms of the Mental Health Act of 1973. 
According to Justice Baker one or the other of the two accused hit the deceased on 
the head with a rake and the other one, in all probability, stood by and punched the deceased 
in the face according to the injuries on the deceased’s face. Both of the accused wanted to 
shift the blame onto one another. Each one of the accused said the other one was the ring 
leader. The deceased was hit so hard that there was a laceration on his brain and it was 
severely bruised. The lawyer for the state argued that although, due to the medical reports 
on the accused, there were extenuating circumstances present, he argued that the offenders 
treated the old man in an animalistic and barbaric manner. Justice Baker agreed with him 
and stated that he had the discretion, even in cases where there were extenuating 
circumstances, to impose the death penalty. Which he subsequently did. They appealed the 
death penalty, but Justice Baker had denied their leave to appeal and they were executed. 
 
5. 1. 20. State v. A. D. v. E., 197636 
This details of this case resembled that of of the State v. P. E. C. The accused, an 18 
year old white male, killed the deceased, a Coloured male by beating him with a piece of 
iron. He was charged with murder and the court requested a welfare report on the accused. 
According to the report his mother was a psychotic schizophrenic with lesbian tendencies. 
She was permanently certified and a patient at Valkenberg. His father was an unemployed 
man with a sub-normal intelligence. The accused’s father and mother had six children in 
total. One had died and the other four were in foster care. 
The mother had allegedly interfered, sexually, with one of her daughters. The family 
lived in a mixed area in 1962. The accused’s behaviour was difficult, especially for his father 
                                                             




who struggled to control him. His behaviour at school was not any better. In 1974 the accused 
was arrested for assault and sent to Valkenberg for psychiatric observation. He managed to 
escape in November of that year, but was caught and brought back to Valkenberg where he 
stayed until January of 1975. The psychiatrist determined that he was fit to stand trial and 
was found guilty of common assault and given eight lashes. The psychiatrist referred to him 
as a pathological liar who denied being involved in the assault, contrary to the evidence. 
Regarding the current case, the accused seemed to have no vestige of a conscience 
regarding the crime he committed. He maintains that he was under the influence of liquor 
and that the deceased endeavoured to assault him sexually. However, the court could not 
take him at his word. In his mind the cumulative effect of these factors exonerated him from 
any possible moral guilt. The court found that the accused was a psychopath in terms of the 
Mental Health Act of 1973. Justice Theron found him guilty of murder with extenuating 
circumstances and sentenced him to 10 years imprisonment. He recommended that the 
accused be treated in terms of section 30 of the Mental Health Act. 
 
5. 1. 21. State v. K. E., 197637 
The accused, a white male, assaulted a work colleague after he had hit him over the 
head. The assault led to the deceased’s death. According to the accused he had no breakfast 
on the day and was physically exhausted as a result of very hard manual labour over a period 
of hours. He had received two painful blows on his head, and that he reacted to this situation 
with emotions of intense fear and anger. 
According to the report from Valkenberg the accused was in good physical health, 
except that he suffered from epilepsy. He complained of pain and tenderness over an area to 
the left of the midline of his head. He was a known epileptic. He first received treatment as 
an out-patient at Valkenberg at the request of his employer. There was no other evidence of 
mental illness. He was prescribed medication for his epilepsy. He started to have epileptic 
fits again when he went off his medication. According to the EEG38 his fits were consistent 
with grand mal epilepsy. There was no violence that accompanied his fits. The accused had 
a fit on the day before the murder and on the day of the murder. 
                                                             





The accused did not suffer from delusions, his memory was intact, and his IQ was 
low, however not certifiably low. He was able to understand the proceedings of the court and 
instruct his defence. The report concluded that he was not mentally ill in terms of the Mental 
Health Act. Justice Diemont found him guilty of murder with extenuating circumstances and 
sentenced him to eight years imprisonment of which four years were suspended for three 
years. 
 
5. 1. 22. State v. W. O., 197639 
W. O. assaulted a man by throwing rocks at him and by jumping on him resulting in 
that man’s death. He was referred to Valkenberg for 28 days for observation. The reason for 
his referral was due to a head injury he received two years prior to the alleged crime. The 
injury caused him headaches. When this occurred he did not receive medical treatment and 
the wound later became septic. Afterwards a piece of bone came out of the wound and the 
wound healed. The accused still did not seek medical assistance. The examination confirmed 
that there was a scar on his head and a bone deficit where the wound was. 
According to the report of Dr. Pascoe the accused appeared to have been involved in 
three previous cases where he was involved in acts of violence. Two cases in 1969 and one 
in 1974. Dr. Pascoe noticed the gap from 1969-1972 during which the accused was not in 
trouble. He accepted financial responsibility for his child and had been self-sufficient. His 
IQ was on the average range. This does not indicate impairment of functionality due to brain 
injury. During interviews the accused was quiet and co-operative, his mood was 
“appropriate”, and he appeared to be anxious and depressed. He also showed remorse for 
what he had done. He expressed himself clearly without thought disorder and there was no 
evidence of hallucinations or delusions. 
According to Dr. Pascoe he was not mentally ill in terms of the Mental Disorders 
Act, the relevant sections retained in the Mental Health Act. Justice Schoek found him guilty 
of murder with extenuating circumstances and sentenced him to seven years imprisonment. 
 
                                                             




5. 1. 23. State v.  M. T. S., 197640 
The accused was sent to Valkenberg for examination after he allegedly stabbed a 
person with a sharp object resulting in their death. He pleaded not guilty and the court found 
him not guilty and discharged the accused. The accused in this case did not plead, because 
he was not aware of the deceased’s death. The lawyer for the defence motioned that the case 
against the accused be withdrawn and Justice Baker agreed. It did not appear that the accused 
was involved in the murder of the deceased. However, it was interesting to refer to this case, 
because the accused was sent to Valkenberg where it was determined that he might have had 
possible brain damage. The accused was in a motorcycle accident in his youth which resulted 
in a head injury. He complained that he suffered periodic headaches, drowsiness, and 
suffered from sleepiness on occasion. Although the accused was sent to Valkenberg in terms 
of the Mental Health Act. The court still refers to section 28 (3) of the Mental Disorders Act 
of 1916. 
 
5. 2. General Trends in the Court, 1973-1976 
The criminal cases for this period is dominated by cases where mental illness features 
quite often.  From 1973 we see more cases where mental illness is a factor. The commission 
of inquiry into the Mental Disorders Act published their report in the previous year, and 
parliament had been discussing the proposed Bill of the new Act, and discussing the revision 
of the Criminal procedure Act of 1955. Therefore, it would be accurate to say that issues of 
mental health and how they relate to crime were of concern to legal professionals and mental 
health care practitioners.  
In the cases from 1973 the old Mental Disorders Act was still being used, particularly 
sections 27-29 that deals with the procedure to be followed when the accused’s mental state 
comes into question, including the special order declaring an accused a State President’s 
patient. In the case of the State v. J. M.41 the accused was found to be mentally defective in 
terms of section 28 of the act. The psychiatrist at Valkenberg deemed him certifiable and the 
trial judge agreed and he was sent to the hospital section of Polsmoor prison.  
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In the case of G. C.42, his lawyer argued that he is a psychopath and that the court 
needed to consider the new legislation that would soon become law. However, the trial judge, 
Justice Vos, argued that the court must apply the law as it currently is, and not as it will soon 
be. The commission of inquiry into the Mental Disorders Act defined three concepts that is 
important when dealing with the mentally disordered. Namely, trialability, certifiability, and 
responsibility. According to the new proposed act a psychopath could be certified, but 
according to the new proposed legislation it also appears that the psychopathy could be a 
factor that would later be handled in the new Criminal Procedure Act, even though the court 
was unsure when it would be ascended to. Justice Vos made an important point that should 
be kept in mind when discussing the impact of legislation, especially criminal cases. By 
interpreting the law as it is Justice Vos maintains that the job of a judge is to interpret the 
legislation as the legislature indicated it should be interpreted. Therefore it is clear to see 
what the legislature had intended with the Mental Disorders Act No. 38 of 1916. 
Additionally, sections 27-29 that had bearing on this case was to be handled in the new 
Criminal Procedure Act, and according to Justice Vos it was not clear when that would 
become law. If Justice Vos had considered the new legislation he would have set a 
precedence in the superior courts that could have had far-reaching consequences. This 
reasoning on the part of judges, clearly changes during the 1974-1976 period.  
The new Mental Health Act became law in 1975. The last case for that year that 
referred to the old Act was the State v. N. K.43 in which the accused was deemed mentally 
disordered because he was considered unfit to plead, and therefore instruct his defence. The 
first case that used the new Mental Health Act was in the State v. A. B.44 that deemed the 
accused not certifiably defective or psychotic in terms of the Mental Health Act. In the case 
of the State v. B. H. H. of 197645 the accused was sent to receive treatment under section 30 
of the new Mental Health Act. This section provided the Superior court judge, or the 
magistrate, with the power to have the convicted accused sent for treatment, or inquire into 
their mental state. The accused in that case was convicted of culpable homicide.  
In the case files from 1976 the Valkenberg reports refer to both the Mental Health 
Act and the old Mental Disorders Act. This is due to sections 27-29 of the old act being 
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retained in the new act. In the case of the State v. M. T. S.46 the report says that they were 
referred to Valkenberg in terms of section 28 of the Mental Disorders Act. In the case of the 
State v. W. O.47 the accused is deemed not mentally ill in terms of the Mental Disorders Act, 
the relevant section retained in the Mental Health Act. The new Mental Health Act is 
especially concerned with patients who could possibly be psychopaths. Dr Pascoe, the 
superintendent at Valkenberg reminded the court in the State v. D. M. & Others48 that a 
person can act like a psychopath, but that does not make them one. 
The increase in cases for 1976, the year after the Mental Health Act was ascended to, 
can be attributed to an increased awareness of mental health, and mental illness among those 
accused in criminal cases. However, the full impact of the legislation cannot be seen due to 
the revised Criminal Procedure Act lapsing and only becoming law in 1977. To be able to 
evaluate the full scope of the impact if this legislative change, one would have to assess the 
criminal cases for 1977 to at least 1980. Nevertheless, the details of the courtroom trials 
presented clearly indicate how debates on procedure and mental health permeated the court 
room because the very protagonists involved in the debates, were party to the criminal 
procedure during the trials. In the face of uncertainty, new and old Acts were referred to. 
Judges, as has already been established in the secondary literature, mentioned in Chapter 
One, deviated from law if they felt inclined. These court records also suggest that the 
psychiatrists in turn, deviated from agreed definitions of mental illness and their reflections 
further contributed to the final decision made by judges on appropriate punishment. The 
process was therefore guided more by personal considerations rather than legislated 
certainty.  
 
5. 3. Statistic of Offences 1977-198049 
Due to criminal cases for 1977-1980 not being available in the archives, this 
dissertation will refer to the national statistics for murder and culpable homicide 
prosecution50 and conviction rates. Similar to the trend at the Cape Supreme Court the 
prosecution rate for murder was nationally high with a corresponding lower conviction rate. 
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The statistics compiled from the archives for 1964-197651 show that there is a lower 
prosecution rate for culpable homicide, nationally the prosecution rate for culpable homicide 
was comparatively much higher than at the Cape Supreme Court. One would expect that the 
trend would be the same nationally, considering that culpable homicide was a lesser charge 
than murder and due to Attorney-General’s usually pursuing the maximum charge of murder. 










Table 4: Tabulated from the Report of the Statistics of Offences and Penal Institutions, 1977-7853 
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Table of Statistics of Offences and of Penal Institutions 
C1 Murder Statistics for persons over the age of 7
Prosecutions Convictions
1977-78 TOTAL Male Female TOTAL Male Female
Code 148 48 22 26 33 13 20
Code 149 64 60 4 41 40 1
Code 150 17 15 2 11 10 1
Code 151 82 77 5 66 61 5
Code 152 17 17 0 10 10 0
Code 153 28 27 1 12 11 1
Code 154 3 990 3 706 284 1 752 1 626 126
Total C1 4,246 3,924 322 1,925 1,771 154
Table of Statistics of Offences and of Penal Institutions 
C1 Culpabale Homicide Statistics for persons over the age of 7
Prosecutions Convictions
1977-78 TOTAL Male Female TOTAL Male Female
Code 143 1 937 1 846 91 1 186 1 130 56
Code 144 59 54 51 38 35 3
Code 145 111 110 1 65 64 1
Code 146 106 93 13 84 77 7
Code 147 2 134 1 939 195 1 884 1 707 177




Table 5: Tabulated from the Report of Statistics of Offences and Penal Institutions, 1979-8054 
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C1 Murder Statistics for persons over the age of 7 
 
  
              
  Prosecutions     Convictions     
1979-80 TOTAL Male Female TOTAL Male Female 
Code 148 62 47 15 36 25 11 
Code 149 36 34 2 22 22 0 
Code 150 41 38 3 31 28 3 
Code 151 64 53 11 48 41 7 
Code 152 5 5 0 0 0 0 
Code 153 43 42 1 24 24 0 
Code 154 1 409 1 326 83 606 563 43 
Code 155 46 42 4 26 24 2 
Code 156 40 39 1 33 32 1 
Code 157 107 89 18 89 74 15 
Code 158 4 4 0 3 3 0 
Code 159 48 47 1 16 16 0 
Code 160 2 657 2 513 144 1 128 1 065 63 
Total C1 4,562 4,279 283 2,062 1,917 145 
Table of Statistics of Offences and of Penal Institutions    
C1 Culpable Homicide Statistics for persons over the age of 7   
              
  Prosecutions     Convictions     
1979-80 TOTAL Male Female TOTAL Male Female 
Code 143 1 832 1 734 98 1 043 984 59 
Code 144 55 51 4 40 37 3 
Code 145 69 67 2 47 46 1 
Code 146 94 85 9 59 51 8 
Code 147 2 418 2 165 253 2 089 1 885 204 




From the government statistics it can be ascertained that nationally there was a slight 
increase in murder prosecutions from 4, 246 in 1977-88 to 4, 562 in 1978-80. 
Correspondingly, the conviction rate for murder increased in 1979-80 from 1, 925 to 2, 062, 
but as a percentage of the prosecution rate there was a slight decrease from 1977/88 to 
1979/80. Similarly with the Culpable homicide prosecution and murder rates there were 
marginal increases. Interestingly, as in the case with murder, there was a slight decrease of 
prosecutions for culpable homicide from 1977/88-1979/80. Additionally, how the 
government would tabulate the statistics changed. Notably, the classifications of White, 
Coloured, Bantu, and Asiatic were removed, as can be seen from tables 18 to 25.55 However, 
the codes were still tabulated according to race, and from 1979-80 there were further 
classification codes added to the murder section of the government statistics.  
These statistics, unlike those tabulated in Chapter Two, do not reflect how mental 
health was actually considered in the courts. Similarly, the trends and nuances discussed in 
the various case studies presented throughout this dissertation, are not reflected in the official 
reports presented by the legal profession. Legal discussions only reflect in case law when 
that trial deviates from legislated laws and practices. They are reflect on cases sent for 
Appeal. These are not the original documents of the trial but rather an interpretation of what 
was most relevant to case law. Focus is therefore placed on what actually deviated from the 
law compared to how this evolved and if any traces of those eventual changes were present 
in other trials not necessarily presented as case studies in the legal reports. Three particular 
reports foreground this observation.   
 
5. 4. Law Reports, 1976-1978 
5. 4. 1. State v. De Bruyn. 197656 
The accused was a 30 year old white male found guilty of three charges of planned 
and brutal murders. Before he committed the crimes he was convicted of, he was 
unemployed for a very long time. During that time he met a white woman, Johanna van 
Jaarsveld, with whom he started a relationship. By day, the pair would roam the streets of 
Johannesburg begging, telling people false stories of their hardship. They would use the 
money they got from begging for alcohol. They had no home and would sleep wherever they 
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can. There was also another way the appellant and Johanna made money. Johanna would 
become very friendly with male suitors. She would then accompany these men, whom were 
under the impression they will be having sex with Johanna, to a room where the appellant 
would rob or blackmail the victim. 
The accused appealed against the death penalty that had been imposed at the 
Witwatersrand provincial division. The trial court found that there were no extenuating 
circumstances and imposed the death penalty. In the appeal court it is claimed that the 
following factors made out a case for extenuating circumstances: (a) according to the 
respondent his abuse of alcohol over a long period of time, especially his abuse on the days 
the three murders were committed (b) that he suffered from epilepsy from an early age (c) 
that he has shown remarkable psychopathic tendencies, coupled with emotional immaturity, 
and hysterical tendencies. 
Every single one of the three victim were lured to a room where they were killed. 
Two of the victims were killed in November of 1973 and the third in March of 1974 in Port 
Elizabeth. On the 5th of March 1974 the appellant and Johanna were arrested in 
Humansdorp. Afterwards the appellant and Johanna appeared at a provincial trial. Based on 
medical inquiries Johanna was referred to the Sterkfontein Hospital as a State President’s 
patient. Thus, the appellant was the only defendant at the trial. At the trial he denied being 
the murderer and tried to put all the blame on his accomplice, Johanna. At the trial only two 
people testified for the appellant. A social worker, Ms Tollman and the superintendent of 
Weskoppies Hospital, Dr Phyllis Morgan. According to her he did not suffer from any mental 
illness or defect as described in the Mental Disorders Act of 1916. On the issue of whether 
he suffered from epilepsy her testimony was as follow: 
There was a history which strongly suggested epilepsy and during his period of 
observation at Weskoppies three electroencephalograph readings were done. The 
first two which were done with the accused fasting, which is usual, fasting may 
bring out more  G abnormalities than otherwise, showed some non-specific 
abnormalities but were still essentially within normal limits. The third one which 
was done, both fasting and with eight ounces of alcohol given half an hour prior 
to the test, showed an excess of bi-temporal slow-wave activity. This is a type of 
recording found frequently in individuals who have a personality disorder and 
particularly those with aggressive tendencies. Not any of the three E.E.G.'s 
showed evidence of epilepsy. But this in itself does not exclude the diagnosis of 
epilepsy. The accused himself, during the period I saw him showed, was never 




However, during the examination it was discovered that the appellant did show 
noticeable psychopathic tendencies. Primarily, he was aggressive and had no shame or 
showed no remorse for his actions. 
According to Dr Coetzee, a clinical psychologist at Weskoppies Hospital who 
performed certain tests on the appellant, the appellant’s intelligence was above average. This 
was the following summary of his testimony concerning the appellant:” As a whole, it seems 
to be an emotional, immature personality structure with psychopathic, and to a lesser extent, 
hysterical tendency”. 
The appellate division came to the conclusion that any other reasonable court would 
have come to the same conclusion as the initial conviction. His alcohol abuse was not 
considered a mitigating factor because he was very much in control of his actions. The court 
acknowledged that he suffered from epilepsy when he was young, but as an adult the disease 
did not manifest again. He once lost consciousness when he was transported from Port 
Elizabeth to Johannesburg, but other than that there are no other clear epileptic fits to go on 
or a concise history of his epileptic fits. 
Lastly, the appellant did not cave under his emotional, immature, psychopathic 
personality during the murders. His crimes were premeditated. The Appeal Court held in 
response to the accused’s factors that made a case for extenuating circumstances that (a) that 
he could not have been much affected by the liquor; (b) that the epilepsy had not again shown 
itself.; and (c) that it had only been established that the appellant had psychopathic 
tendencies, combined with emotional immaturity and hysterical tendencies, to which the trial 
Court had given proper consideration. The Court could not find that no reasonable Court 
could come to any other conclusion than that extenuating circumstances were present, that 
there was no ground for intervention in the trial Court's sentence. Based on all of the facts 
discussed, the appeal’s court could not find a reason to overturn the original sentence. 
 
5. 4. 2. State v. Mnyanda, 197657 
This appeal was against a death sentence in the Cape Provincial Division in front of 
trial judge Justice R. Steyn. The case is concerned with the intention of the legislature that 
the definition of “mental illness” in Act 18 of 1973 would only come into operation when a 
                                                             




new Criminal Procedure Act was introduced and when “psychopathy” could be regarded as 
an extenuating circumstance. The legislature did not intend to insert more into the definition 
of “psychopathic disorder” in section 1 of the Mental Health Act, 18 of 1973, such as that 
“abnormally aggressive or seriously irresponsible conduct must be shown to occur in a way 
which was not deliberately chosen or planned, but was only minimally subject to willed 
control, and that this type of reaction to situations has been persistent, thus demonstrating 
that it results from a “persistent disorder or disability of mind”, and that other feature of 
psychopathy must also be present”. The legislature also did not intend to impose a tacit 
limitation on the clinical concept of psychopathy. 
The legislature had left this naturally difficult diagnosis to expert medical opinion, 
with due consideration of the general picture of each particular case, and, in Act 18 of 1973, 
did not wish to interfere more with the expert medical opinion than was required by the 
definition of “psychopathic disorder”. If acceptable expert evidence showed that a person 
suffered from a “psychopathic disorder” as defined in the Act, and could be regarded as a 
patient as defined in section one, then it appears that it was the legislature's intention that he 
should be dealt with according to the Act. In the absence of any exceptional symptom, a 
complete psychopath was criminally responsible. As the result of an amendment in 195758 
the Mental Disorders Act, 38 of 1916, no longer defined a psychopath as a mentally 
disordered person. 
Where a court finds that an accused suffers from a “mental illness” or “mental 
disability” according to Act 18 of 1973 it must act in terms of sections 28 to 29 bis inclusive 
of the Mental Disorders Act, 38 of 1916, as Act 18 of 1973 does not provide for what must 
be done with the accused in such a case, but has left sections 28 to 29 bis inclusive in 
operation. It is clear that section 28 of Act 38 of 1916 concerns the mental condition of the 
person at the time of trial and not to the mental condition of a person at the time of the 
committing of the alleged offence, which is dealt with in section 29. It follows, therefore, 
that section 28 did not deal with the question of responsibility at the time of the commission 
of the offence, a concept which is specifically mentioned in section 29. In the application of 
section 28 the question whether the accused must necessarily be placed in a prison or 
institution pending the decision of the State President must be answered. The legislature 
intended in Act 18 of 1973 that, for the adjudication of (the responsibility of) a person, the 
                                                             




definition of “mental illness” in the Act would only come into operation when the new 
Criminal Procedure Act, to which reference is made in Act 18 of 1973, was introduced. 
The Pro-deo lawyer for the appellant, C. J. de Klerk argued that the trial court had 
failed to find that the appellant was not a psychopath in terms of the Mental Health Act, 18 
of 1973. If the appellant was a psychopath in terms of the definition contained in Act 18 of 
1973, he should have been dealt with in terms of section 28 of Act 38 of 1916 and section 
27 to 29a of the latter Act, which was not repealed by Act 18 of 1973 and therefore remained 
in place. Because the definition of the section of Act 38 of 1916 was recalled, section 28 of 
that act should have been viewed either in vacuo59 or in the light of act 18 of 1973, and thus 
not to the repealed wording of the first mentioned Act. 
This means that appellant should have been treated in terms of section 28 of Act 38 
of 1916. It appears from Act 18 of 1973 that the legislature wanted to change the position to 
also provide for psychopaths. The argument that the legislature did not want to change the 
position since section 29 of Act 18 of 1973 refers to a non-existent Criminal Procedure Act 
of 197460 in terms of which section 27 to 29 bis of Act 38 of 1916 would be repealed by 
Chapter 13 of the said non-existent Act, is illogical and does not end, as this Criminal 
Procedure Act does not exist and therefore still has to be looked into. In order to give due 
consideration to a non-existent act, only reference is made to speculation, and it could 
possibly even appear that the legislature meant section 28 of Act 38 of 1916 would apply to 
psychopaths. Alternatively, the court failed to prove that there were no mitigating 
circumstances after Act 18 of 1973.  Dolus Eventualis61 or the absence of dolus directus62 
may act alone or in conjunction with other circumstances as a mitigating circumstance. 
H. G. Klem for the State argued that the trial court was correct in its ruling that the 
appellant was not suffering from a psychopathic disturbance as described in section one of 
act 18 of 1973. The onus rested on the appellant, and he did not indicate in all probability 
that he was suffering from a psychopathic disturbance as section one of act 18 of 1973. In 
the alternative, even if the Court of Appeal found evidence that the appellant suffered from 
a psychopathic disorder, he could not be declared a State President’s patient in terms of the 
                                                             
59 Definition: “Away from or without the normal context or environment”. 
60 Only became law in 1977. 
61 Definition: “Foresaw the possibility of their actions resulting in the death of someone but continued regardless”. 
62 Definition: “Intent in the form of dolus eventualis or legal intention, which is present when the perpetrator 
objectively foresees the possibility of his act causing death and persists regardless of the consequences, suffices 




provisions of section 28 (a) of Act 38 of 1916. Section 27 to 29a of Act 38 of 1916 remained 
in force and would remain in force until revoked by the new Criminal Procedure Act, which 
did not yet exist at the time. Section 28 (2) must be read with section two and three of Act 
38 of 1916 and not with the wording contained in section one of Act 18 of 1973. A definition 
is part of the provision in which a defined expression appears as if incorporated into the 
provision. In order to explain the remaining provisions of a law, which has been partially 
repealed, a court should have considered the purpose of the Act in its original form and not 
the purpose of the Act in its cut-off form, except where the partial revocation is apparently 
intended to change the meaning of the remaining provisions. However, until the new 
Criminal Procedure Act becomes effective, section 28 (2) of the old act in the light of its 
own wording remained in effect. 
According to the Appeal judge, Justice Rumpff, the factors considered by the trial 
court for mitigation, as well as the age of the appellant, did not constitute separately or 
cumulatively, mitigating circumstances. Mitigating circumstances must be considered and 
weighed within the factual complex of the particular crime. 
 
5. 4. 3. State v. Swart, 197863 
When the Mental Health Act, 18 of 1973, came into force on 27 March 1975, section 
8 of that Act superseded section 5 of the Mental Disorders Act, 38 of 1916, and its operation 
was not postponed or suspended by reason of the fact that, until the Criminal Procedure Act, 
51 of 1977, came into force on 22 July 1977, sections 27, 28, 29 and 29 bis of the 1916 Act 
remained in force. Consequently, where the mental condition of the accused became an issue 
during the hearing of a criminal charge in a magistrate's court before the Criminal Procedure 
Act, 51 of 1977, came into force, it was competent for the magistrate either to enquire then 
and there into the accused's mental condition (under section 28 of the 1916 Act) or to 
postpone the hearing to enable a magistrate, sitting in a capacity other than that of a criminal 
judicial officer, to consider whether a reception order should be made under section eight of 
Act 18 of 1973, committing the accused to an institution as defined in that Act. The appeal 
argued that when an accused is a chronic alcoholic and appears to have brain damage caused 
                                                             




by excessive consumption of alcohol, he is prima facie64 in need of treatment in an institution 
rather than imprisonment. 
This appeal was against an order in a magistrate's court refusing a postponement to 
enable application to be made for a reception order under sec. 8 of Act 18 of 1973 and against 
sentence. The facts appear from the reasons for judgment. S. Baker argued for the state that 
on 20 April 1977 and at Bredasdorp the appellant was convicted of drunken driving. On 29 
June 1977 he was sentenced to two years' imprisonment and was declared unfit to possess a 
driving license for an indefinite period. The licence had on or about 7 April 1977 been 
withdrawn in terms of sec. 75 (2) of the Road Traffic Ordinance, 21 of 1966 (C). The 
Appellant had two previous convictions for drunken driving and one for driving without a 
licence. His conviction was in order, and there is no appeal against that. On 19 July 1977 he 
lodged an appeal against the sentence on the ground that it was inappropriate and excessive. 
This was superseded by an amended notice lodged on 15 August 1977 and reading as 
follows: 
Dat die landdros fouteer het deur die aansoek namens appellant om die uitstel van 
die strafsaak, hangende die oorweging van 'n aansoek om 'n opnemingsbevel 
kragtens art. 8 van die Wet op Geestesgesondheid, 18 van 1973, van die hand te 
wys.  Dat die opgelegde vonnis buitensporig is in die lig van al die omstandighede 
van die misdryf en die persoonlike omstandighede van die appellant.65 
After conviction on 20 April 1977 the case was adjourned to 25 May 1977 for the 
previous convictions to be proved. They were duly produced and admitted. At this stage the 
attorney for the accused asked that the proceedings be stayed and that the court should hold 
an inquiry in terms of sec. 30 of Act 41 of 1971 (an ordinary inquiry involving someone who 
appears to be an alcoholic, inter alios).66 
The application purported to be made under sec. 341 (1) of Act 56 of 1955 as 
substituted by sec. 62 of Act 41 of 1971. This section (341) makes the consent of the public 
prosecutor (given after consultation with a social welfare officer) a prerequisite to the 
holding of the inquiry. The attorney said his client was such a one as was contemplated in 
sec. 29 of Act 41 of 1971. The public prosecutor made no objection to the request. The case 
was therefore postponed so that he could consult the social welfare officer. On resumption 
                                                             
64 Definition: “Based on the first impression; accepted as correct until; proved otherwise”. 
65 Translation: That the magistrate has went through the application on behalf of the appellant for the 
postponement of the criminal case, pending consideration of an application for a notice of institutionalization 
under section. 8 of the Mental Health Act, 18 of 1973. 
66 Definition: “That the imposed sentence is excessive in the light of all the circumstances of the offense and the 




(29 June 1977) the public prosecutor said that, after consulting with the social welfare 
officer, he would not consent to the  G conversion (under sec. 341 of Act 56 of 1955) of the 
proceedings into a rehabilitation inquiry under sec. 30 of Act 41 of 1971. 
The public prosecutor explained that he had been informed by Mrs. Volschenk (a 
social welfare officer) that the accused would not, in her view, benefit by treatment in a 
rehabilitation centre. She had read a letter written by a psychiatrist at Stikland Hospital, Dr. 
Hans Rompel and, according to this, the appellant had been five and a half months in Stikland 
and was discharged upon his own insistence. He was regarded by Rompel as an incurable 
drinker. Therefore the public prosecutor refused his consent. The attorney agreed that he 
could not press this application. 
The accused's attorney then asked the court to postpone the case until an application 
already brought before the magistrate in terms of sec. 8 of the Mental Health Act, 18 of 1973, 
was disposed of. The magistrate would hear this application in a different capacity from that 
in which he was currently acting. Sec. 8 of Act 18 of 1973 provides that a "reception order" 
may be made in respect of a person believed to be suffering from mental illness to such a 
degree that he should be committed to an institution. Certain facts have to be laid before the 
magistrate requested to make the order. 
The court told the attorney that secs. 27 - 29 of the "Wet op kriminele sake" were 
applicable (he meant the old Mental Disorders Act, 38 of 1916). Secs. 27 - 29 of the 1916 
Mental Disorders Act deal with the situation where someone is found to be mentally 
disordered or defective prior to arraignment or sentence (sec. 27); or mentally disordered or 
defective on arraignment or during trial (sec. 28); or mentally disordered or defective at the 
time of the offence (sec. 29). They do not, prima facie, appear to have any application to a 
chronic alcoholic who has been found to be such, or is believed to be such, at the stage when 
he has already been convicted of drunken driving and now awaits sentence. “Mental illness" 
in sec. 8 of Act 18 of 1973 is defined in sec. 1 of the Act as being "any disorder or disability 
of the mind, and includes any mental disease, any arrested or incomplete development of the 
mind, and any psychopathic disorder...". This definition seems to me to be wider than the 
concepts of "mental disorder" or "mental defect" contained in the 1916 Mental Disorders 
Act. It may be, therefore, that chronic alcoholism falls within the concept of "mental illness" 
contemplated by the 1973 Mental Disorders Act. The attorney for the appellant argued that 




8 of the 1973 Mental Health Act did. He contended that his client was "mentally ill" in terms 
of the 1973 Act, and referred to affidavits by Drs Rompel and Van Heerden and accused's 
son to substantiate this submission. 
Dr. Rompel said in his affidavit that accused had brain damage; so did Dr. Van 
Heerden; and so did Johannes J. Swart, the son. All these affidavits were originally filed in 
an application to the Supreme Court brought by the son to have his father declared unfit to 
manage his own affairs, and for the appointment of a curator bonis.67 The attorney's 
contention was that "brain damage" amounted to “mental illness.” The order which this Court 
made at this stage is that the sentence of two years' imprisonment was set aside; the refusal 
of the postponement was set aside; the matter was remitted to the magistrate to reconsider 
the application for a postponement in order to enable the applicant to bring an application 
under sec. 8 of Act 18 of 1973, bearing in mind the views expressed by the Court in this 
judgment. It was not, in this circumstance, found necessary to deal with the second ground 
of appeal argued by counsel. 
 
5. 5. Chapter Conclusion 
In the period of 1974-1980 the majority of the important changes occurred in mental 
health legislation. The Mental Health Act of 1973 passed in Parliament and became law in 
1975. However, the Criminal Procedure Bill of 1973 lapsed and only became law in 1977. 
Due to the criminal cases in the archive for 1977 not being available, the law reports for 
1977-1980 were consulted. The law reports show that there were discussions surrounding 
mental health legislation taking place in other courts throughout the country. Additionally, 
the statistics for this period also show an increase in defendants being sent for mental health 
evaluation, however there was not a corresponding increase in defendants being declared 
mentally ill in terms of the Mental Health Act of 1973. According to the national statistics 
for the murder and culpable homicide rates there was nationally a high culpable homicide 
charge rate, whereas the opposite was the case according to the statistics compiled from 
archival research for 1964-1976. This indicated that the murder charge was favoured over a 
charge of culpable homicide. Yet, the conviction rate indicated that culpable homicide was 
favoured over a murder conviction.  
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Essentially, this chapter has also shown how despite new Acts being passed, there 
was a tendency to draw on aspects of previously defunct Acts within court cases and appeals 
and that even prior to an act being implemented, discussions around those changes became 
part of the judicial proceedings during expert testimony. It cannot be concluded that this had 
a direct impact on sentencing practices but during the delivery of the sentence, judges would 
often draw references to what motivated their sentence. In the cases presented before the 
Cape Town Supreme court, it is clear that the debates and around mental health, changing 
fields of psychiatry and psychology and the various commissions of enquiry following the 
assassination of Verwoerd featured in the court proceedings despite the fact that there were 
alarming lapses in time between the discussions, Bills and eventual Acts which would 
change how mental health would be considered in a court of law. The instigators of these 
considerations were the psychiatrists who in large part therefore had a profound impact on 
the sentence passed in the event of a guilty verdict being passed. More importantly, it is clear 
that the debates and eventual resolution to change both mental health and criminal procedural 
laws allowed a space for greater cohesion between the legal and medical fraternity who took 
these debates from parliament to the courts. Ironically, the actions of a “madman” who 
assassinated H. Verwoerd in 1966, led to an overhaul of two major arms of the political 






Chapter Two provided a statistical analysis of murder charges and sentencing 
practices at the Cape Supreme Court from 1964 to 1976. The most prevalent mitigating 
circumstances taken into consideration throughout the period under investigation were 
foreground. Sentencing practices were influence by these extenuating and mitigating 
circumstances as well as personal eccentricities of the judge. Race, class and notions of 
respectability were of importance and of course, so too was the severity of the crime. These 
observations were hardly restricted to the Cape nor were they restricted by the offence under 
investigation.  
Following the assassination of Verwoerd, Chapter Three showed that an inordinate 
amount of energy was spent on understanding the link between the diseased mind, social 
upbringing and criminality. Inherent were nature/nurture debates on what made the criminal 
mind and how best to treat it, if at all. Penology and discussions around prisons, rehabilitation 
centres, mental institutions or simply eradicating the “beast” were infused in rigorous debates 
on the state of psychiatry, psychology and the law in what almost appeared to be a moral 
panic in the mid-1960s and early 1970s. This marked the beginning of a working relationship 
between these professions as well as produced unlikely forms of support and resistance from 
organisations such as the Scientologists. It is at this stage that a variety of commissions of 
inquiry led to major reforms culminating in the amendment to the outdated 1916 Medical 
Disorders Act in 1973. However, it was only in 1975 that this was ascended to as a major 
overhaul of the Criminal Procedure Act of 1955 was necessitated to accommodate the 
changes proposed by the 1973 Mental Health Act. It is the impact of this transition on 
sentencing practices that becomes the basis for Chapter Four.    
Between 1968 and 1971, five cases of murder in which the mental health of the 
accused is taken into account are delineated. Large portions of the sentencing trends 
correlated with broader extenuating circumstances and mental health concerns. As the 
commissions of inquiry into the criminal procedure unfolded some of the issues prevalent in 
subsequent discussions during the commissions of enquiry lead to serious delay in accepting 
the Criminal Procedure Bill of 1973. This only occurred in 1977. Chapter Five therefore 
reflects on twenty-three cases of murder in which mental health was rigorously discussed 
between 1973 and 1976. This period of the great transition, reflected a much greater 




despite the fact that formally, the criminal procedure was still under review. Here, however, 
the nuances and debates around mental health and the law, as discussed openly in the courts 
of law, further provides a glimpse into the nuances attached to the implications of these two 
Acts of parliament, one still to be implemented at the time. The chapter ends by briefly 
discussing legal reports which very scantily address three cases in which mental health and 
criminal procedure are discussed.  
The statistics provided by government publications on murder and murder related 
crimes were limited due to missing information from these statistics. For some of the years 
only the conviction rates were available. Nationally, they did not reflect the changing 
discussions that took place. However, the statistical analysis provided in Chapter Two better 
reflect changes in the charge rates that correspond with contemporary discussions such as the 
Rumpff Commission, both Van Wyk Commissions, and parliamentary debates. The analysis 
of the criminal cases at the Cape Supreme Court show that these discussion had been 
considered by the judiciary well before becoming legislated. The tabulated statistics in Chapter 
Two indicate that mental illness was given more attention, particularly in the period when the 
Mental Health Act was still being discussed in parliament, and notably after it became law in 
1975, despite the fact that the Criminal Procedure Bill of 1973 was still being debated. The 
judiciary turned to mental health care practitioners to assist the courts with such cases and as 
such, it is argued that their personal considerations, thoughts and compassion allowed for 
verdicts and sentences which deviated from legislated guidelines. Secondary literature has 
argued that much of the sentencing practices was based on judge’s proclivities. This 
dissertation argues that it relied on the proclivities of both judges and psychiatrists, two 
professions brought together to discuss pivotal national concerns around redundant mental 
health and criminal procedure after the assassination of Verwoerd.   
The debates from parliament sheds light on the legislative process and logistical 
nightmare regarding the Mental Health Act of 1973 and the Criminal Procedure Bill of 1973. 
The Mental Health Act passed rather quickly through parliament, with some members of 
parliament showing concern over the speed with which such a complex and changing field 
could be adapted into legislation. Members of parliament appeared to be more in agreement 
with each other regarding the Act. The recommendations by the commissions of inquiry were 
amended where necessary and included in the Act. The necessity of a revised mental health 
law was apparent to all members of the legislature and the psychiatric discipline, therefore the 




Bill of 1973 did not enjoy the same universal approval as the Mental Health Act. Other factors 
also hindered the bill passing simultaneously with the Mental Health Act, such as the Viljoen 
Commission and the election year preventing the bill from being reintroduced again. This 
resulted in sections 27-29 of the old Mental Disorders Act being retained in the new Act. The 
Commissions of enquiry and debates that were concerned with issues of mental health in South 
Africa reflected a change from relying on external English laws and remnants of Roman-Dutch 
law to a more local and context based understanding of mental illness. Additionally, these 
changes were also in line with modern and international trends.  
The secondary literature as discussed in Chapter One highlights the different 
discussions in sentencing practices during Apartheid. Additionally, Chapter One covered 
secondary literature that added additional context to the points of discussion in this study. Some 
of these factors regarding sentencing practices included the race and/or class of the defendant 
in criminal cases. The cases reflect these assertions although no definable trend could be 
ascertained in this particular court of law. Historically, black and coloured individuals were 
seen as intellectually inferior,1 and lived in deplorable conditions. Therefore, these individuals 
were more susceptible to psychological and psychiatric problems compared to white 
individuals. From the commissions of enquiry and the parliamentary debates it can be 
ascertained that there was a growing appreciation for psychological factors as the cause of 
mental illness and not strictly pathological causes as proposed by psychiatry. However, in the 
courts, preference was still given to pathological causes of mental illnesses, however there 
seemed to be a willingness to accept psychological causes in the case of white defendants.  
There were cases where the pathology of mental illness in the accused is considered to 
have a psychological origin and not a physical one such as brain damage, syphilis, or epilepsy. 
In the case of the State v. D.2 the specialist psychiatrist, Dr. Zabow testified that the accused 
was not mentally disordered due to physical disease such as epilepsy or brain damage, but that 
he was psychiatrically disordered. The accused’s behaviour can be attributed due to his lack of 
sexual development which caused him to experience problems which manifested in abnormal 
behaviour. In D.’s case the trial judge was not satisfied that the accused was not mentally 
disordered, because psychiatric testimony concluded that he was not mentally disordered or 
defective because of a physical defect such as epilepsy, but psychiatrically disordered. He did 
                                                             
1 See Chapter 2 for discussion on IQ. 
2 See also the State v. G. J. P, 1971. The case is similar to that of D. in the sense that the mental problems 
experienced by the accused was due to other psychological problems, however only a light cerebral dysrhythmia 




however concede that the accused was suffering from some psychiatric ailment. This indicates 
that whereas psychiatrist are well versed in mental illnesses, physical or psychological, the 
judiciary still considered pathology a more acceptable explanation for crime. This is but one 
example of the divergence between mental health professionals and the judiciary.  
In the criminal cases of this dissertation the most important aspect of mental health 
which created much confusion for both the mental health and legal professionals is that of 
psychopathy.3 The Second Van Wyk Commission4 was arguably more concerned with the 
concept of psychopathy than the Rumpff Commission5 of 1967 that made reference to the 
deletion of Class VI in the Mental Disorders Act that referred to anti-social behaviour. The 
Commission noted that this class seemed important considering the importance of 
psychopathy.  
The legislature also did not intend to impose a tacit limitation on the clinical concept of 
psychopathy. The legislature had left this difficult diagnosis to expert medical opinion, with 
due consideration of the general picture of each particular case, and, in Act 18 of 1973, did not 
wish to interfere with the expert medical opinion than was required by the definition of 
“psychopathic disorder”. If acceptable expert evidence showed that a person suffered from a 
“psychopathic disorder”, as defined in the Act, and could be regarded as a “patient” as defined 
in section one, then it appears that it was the legislature's intention that he should be dealt with 
according to the Act. In the absence of any exceptional symptom, a complete psychopath was 
criminally responsible. 
These debates were clearly visible in the court trial records. These, in stark contrast to 
the legal reports, allow a much clearer understanding of the intricate and nuanced manner in 
which these patchworks of “confusion” were practically negotiated. They also reflect the 
prevalence of cases in which mental health was actually a point for consideration. In contrast, 
the legal reports only reflect on three cases where mental illness was a factor for the criminal 
proceedings. These cases were from the appeals court, and there is one that dealt with the 
Mental Health Act of 1973 and the proposed Criminal Procedure Bill of 1973. In the State v. 
Myanda6 the appellant’s lawyer argued that the trial court failed to prove that the appellant was 
                                                             
3 In cases the State v. G. J. P, 1971, the State v. G. C, 1974, the State v. D. M & others, 1976 psychopathy was 
discussed.  
4 RP 180/1972, Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Mental Disorders Act. 
5 RP 69/1967, Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the responsibility of mentally deranged persons and 
related matters. 




not a psychopath in terms of the Mental Health Act of 1973. Therefore, the trial court did not 
consider psychopathy as an extenuating circumstance. The case was concerned with the 
intention of the legislature that the definition of “mental illness” in Act 18 of 1973 would only 
become law when the new Criminal Procedure Act became law, and when “psychopathy” 
could be regarded as an extenuating circumstance. The legislature did not intend to insert 
anything more into the definition of “psychopathic disorder” in section one of the Mental 
Health Act, 18 of 1973.  
The focus of this study was on the legislative changes, such as the Mental Health Act 
of 1973 and other related legislation, that took place in the aftermath of Verwoerd’s 
assassination in 1966. These changes included the Mental Health Act of 1973 that only became 
law in 1975 and in addition to this there was the Criminal Procedure Bill of 1973 that was 
supposed to pass in the house of assembly in tandem with the Mental Health Act of 1973. The 
Criminal Procedure Act became law in 1977 and there should have been visible change in the 
sentencing practices of offenders where their mental illness became an extenuating factor. 
Existing secondary literature has argued that the Mental Health Act of 1973 could only become 
effective after the changes of Criminal Procedure in 1977. This dissertation argues differently. 
Analysis of the archival records suggest that the debates surrounding these two major Acts of 
parliament played a central role in the sentencing of condemned murderers in the courts of law 
because the very members of parliament, professionals and even organisations asked to 
contribute to national debates on reform, were the very people asked to provide expert 
testimony in court. Their reflections affected the outcome of both verdict and trial. Therefore, 
this dissertation argues that the sentencing practices were rather dependent on the people 
involved in the trial process rather than on the actual legislative changes which took place 
during this investigation and this had a direct impact on both verdicts and sentences presented 
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Tabulated Government Statistics of Murder and Culpable Homicide Prosecution and 
Conviction Rates, 1964-1976 
 
1963-64 
Table 6: Government Published Statistics for the Murder Prosecution Rate, 1963-647 
 
Table 7: Government Published Statistics for the Murder Conviction Rate, 1963-648 
  
                                                             
7 Tabulated from the Statistics of Offences and Penal Institutions, 1963-64. 
8 Ibid. 
Table of Statistics of Offences and of Penal Institutions          
C1 Murder Statistics for persons over the age of 7       
                    
  Prosecutions White White Coloured Coloured Bantu Bantu Asian Asian 
1963-64 TOTAL Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Code 148 63 0 2 3 2 14 41 0 0 
Code 149 45 37 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Code 150 29 0 0 17 2 0 0 9 1 
Code 151 92 0 0 0 0 87 5 0 0 
Code 152 7 6 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Code 153 14 14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Code 154 2 933 0 0 217 25 2 461  205 19 6 
Total C1 3 183 57 11 237 29 2 562 251 28 7 
Table of Statistics of Offences and of Penal Institutions          
C1 Murder Statistics for persons over the age of 7       
                    
  Convictions White White Coloured Coloured Bantu Bantu Asian Asian 
1963-64 TOTAL Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Code 148 41 0 0 1 1 9 29 0 0 
Code 149 20 19 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Code 150 15 0 0 9 2 0 0 4 0 
Code 151 45 0 0 0 0 42 3 0 0 
Code 152 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Code 153 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Code 154 844 0 0 65 5 707 59 5 3 





Table 8: Government Published Statistics for the Culpable Homicide Prosecution Rate, 1963-649 
 
Table 9: Government Published Statistics for the Culpable Homicide Conviction Rate, 1963-6410  
                                                             
9 Tabulated from the Statistics of Offences and Penal Institutions, 1963-64. 
10 Ibid. 
Table of Statistics of Offences and of Penal Institutions         
C1 Culpable Homicide Statistics for persons over the age of 
7       
               
  Prosecutions White White Coloured Coloured Bantu Bantu Asian Asian 
1963-64 TOTAL Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Code 143 1 237 606 33 88 2 453 6 48 1 
Code 144 55 45 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Code 145 72 71 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Code 146 19 0 0 2 0 14 2 1 0 
Code 147 1 770 0 0 190 20 1 434 121 5 0 
Total C1 3,153 722 44 280 22 1,901 129 54 1 
Table of Statistics of Offences and of Penal Institutions         
C1 Culpable Homicide Statistics for persons over the age of 
7       
               
  Convictions White White Coloured Coloured Bantu Bantu Asian Asian 
1963-64 TOTAL Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Code 143 563 240 12 42 2 248 3 16 0 
Code 144 19 13 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Code 145 27 27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Code 146 13 0 0 2 0 10 1 0 0 
Code 147 1 391 0 0 171 18 1 108 91 3 0 





Table 10: Government Published Statistics for the Murder Prosecution Rate, 1965-6611 
 




                                                             
11 Tabulated from the Statistics of Offences and Penal Institutions, 1965-66. 
12 Ibid. 
Table of Statistics of Offences and of Penal Institutions          
C1 Murder Statistics for persons over the age of 7       
                    
  Prosecutions White White Coloured Coloured Bantu Bantu Asian Asian 
1965-66 TOTAL Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Code 148 46 1 0 1 6 17 21 0 0 
Code 149 41 38 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Code 150 30 0 0 21 2 0 0 6 1 
Code 151 59 0 0 0 0 56 3 0 0 
Code 152 5 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Code 153 20 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Code 154 4 339 5 0 442 42 3 549 279 25 2 
Total C1 4 540 69 3 464 50 3 622 303 31 3 
Table of Statistics of Offences and of Penal Institutions          
C1 Murder Statistics for persons over the age of 7       
                    
  Convictions White White Coloured Coloured Bantu Bantu Asian Asian 
1965-66 TOTAL Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Code 148 28 0 0 0 3 9 16 0 0 
Code 149 14 13 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Code 150 22 0 0 16 2 0 0 4 0 
Code 151 22 0 0 0 0 21 1 0 0 
Code 152 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Code 153 5 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Code 154 1 375 0 0 139 10 1 144 75 7 0 




Table 12: Government Published Statistics for the Culpable Homicide Prosecution Rate, 1965-6613 
 
Table 13: Government Published Statistics for the Culpable Homicide Conviction Rate, 1965-6614 
 
  
                                                             
13 Tabulated from the Statistics of Offences and Penal Institutions, 1965-66. 
14 Ibid. 
Table of Statistics of Offences and of Penal Institutions       
C1 Culpable Homicide Statistics for persons over the age of 7      
                 
  Prosecutions White White Coloured Coloured Bantu Bantu Asian Asian 
1965-66 TOTAL Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Code 143 178 849 37 150 0 646 15 83 1 
Code 144 64 61 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Code 145 48 47 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Code 146   0 0   0 34 4   0 
Code 147 2 140 0 0 214 24 1 776 115 11 0 
Total C1  2 460 957  41  364  24  2 456  134   94 1  
Table of Statistics of Offences and of Penal Institutions       
C1 Culpable Homicide Statistics for persons over the age of 7      
            
  Convictions White White Coloured Coloured Bantu Bantu Asian Asian 
1965-66 TOTAL Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Code 143 706 264 2 67 0 327 9 26 0 
Code 144 32 30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Code 145 16 16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Code 146 43 0 0 11 0 31 1 0 0 
Code 147 1 582 0 0 198 20 1 262 96 6 0 





Table 14: Government Published Statistics for the Murder Prosecution Rate, 1967-6815 
 
Table 15: Government Published Statistics for the Murder Conviction Rate, 1967-6816 
  
                                                             
15 Tabulated from the Statistics of Offences and Penal Institutions, 1967-68. 
16 Ibid. 
Table of Statistics of Offences and of Penal Institutions          
C1 Murder Statistics for persons over the age of 7       
                    
  Prosecutions White White Coloured Coloured Bantu Bantu Asian Asian 
1967-68 TOTAL Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Code 148 75 1 2 1 5 31 33 1 1 
Code 149 60 52 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Code 150 37 0 0 30 2 0 0 5 0 
Code 151 99 0 0 0 0 96 3 0 0 
Code 152 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Code 153 18 17 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Code 154 4,751 0 0 447 41 3,886 343 30 4 
Total C1 5,043 73 11 478 48 4,013 379 36 5 
Table of Statistics of Offences and of Penal Institutions  
        
C1 Murder Statistics for persons over the age of 7       
                    
  Convictions White White Coloured Coloured Bantu Bantu Asian Asian 
1967-68 TOTAL Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Code 148 34 0 1 0 2 9 21 0 1 
Code 149 20 18 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Code 150 18 0 0 15 0 0 0 3 0 
Code 151 59 0 0 0 0 58 1 0 0 
Code 152 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Code 153 9 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Code 154 1,456 0 0 144 7 1,261 120 12 2 




Table 16: Government Published Statistics for the Culpable Homicide Prosecution Rate, 1967-6817 
 
Table 17: Government Published Statistics for the Culpable Homicide Conviction Rate, 1967-6818 
 
  
                                                             
17 Tabulated from the Statistics of Offences and Penal Institutions, 1967-68. 
18 Ibid. 
Table of Statistics of Offences and of Penal Institutions  
     
C1 Culpable Homicide Statistics for persons over the age of 7      
                 
  Prosecutions White White Coloured Coloured Bantu Bantu Asian Asian 
1967-68 TOTAL Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Code 143 2,245 1,052 47 167 3 814 16 644 75 
Code 144 36 33 3 0 0 0 0 8 0 
Code 145 64 62 2 0 0 0 0 146 0 
Code 146 35 0 0 10 0 23 1 0 0 
Code 147 2,398 0 0 264 35 1,911 178 0 0 
Total C1 4,778 1,147 52 441 38 2,748 195 798 75 
Table of Statistics of Offences and of Penal Institutions  
     
C1 Culpable Homicide Statistics for persons over the age of 7      
                 
  Convictions White White Coloured Coloured Bantu Bantu Asian Asian 
1967-68 TOTAL Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Code 143 934 362 16 88 3 402 11 52 0 
Code 144 21 19 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Code 145 23 23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Code 146 23 0 0 8 0 14 1 0 0 
Code 147 1 800 0 0 235 29 1,387 146 3 0 

























                                                             
19 Tabulated from the Statistics of Offences, 1968-1969 to 1978-1979. 
20 Ibid. 
Table of Statistics of Offences and of Penal Institutions  
C1 Murder Statistics for persons over the age of 7 
          
  Convictions    
1969-70 TOTAL    
Code 148 40    
Code 149 11    
Code 150 6    
Code 151 29    
Code 152 0    
Code 153 5    
Code 154 1,209    
Total C1 1,300    
Table of Statistics of Offences and of Penal Institutions  
C1 Culpable Homicide Statistics for persons over the age of 7 
            
  Convictions     
1969-70 TOTAL     
Code 143 801     
Code 144 23     
Code 145 31     
Code 146 6     
Code 147 1,573     























                                                             
21 Tabulated from the Statistics of Offences, 1968-1969 to 1978-1979. 
22 Ibid. 
Table of Statistics of Offences and of Penal Institutions 
C1 Murder Statistics for persons over the age of 7 
       
  Convictions       
1971-72 TOTAL    
Code 148 20    
Code 149 24    
Code 150 3    
Code 151 31    
Code 152 3    
Code 153 7    
Code 154 1,065    
Total C1 1,153    
Table of Statistics of Offences and of Penal Institutions  
C1 Culpable Homicide Statistics for persons over the age of 7 
            
  Convictions     
1969-70 TOTAL     
Code 143 1,150     
Code 144 26     
Code 145 36     
Code 146 25     
Code 147 2,422     
























                                                             
23 Tabulated from the Statistics of Offences, 1968-1969 to 1978-1979. 
24 Ibid. 
Table of Statistics of Offences and of Penal Institutions 
C1 Murder Statistics for persons over the age of 7 
          
  Convictions    
1973-74 TOTAL    
Code 148 29    
Code 149 23    
Code 150 4    
Code 151 27    
Code 152 1    
Code 153 12    
Code 154 1,367    
Total C1 1,463    
Table of Statistics of Offences and of Penal Institutions  
C1 Culpable Homicide Statistics for persons over the age of 7 
            
  Convictions     
1969-70 TOTAL     
Code 143 1,060     
Code 144 27     
Code 145 40     
Code 146 36     
Code 147 2,430     























                                                             
25 Tabulated from the Statistics of Offences, 1968-1969 to 1978-1979. 
26 Ibid. 
Table of Statistics of Offences and of Penal Institutions 
C1 Murder Statistics for persons over the age of 7 
          
  Convictions    
1975-76 TOTAL    
Code 148 22    
Code 149 18    
Code 150 16    
Code 151 56    
Code 152 1    
Code 153 12    
Code 154 1,655    
Total C1 1,780    
Table of Statistics of Offences and of Penal Institutions  
C1 Culpable Homicide Statistics for persons over the age of 7 
            
  Convictions     
1969-70 TOTAL     
Code 143 1,304     
Code 144 34     
Code 145 54     
Code 146 83     
Code 147 2,632     









Code: Explanation:       
143 Culpable homicide as a result of driving a vehicle 
144 Culpable homicide: White by White   
145 Culpable homicide: Non-white by White   
146 Culpable homicide: White by Non-white   
147 Culpable Homicide: Non-white by Non-white 
From 1979-80 Murder With a 
Firearm:           
148 Murder as a result of Infanticide   
149 Murder: White by White      
150 Murder: White by Coloured or Asiatic   
151 Murder: White by Bantu     
152 Murder: Murder: Coloured by Asiatic or White 
153 Murder: Bantu by White      
154 Murder: Non-white by Non-white   
From 1979-80 Murder with another weapon:     
155 White by White       
156 White by Coloured or Asian     
157 White by Black       
158 Coloured or Asian by White     
159 Black by White       





Graphs of the Prosecution and Conviction rate of Murder and Murder related cases for 
1964-1976 
 











Graph 2: Prosecution and Conviction rate, 196528 
 
  
                                                             
27 Tabulated from KAB CSC 1/1/1/581-627, Cape Supreme Court Records, 1964. 
































Prosecution and Conviction Rate 1965

















Graph 4: Prosecution and Conviction rate, 196730 
  
                                                             
29 Tabulated from KAB CSC 1/1/1/731-856, Cape Supreme Court Records, 1966. 
































Prosecution and Conviction rate 1966































Prosecution and Conviction rate 1967














Graph 6: Prosecution and Conviction rate, 196932 
 
  
                                                             
31 Tabulated from KAB CSC 1/1/1/982-1152, Cape Supreme Court Records, 1968. 































prosecution and conviction rate 1968































Prosecution and Conviction rate 1969















Graph 8: Prosecution and Conviction rate, 197134 
 
  
                                                             
33 Tabulated from KAB CSC 1/1/1/1328-1511, Cape Supreme Court Records, 1970. 































Prosecution and Conviction rate 1971






























Prosecution and Conviction rate 1970
















Graph 10: Prosecution and Conviction rate, 197336 
 
  
                                                             
35 Tabulated from KAB CSC 1/1/1/1714-1910, Cape Supreme Court Records, 1972. 































Prosecution and Conviction rate 1972

































Prosecution and Conviction rate 1973
















Graph 12: Prosecution and Conviction rate, 197538 
 
  
                                                             
37 Tabulated from KAB CSC 1/1/1/2166-2319, Cape Supreme Court Records, 1974. 
































Prosecution and Conviction rate 1974



































Prosecution and Conviction rate 1975
















Defendants sent for Mental Health Evaluation, 1964-197640 
 
 
                                                             
39 Tabulated from KAB CSC 1/1/1/2580-2714, Cape Supreme Court Records, 1976. 
40 Tabulated from KAB CSC 1/1/1/581-2714, Cape Supreme Court Records, 1964-1976. 
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PROSECUTIONS 1976 CONVICTIONS 1976
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
